Hart v Finnis: How will Positivism and Natural Law Account for the Socio-Legal Paradigm in Wikipedia by CHEN, Siyuan
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
2011
Hart v Finnis: How will Positivism and Natural Law
Account for the Socio-Legal Paradigm in
Wikipedia
Siyuan CHEN
Singapore Management University, siyuanchen@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
CHEN, Siyuan. Hart v Finnis: How will Positivism and Natural Law Account for the Socio-Legal Paradigm in Wikipedia. (2011).
1-79. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1038
  - 1 -
Hart v Finnis: How Will Positivism and Natural Law Account for the Socio-Legal 




I. Overview and schematic layout 
 
“Imagine a world in which every single person on the planet is given free access 
to the sum of all human knowledge. That’s what we’re doing.”1  
 
There is little doubt that Wikipedia is one of the world’s most influential websites today – 
and its sphere of influence is set to grow in days to come.2 The evidence for this is strong. 
As of December 2010, Wikipedia is the internet’s 6th most popular website (by virtue of 
the Alexa Traffic Rank),3 and it is also the most popular “general reference” site in 
cyberspace,4 with almost 4 million articles in the English language edition.5 It has been 
and will continue to be the flagship of Web 2.0,6 with every single edit being potentially 
scrutinised by a global audience, and it is well on its way to becoming the world’s largest 
repository of knowledge and most consulted resource.7 Anyone who has any decent 
amount of experience using the internet will know that searching for anything on the 
internet via popular search engines such as Google, Bing or Yahoo! will almost 
invariably result in Wikipedia entries being ranked among the top 5 hits;8 as a result, 
anybody who has access to the internet would very likely have used Wikipedia in one 
                                                 
* LL.B. (National University of Singapore, First Class Honours); LL.M. (Harvard University); Assistant 
Professor, Singapore Management University Faculty of Law. I wish to express my thanks and gratitude to 
Professor Scott Brewer for emboldening me and agreeing to supervise this piece of work. All errors 
(stylistic or substantive), however, remain my own. I also wish to dedicate this endeavour to my family, 
Eunice and her family, my teachers and my students. Above all, to God be the glory.  
1 Jimmy Wales, co-founder and de facto leader of Wikipedia, presenting his vision of a cyber utopia: see 
Rob Miller, “Wikipedia Founder Jimmy Wales Responds”, Slashdot, July 28, 2004. 
2 See e.g., Time’s Person of the Year: You – TIME, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1569514,00.html (last visited December 24, 2010). As 
Wikipedians explain it (befittingly) in Wikipedia – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia (last visited December 24, 2010): “When Time 
magazine recognized “You” as its Person of the Year for 2006, acknowledging the accelerating success of 
online collaboration and interaction by millions of users around the world, it cited Wikipedia as one of 
several examples of Web 2.0 services, along with YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook.”  
3 See Wikipedia.org: Traffic details – Alexa, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/wikipedia.org (last visited 
December 5, 2010). Alexa states that “The rank is calculated using a combination of average daily visitors 
and pageviews over the past 3 months. The site with the highest combination of visitors and pageviews is 
ranked #1.” 
4 See Top Sites by Category: Reference – Alexa, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/Reference 
(last visited December 24, 2010).  
5 See Statistics – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:Statistics (last 
visited December 24, 2010). The rate of growth is likely to be slower as compared to 2007 through 2009, 
but it will not be surprising to see the total exceed 4 million within a couple of years. 
6 See Tim O’Reilly and John Battelle, “Web Squared: Web 2.0 Five Years On”, (2009) Web 2.0 Summit 
White Paper. 
7 As is popularly opined, it will be a “first port of call” for all manner of research projects, including the 
subject of law. 
8 See Andrew Dalby, The World and Wikipedia, (2009), at 82 to 83. 
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way or another.9 And it is not uncommon for us to chance upon exceptionally well 
written and referenced articles with outstanding detail and scope.10 However, while 
everybody may be familiar with what Wikipedia is in a very general sense, not everybody 
is necessarily well acquainted with how Wikipedia actually governs itself – an 
increasingly complex society in cyberspace, as it were,11 with almost 100,000 “active 
contributors” from around the world working on the project,12 and hundreds of thousands 
of other unidentifiable or casual editors contributing hundreds of thousand edits on a 
daily basis as well. Specifically, one has to realise that for an international community of 
editors to build up the world’s largest encyclopedia effectively, a comprehensive array of 
internal regulations needs to be constantly designed (principally by the editors no less), 
refined (just like any other article in the encyclopedia), and adhered to, and indeed this is 
a very nuanced process that has been ongoing – and will continue to take place. This 
point is particularly significant, bearing in mind that Wikipedia by and large holds true to 
its widely known mantra as being “the free encyclopedia” that anyone is able to edit,13 at 
any place,14 and at any point in time.15 From the aforementioned realisation, a whole host 
of potentially intriguing socio-legal issues emerge.  
                                                 
9 As of December 2009, Alexa records that some 10% of “global internet users… visit wikipedia.org”: 
supra, Alexa, note 3.  
10 See Wikipedia: Featured articles – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Fa (last visited December 24, 2010). 
11 See generally, infra, The Future of the Internet, note 26. This is also partly a personal attestation. Having 
been an active contributor to the encyclopedia since June 2005 – editing and writing articles, and uploading 
and sharing photographs – I am rather familiar with many of the processes of Wikipedia, and have 
observed a wide spectrum of behavioural and interactive patterns to come to this conclusion. For a number 
of years now, I have been placed in the top 300 in the world for total number of edits made with over 
50,000. I have also uploaded hundreds of pictures unto Wikimedia Commons, written dozens of “Good 
Articles” (see Wikipedia: Good articles – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Ga (last visited December 24, 2010)) and 
“Featured Articles” (id), and have received numerous “barn stars” (see Wikipedia: Barnstars – Wikipedia, 
the free Encyclopedia, https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Barnstar (last visited 
December 24, 2010)) – unofficial marks of achievements – for my contributions (see User: Chensiyuan – 
Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/User:Chensiyuan/About 
(last visited December 24, 2010)). 
12 See Wikipedia Statistics – Tables – Active Wikipedians – Wikimedia, 
http://stats.wikimedia.org/EN/TablesWikipediansEditsGt5.htm (last visited December 24, 2010). 
13 For a collation of the criticisms levelled against this concept, see Criticism of Wikipedia – Wikipedia, the 
free Encyclopedia, https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Criticism_of_Wikipedia (last visited 
December 24, 2010). Former Britannica Online editor-in-chief Robert McHenry once remarked, “The user 
who visits Wikipedia to learn about some subject, to confirm some matter of fact, is rather in the position of 
a visitor to a public restroom. It may be obviously dirty, so that he knows to exercise great care, or it may 
seem fairly clean, so that he may be lulled into a false sense of security. What he certainly does not know is 
who has used the facilities before him.”: see The Faith-Based Encyclopedia – University of Rochester, 
Department of Computer Science, http://www.cs.rochester.edu/~vandurme/misc/wikipedia_comment.html 
(last visited December 24, 2010).  
14 Even China – one of the last bastions to prevent access to Wikipedia – has recently lifted its ban on 
Wikipedia. For a comprehensive historical survey of China’s cyclical lifting and restoration of its bans, see 
Blocking of Wikipedia by the People’s Republic of China – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia,  
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Blocking_of_Wikipedia_by_the_People%27s_Republic_of
_China (last visited December 24, 2010). 
15 See Reliability of Wikipedia – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Reliability_of_Wikipedia (last visited December 24, 2010). 
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To elaborate on what I mean: key to Wikipedia’s success (in terms of the scale and depth 
of the project and its current web presence) has been its intricate web of guidelines, 
ethical norms, philosophies, policies, rules, precedents, sanctions, administrative 
procedures, and dispute resolution and adjudication mechanisms (for convenience, I will 
refer to these entities in this paper collectively as “regulations”)16 that govern how editors 
and administrators should edit, provide input on policies, shift balances of power, behave, 
and interact with each other. A safe prediction will be that this intricate web will only 
become even more intricate as Wikipedia forges ahead to increase its encyclopedic 
legitimacy.17 Necessarily, from a socio-legal viewpoint, a question of tremendous interest 
is why should these regulations be binding, without exception, on editors who – given 
that Wikipedia is what I describe as essentially an evolving microcosm of an international 
community,18 or more boldly, a multicultural society constantly mutating in the strong 
sense of the word – come from different backgrounds and have different values and 
beliefs? Then there are even more precise questions: how, and why is it that certain 
regulations have the elevated status of enforceable rules, and some are merely general 
guidelines;19 what is the normative basis of the mandate bestowed upon administrators to 
govern other editors, since Wikipedia is not a democracy20 (but predicated on the rather 
elusive and abused  concept of consensus)21 and yet administrators are in effect “voted” 
in;22 can arbitration hearings (for resolving serious disputes between users) be conducted 
                                                 
16 For a quick overview of the regulatory and administrative structure, see Wikipedia: Editorial oversight 
and control – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Editorial_oversight_and_control (last visited 
December 24, 2010). 
17 See e.g., Wikipedia: Flagged protection and patrolled revisions – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Flagged_protection_and_patrolled_revisions (last visited December 
24, 2010); but cf, Wikipedia: Why stable versions – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Why_stable_versions (last visited December 24, 
2010). Larry Sanger, the co-founder of Wikipedia, created Citizendium as a response to the purported 
unreliability of Wikipedia: see http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Welcome_to_Citizendium (last visited 
December 24, 2010). Incidentally, there was a lot of community rhetoric raised recently against the 
implementation of flagged revisions in the English version of Wikipedia. The German Wikipedia has an 
even more sophisticated system in the form of “trust” ratings. 
18 Consider too, that if Wikipedia stays on course to become the world’s de facto number one repository of 
all human knowledge, will it assume the structure of definitive international, non-governmental legal 
regimes? For instance, the International Olympic Committee, by virtue of the Olympic Charter, through its 
creation and rendering of rules, by-laws and decisions, has become an autonomous regime governing the 
relevant sports world and are even given effect as such by governments. Indeed, the advent of cyberspace 
has created many pockets of private, self-contained, self-governed and ethics-driven enclaves such as 
internet forums and user review-related websites. It is submitted that none of them, however, match the sort 
of social and quasi-legal nuances and depth found in Wikipedia. 
19 See e.g., Wikipedia: Policies and guidelines – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:PG (last visited December 24, 2010). 
20 See Wikipedia: What Wikipedia is not – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:What_Wikipedia_is_not (last visited December 
24, 2010). 
21 See Wikipedia: Consensus – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Consensus (last visited December 24, 2010). 
22 See Wikipedia: Requests for adminship – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_adminship (last visited December 
24, 2010). 
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fairly in cyberspace;23 how and why do new norms even come into existence and how 
and why are they modified; and last but not least, why, in the first place, and assuming 
that they have the choice, do editors obey the regulations? And the list of questions 
continues.  
 
This paper therefore humbly endeavours – an attempt unprecedented in the legal 
academic context it seems – to examine, from a jurisprudential or legal theory viewpoint, 
how and why regulations made and adhered to in Wikipedia are made and adhered to by 
Wikipedians.24 Even though Wikipedia is not intuitively associated with a “conventional” 
legal system with a keen focus on traditional judicial elements that govern “society” as is 
popularly conceived (an association that is probably the progeny of orthodox legal 
theory),25 it is still highly plausible and indeed purposeful to examine Wikipedia’s system 
of rules (that have a technical aspect and a social aspect – the former governing editing 
and the latter governing behaviour), enforcement measures and adjudication devices 
within the context of the larger and ever enigmatic questions, “What is law?” or “What is 
the nature of law?”, both of which are also connected to the question of “What exactly 
causes people to obey the law?” Can any legal theory possibly come close to answering 
these questions? 
 
Proceeding on that basis, this paper will consider whether the legal theories proffered by 
the proponents of positivism and the proponents of natural law square with the quasi-
legal paradigm found in Wikipedia.26 In the interests of focus, greater attention will be 
accorded to H.L.A. Hart and John Finnis. These two philosophers have been chosen 
because they represent, in my opinion, an excellent modern sampling of views that 
                                                 
23 See Wikipedia: Arbitration – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Arbitration (last visited December 24, 2010); 
and Wikipedia: Arbitration Committee – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Arbcom (last visited December 24, 2010). 
24 A “Wikipedian” is defined, for the purposes of this paper, as any user who attempts or successfully 
makes an edit to the encyclopedia.   
25 See e.g., H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (1994) at 17: “For [the purpose of this book] is not to provide 
a definition of law, in the sense of a rule by reference to which the correctness of the use of the word can be 
tested; it is to advance legal theory by providing an improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a 
municipal legal system and a better understanding of the resemblances and differences between law, 
coercion, and morality, as types of social phenomena.” (emphasis added); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 
(1986) at 407: “The courts are the capitals of law’s empire, and judges are its princes” (emphasis added); 
and John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (1980) at 148: “We can certainly speak intelligibly and 
usefully of law of some lesser group, even of a gang. But, as the common understanding of the unqualified 
expressions of ‘law’ and ‘the law’ indicates, the central case of law and legal system is the law and legal 
system of a complete community. That is why it is characteristic of legal systems that… they claim 
authority to regulate all forms of human behaviour… they therefore claim to be the supreme authority for 
their respective community, and to regulate the conditions under which the members of that community can 
participate in any other normative system or association…” (emphasis added). 
26 See e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet – and How to Stop it, (2008) at 143: “Wikipedia – 
with the cooperation of many Wikipedians – has developed a system of self-governance that has many 
indicia of the rule of law without heavy reliance on outside authority or boundary… [its] structure is a 
natural form of what constitutionalists would call subsidiarity: centralized, “higher” forms of dispute 
resolution are reserved for special cases, while day-to-day work and decisions are undertaken in small, 
“local” groups [footnote omitted]. Decisions are made by those closest to the issues, preventing the lengthy, 
top-down processes of hierarchical systems.”    
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demonstrate two principal competing schools in legal theory,27 viz., positivism and 
natural law.28 Very broadly speaking, the gist of each philosopher’s theory can be 
condensed, respectively, as law being a system of primary and secondary rules, with a 
particular premium placed on the internal point of view, critical reflective attitude and 
rule of recognition (Hart’s “soft” version of positivism); and law as a system preferably 
governed by, or reflective of the “common good” or constitution of a worthwhile life, 
brought to bear by the 7 (or 8, if we include “work”) basic goods29 and 9 basic 
requirements of practical reasonableness30 (Finnis’ “restatement” of classical natural 
law).  
 
This paper will analyse the salient features, strengths and weaknesses of the claims of 
each legal theory vis-à-vis this peculiar, yet familiar phenomenon which we know as 
Wikipedia; and much as Hart and Finnis have placed certain limits on the reach of their 
theories,31 this paper will attempt to conclude as to which theory is more successful at 
providing a universal (and therefore complete) account of what law is.32 It bears 
repeating, therefore, that an overarching presupposition of this paper is that Wikipedia 
represents some sort of society that is governed by some manner of law (i.e., an 
acceptable approximation of a legal system). Where appropriate, there will be occasional 
recourse to other legal philosophers involved in the positivism and natural law divide; 
just as well, there will also be references to relevant sociological studies – studies that 
may or may not have some explanatory effect on human behaviour in this context. 
Finally, while a paper premised on relatively unchartered waters will necessarily be 
incomplete and disarmed of the benefit of literary precedence, it is hoped that this paper 
will form the foundations of deeper studies into avant-garde, content- and norm-
generative societies (such as Wikipedia) that transcend time and physical boundaries.   
                                                 
27 That there even exists a dichotomy between positivism and natural law, has, of course, been disputed by 
several jurisprudence scholars: see e.g., Brian Bix, “On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law Theory 
and Legal Positivism”, (2000) 75 Notre Dame Law Review 1613; and W.J. Waluchow, “The Many Faces 
of Legal Positivism”, (1998) 48 University of Toronto Law Journal 387 at 388. There are those, of course, 
who prefer to see the real dichotomy (at least from the Anglo-American viewpoint) as between 
Hart/Dworkin or Hart/Raz: see e.g., Brian Leiter, “Has Law Moral Foundations?”, (2003) 48 American 
Journal of Jurisprudence 17 at 17 to 19. Then there are even those believe Finnis is actually more rightly 
classified as a positivist: see e.g., Tan Seow Hon, “Validity and Obligation in Natural Law Theory: Does 
Finnis Come too Close to Positivism?”, (2003-2003) 15 Regent University Law Review 195 at 221.  
28 See e.g., Cristóbal Orrego, “H.L.A. Hart’s Understanding of Classical Natural Law Theory”, (2004) 24 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 287; and Kent Greenawalt, “How Persuasive is Natural Law Theory?”, 
(2000) 75 Notre Dame Law Review 647.  
29 Life; knowledge; play; aesthetic experience; sociability or friendship; practical reasonableness; and 
religion. 
30 Active pursuit of goods; coherent life plan; no arbitrary preference among values; no arbitrary preference 
among persons; detachment and commitment; efficiency within reason; respect for every basic value in 
every act; requirements of the common good; and following one’s conscience.  
31 But, as will be elaborated in the sections detailing their theories, their intended reach of their theories 
remain considerably wide. 
32 As a minor prefatory remark, there are at least two aspects of the system of regulations in Wikipedia that 
render it an atypical legal (but nevertheless legal) institution: (a) affairs are for all intents and purposes 
conducted entirely in cyberspace; and (b) it cannot be said that the conventional model of separating the 
legislature, executive and judiciary, insofar as creating, interpreting and enforcing the regulations are 
concerned, is clearly used. It is submitted that the consequence of these two aspects, however, are minor or 
tangential to the discussion at hand. 
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Having provided an overview of this paper, it will now be timely for me to set out the 
framework of the task at hand: 
 


































The hypothetical of James Williams the Harvard quarterback and Mary 
the ardent fan: getting a grasp of a Wikipedia article’s chronology – 
from creation to management 
 
James Williams does not exist on Wikipedia 
Mary has a little stab 
The gatekeepers come crashing 
Richard crosses swords 
Vandalism; reversion; conflict of interest; illegality; harassment; threat 
of suit 
The attempt to disrobe Max of administrator privileges: lacuna in the 








Recap: classification of terms and concepts concerning the creation and 























The principal claims of H.L.A. Hart 
 
Objectives and dismantling John Austin 
Union of primary and secondary rules 
The rule of recognition and the two minimum conditions of a legal 
system 
Minimum content of natural law 
Distinguishing between justice and morality, and law and morality 


















The principal claims of John Finnis 
 
Justification of self-evidence 
Unjust laws as laws? 
The 7 basic goods necessary for human flourishing 














Analysing the claims vis-à-vis the world of Wikipedia 
 











The different types of rules for community living 
Authority and obedience 
Lawmaking  










Part I has been covered above. In Part II, we will get up to speed with the ins and outs of 
Wikipedia by examining a hypothetical situation in which a new user creates a new 
article, and subsequently interacts with other users in a variety of ways vis-à-vis the 
management of the article. In Part III, we will consolidate and classify all the regulations 
that we have encountered in the hypothetical. After we have gotten a flavour of the 
potential jurisprudential issues through the hypothetical narrative (which in itself can 
only be a limited representation of the many socio-legal facets of Wikipedia) and the 
taxonomical table, we will look briefly at, without over-simplifying, the principal claims 
made by H.L.A. Hart (Part IV), followed by John Finnis (Part V). It is hoped that this will 
create the necessary platforms prior to us “connecting the dots” between the two legal 
theories and the various facets of the socio-legal paradigm of Wikipedia explored in Part 
VI. Concluding remarks will naturally reside in the final part, Part VII. 
 
II. The hypothetical of James Williams the Harvard quarterback and Mary the 
ardent fan: getting a grasp of a Wikipedia article’s chronology – from 
creation to management 
 
“As time goes on, the rules and informal policies on Wikipedia tend to become 
less and less plastic and harder and harder to change.”33 
 
Regardless of one’s degree of familiarity with Wikipedia, it will be a useful exercise for 
the purposes of this paper to sketch out the general chronological processes involved 
when a new Wikipedia entry is created, beginning from the very first edit of the article to 
the subsequent management of the article created. Obviously, not all processes (and 
regulations) can be canvassed, but this exercise should still allow us to have a good sense 
of where the social, ethical and legal issues may possibly arise, and for the more 
adventurous, preconceive how these issues may be resolved in jurisprudential terms. 
Indeed, a general pattern may arguably be discerned in that the longer an article stays in 
existence and is debated, the greater the recourse is to rules and (later on) quasi-legal 
precepts – all of which are animated by community norms. To create an even greater 
verisimilitude (and hence greater understanding) of these processes, I will employ the 
                                                 
33 Mark Pellegrini, better known as “Raul654” – Wikipedia administrator, bureaucrat, oversighter, 
checkuserer, arbitrator emeritus (all terms explained in due course) and one of the most influential 
personnel on Wikipedia, proclaiming the somewhat counter-intuitive “Law #7” (given that Wikipedia is 
synonymous with maximum fluidity): see User:Raul654/Raul’s laws – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/User:Raul654/Raul%27s_laws (last visited December 24, 
2010). 
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device of the hypothetical.34 Much as it will soon become clear that I will need to urge 
you to indulge me with my fictitious conjurations in the following pages, the portrayal of 
the events in terms of community reactions and interactions are not far removed from 
actual daily happenings on Wikipedia. Where necessary, some of the major events 
happening in the hypothetical will be elaborated in subsequent parts of the paper; and 
where appropriate, I have also incorporated concise summaries in the footnotes 
accompanying the hypothetical to briefly explain the content and the application of the 
regulations invoked.  
 
(a) James Williams does not exist on Wikipedia 
 
Let us suppose we wish to create an entry on a person named James Williams. A quick 
search on Wikipedia will reveal that there are more than 20 people named James 
Williams who have a Wikipedia article written on them35 (the nuts and bolts of the 
disambiguation process ought to be reserved for another time)36 – but none of them are 
about the James Williams that we are looking for. As it were, our hypothetical James 
Williams was a statewide sensation when he turned out for his high school football team 
as the starting quarterback. However, because he comes from a small town in a relatively 
small state, his star is not shining as brightly as it should be for the moment – so, as 
popular culture dictates, he does not yet have a Wikipedia entry on him. Still, not long 
after being admitted into Harvard University, his rise to prominence begins. After playing 
just a couple of preseason games for the Crimsons, word has spread around campus about 
James Williams’ game: his superb decision-making and throwing abilities have made him 
an instant favourite. National Football League (“NFL”) scouts reportedly begin to 
traverse the country to watch James Williams in action and the internet college football 
forums are abuzz about Williams’ prospects in the 2011 NFL Draft; netizens from 
Williams’ town have even audaciously declared the 2011 draft to be the “Williams 
Sweepstakes”. Some of his fans then use the Wikipedia search as a barometer of his 
fame, only to discover that James Williams the Harvard quarterback is not documented in 
any way whatsoever by what is now undisputedly acclaimed as the world’s largest 
encyclopedia.37 
 
(b)  Mary has a little stab 
 
Still, amongst his legions of fans, only one fan (let us call her Mary; and let us further 
make her a Harvard Law School freshman) has found the impetus to attempt to write the 
name of James Williams the Harvard quarterback into posterity (or so she thinks), i.e., the 
                                                 
34 It may be said that to this end, I am to some degree taking a leaf out of Professor Duncan Kennedy’s 
methodology in Duncan Kennedy, “Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology”, 
(1986) 36 Journal of Legal Education 518. 
35 See James Williams – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/James_Williams (last visited December 24, 2010). 
36 For now, however, see Wikipedia: Disambiguation – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Disambiguation (last visited December 24, 
2010); and infra, note 47. 
37 See Wikipedia: Size comparisons – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Size_comparisons (last visited December 24, 2010). 
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chronicles of Wikipedia. She, like pretty much any other netizen who has used 
Wikipedia, does not have a clue how to actually edit it. Nevertheless, with an 
autographed poster of James Williams in hand, she is filled with a newfound sense of 
courage and decides to make her maiden edit on Wikipedia. Realising that it is not a 
requirement to register as a user to make edits,38 Mary decides that she will edit under the 
identity of an IP address.39 She is then directed to a couple of pages where she is greeted 
with what seems to be friendly advice on how to get started,40 and that one of the “five 
pillars” of Wikipedia is the exhortation to editors to “be bold” and simply edit away.41 
She does not fail to notice that there is a whole litany of purported guidelines and policies 
that spell out in considerable detail how and what she should write when creating a new 
article, but Mary is overwhelmed by zeal and ignores them for the time being. She recalls 
vaguely though, that as she is writing an encyclopedic “biography of a living person”, she 
needs to write from a neutral point of view, provide verifiable sources, avoid original 
research, and avoid making defamatory edits.42 But she also recalls that rules can be 
                                                 
38 See Wikipedia: Why create an account? – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Why_create_an_account%3F (last visited 
December 24, 2010). 
39 See Wikipedia: Editors should be logged in users – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Editors_should_be_logged_in_users (last visited 
December 24, 2010). 
40 See Wikipedia: Your first article – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Your_first_article (last visited December 24, 
2010). 
41 See Wikipedia: Five pillars – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Five_pillars (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Wikipedia does not have firm rules besides the five general principles presented here. Be bold in updating 
articles and do not worry about making mistakes. Your efforts do not need to be perfect; because prior 
versions are saved by default, no damage you might do is irreparable.”; and Wikipedia: Be bold – 
Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Be_bold (last 
visited December 24, 2010). 
42 See Wikipedia: Biographies of living persons Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Blp (last visited December 24, 2010): “Editors 
must take particular care adding “biographical material about a living person”' to any Wikipedia page. Such 
material requires a high degree of sensitivity, and must adhere strictly to all applicable laws in the United 
States and to all of our content policies, especially: 
• Neutral point of view 
• Verifiability 
• No original research 
We must get the article right. Be very firm about the use of high quality references. Material about living 
persons that is unsourced or poorly sourced – whether the material is negative, positive, or just questionable 
– should be removed immediately and without waiting for discussion. Biographies of living persons must 
be written conservatively, with regard for the subject’s privacy. Wikipedia is an encyclopedia, not a tabloid 
paper; it is not our job to be sensationalist, or to be the primary vehicle for the spread of titillating claims 
about people's lives. The possibility of harm to living subjects is one of the important factors to be 
considered when exercising editorial judgment. This policy applies equally to biographies of living persons 
and to biographical material about living persons on other pages.  The burden of evidence for any edit on 
Wikipedia rests with the person who adds or restores material, and this is especially true for material 
regarding living persons.  Therefore, an editor should be able to demonstrate that such material complies 
with all Wikipedia content policies and guidelines.” 
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ignored on the encyclopedia if it fulfills some abstract notion of common sense or 
community consensus.43 
 
After an hour or so, Mary has created a 1,000 word draft write-up on her idol using the 
“sandbox”,44 replete with superlative descriptions such as “James Williams is widely 
considered as the next football star to redefine the game” and “many scouts agree that 
James Williams possesses a vision unparalleled by anyone who has ever played the 
game”. Despite her initial suspicion that the article might be toned down by other editors, 
she is convinced that she has provided enough sources to verify the claims stated.45 
Satisfied with her draft, Mary attempts to submit her edit, but realises that unregistered 
users can only make edits and not create new articles.46 She quickly creates a random 
account and submits the edit; in an instant, the article on “James Williams (Harvard 
quarterback)”47 is born. While Mary is content with her achievement, elsewhere, the 
creation of this article is noticed by other users who frequently patrol a page that lists all 
recently created new articles.48  
 
(c) The gatekeepers come crashing 
 
A number of these users proceed to examine the contents of the page in question: one of 
them immediately call into question the notability49 of this particular James Williams and 
                                                 
43 This will be made clearer as the hypothetical develops. 
44 See Wikipedia: Sandbox – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Sandbox (last visited December 24, 2010). 
45 See Wikipedia: Verifiability – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Verifiability (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“The threshold for inclusion in Wikipedia is verifiability, not truth – that is, whether readers are able to 
check that material added to Wikipedia has already been published by a reliable source, not whether we 
think it is true. Editors should provide a reliable source for quotations and for any material that is 
challenged or likely to be challenged, or the material may be removed.” 
46 See Wikipedia: Why create an account – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:SIGNUP (last visited December 24, 2010). 
47 See Wikipedia: Naming conventions (people) – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Naming_conventions_%28people%29 (last 
visited December 24, 2010).   
48 See New Pages – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Special:NewPages (last visited December 24, 2010). 
49 See Wikipedia: Notability – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Notability (last visited December 24, 2010): “If 
a topic has received significant coverage in reliable sources that are independent of the subject, it is 
presumed to satisfy the inclusion criteria for a stand-alone article. 
• “Significant coverage” means that sources address the subject directly in detail, and no original 
research is needed to extract the content. Significant coverage is more than a trivial mention but it 
need not be the main topic of the source material. 
• “Reliable” means sources need editorial integrity to allow verifiable evaluation of notability, per 
the reliable source guideline. Sources may encompass published works in all forms and media. 
Availability of secondary sources covering the subject is a good test for notability.  
• “Sources”, for notability purposes, should be secondary sources, as those provide the most 
objective evidence of notability. The number and nature of reliable sources needed varies 
depending on the depth of coverage and quality of the sources. Multiple sources are generally 
preferred.  
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raises this issue on the article’s “talk page” (a separate page for users to discuss various 
aspects of the article); another finds the flowery prose and positive bias unacceptable and 
slaps a “tag” at the top of the article,50 indicating that the neutrality policy has been 
contravened.51 Within a couple of hours, the attention of a bunch of other seasoned 
editors have been called to the article, and one of them, after performing a series of 
searches on the major search engines (and an internal search on the internal links to the 
article), decides to nominate the article for “deletion” over “proposed deletion”52 and 
“speedy deletion”53 on the basis that the subject matter does not satisfy the “notability” 
criterion to warrant inclusion in Wikipedia. Over the next 7 days, interested editors 
debate on whether the article should be kept or deleted. Some express the belief that the 
sole problem with the article is that its style of writing is too biased; the majority, 
however – despite some of them having heard of Williams before – express concerns 
about the purported notability of James Williams, for the only sources used in the article 
are internet college football forums, and a single op-ed piece on The Harvard Crimson, 
which are hardly compelling secondary sources of information to establish the notability 
of a subject matter.54 Almost all of the editors notice that the creator of the article has had 
only 1 edit to her name thus far,55 although not all of them openly make this comment. 
 
Mary – who has been too busy with readings for her classes at Harvard Law School to 
monitor the developments on the page – will go on to discover to her dismay that she can 
                                                                                                                                                 
• “Independent of the subject” excludes works produced by those affiliated with the subject 
including (but not limited to): self-publicity, advertising, self-published material by the subject, 
autobiographies, press releases, etc.  
• “Presumed” means that substantive coverage in reliable sources establishes a presumption, not a 
guarantee, that a subject is suitable for inclusion. Editors may reach a consensus that although a 
topic meets this criterion, it is not appropriate for a standalone article. For example, such an article 
may violate what Wikipedia is not. 
A topic for which this criterion is deemed to have been met by consensus, is usually worthy of notice, and 
satisfies one of the criteria for a stand-alone article in the encyclopedia. Verifiable facts and content not 
supported by multiple independent sources may be appropriate for inclusion within another article.” 
50 See Wikipedia: Tagging pages for problems – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Tagging_pages_for_problems (last visited December 24, 2010); and 
Wikipedia: Tags – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Tags (last 
visited December 24, 2010). 
51 See Wikipedia: Neutral point of view – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view (last visited December 
24, 2010): “Neutral point of view (NPOV) is a fundamental Wikimedia principle and a cornerstone of 
Wikipedia. All Wikipedia articles and other encyclopedic content must be written from a neutral point of 
view, representing fairly, and as far as possible without bias, all significant views that have been published 
by reliable sources. This is non-negotiable and expected of all articles and all editors.” 
52 See Wikipedia: Proposed deletion – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Proposed_deletion (last visited December 24, 
2010). 
53 See Wikipedia: Criteria for speedy deletion – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Criteria_for_speedy_deletion (last visited 
December 24, 2010). 
54 See Wikipedia: Reliable sources – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia,  
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Reliable_sources (last visited December 24, 
2010). 
55 See Help: User contributions – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Contributions (last visited December 24, 2010). 
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no longer find her fruit of labour on Wikipedia. It turns out that the outcome of the 
deletion discussion was “delete”, with 12 editors voting to delete the article, 1 preferring 
to express a “neutral” opinion, and 3 voting to “keep” the article. The consequence of this 
“community consensus”56 meant that the article was completely purged less than a week 
after it was created. Mary does a little detective work and discovers that 6 of these editors 
hail from Yale Law School – as proclaimed on their “user pages”57 – and concludes it is 
probably no coincidence that they have descended upon this deletion discussion. She is 
understandably indignant about this and attempts to restore the article by recreating an 
entry under her first user name. As she does this, she is confronted with the message 
“You are recreating a page that was previously deleted” – Wikipedia had kept a log of the 
article’s deletion history,58 and the message served to deter editors from starting another 
deletion debate for no good reason. After examining the deletion log, Mary surmises that 
if she can include a couple more “legitimate” citations and references, the article may get 
to stay. She uses her law school research tools and navigates through the databases 
containing archives of the regional newspapers, and she manages to find a bunch of short 
articles in The Boston Globe and Boston Herald that make references to James Williams. 
After incorporating these articles into the entry, Mary, imbued with a stronger belief that 
this must surely pass the test of notability, recreates the article on “James Williams 
(Harvard quarterback)”. She then realises that she has made a typographical error, but 
acting on a moment of impulse, she logs out, makes the correction edit, and in the edit 
summary field,59 Mary relies on her double anonymity60 as an unregistered “IP user” and 
                                                 
56 Supra, Wikipedia: Consensus, note 21: “Discussions should always be attempts to convince others, using 
reasons. If discussion turns into a polarized shouting match then there is no possibility of consensus, and 
the quality of the page will suffer… Consensus among a limited group of editors, at one place and time, 
cannot override community consensus on a wider scale. For instance, participants in a WikiProject cannot 
decide that some generally accepted policy does not apply to articles within its scope, unless they can 
convince the broader community that such action is right. In the case of policies and guidelines, Wikipedia 
expects a higher standard of participation and consensus than on other pages. In any case, silence can imply 
consent only if there is adequate exposure to the community… Consensus is not immutable. Past decisions 
are open to challenge and are not binding, and one must realize that such changes are often reasonable. 
Thus, “according to consensus” and “violates consensus” are not valid rationales for making or reverting an 
edit, or for accepting or rejecting other forms of proposal or action. Wikipedia remains flexible because 
new people may bring fresh ideas, growing may evolve new needs, people may change their minds over 
time when new things come up, and we may find a better way to do things. A representative group might 
make a decision on behalf of the community as a whole. More often, people document changes to existing 
procedures at some arbitrary time after the fact. But in all these cases, nothing is permanently fixed. The 
world changes, and the wiki must change with it. It is reasonable and indeed often desirable to make further 
changes to things at a later date, even if the last change was years ago.” 
57 See Wikipedia: User page – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/User_page (last visited December 24, 2010). 
58 See Deletion log – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Special:Log/delete (last visited December 24, 2010). 
59 See Help: Edit summary – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Edit_summary (last visited December 24, 2010). 
60 There is “double” anonymity because on the first level, even registered Wikipedia editors do not use their 
real name or reveal much information about themselves; and on the second level, because a single IP 
address can actually be used by several users (registered or otherwise), it becomes even more difficult to 
identify if two edits from the same IP address emanate from the same person. Some anonymous editors also 
hop from one IP address to another so that they are less easily traceable. Here, of course, it is a dead 
giveaway that Mary and the “anonymous IP user” are one and the same person. 
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departs with the scathing words, “Do not even attempt to delete this, you moronic self-
appointed gatekeepers of Wikipedia. Stop politicising Wikipedia with your anti-Harvard 
bias and go get a life.” This time round, she stays by her computer to keep track of the 
edit history61 of her article.  
 
(d) Richard crosses swords 
 
Within 20 minutes, a member of the “Recent Changes Patrol” squad62 (let us call him 
“Richard”) – a volunteer group that regularly monitors, inter alia, the directory of 
recently modified articles63 – spots the recreation of the article by the same registered 
user that had created the original article and promptly re-nominates the article for 
deletion without even reading it (and thus not realising that changes have been made to 
the original version). On the “talk page”64 Mary’s user page, Richard accuses Mary 
(without knowing the real identity Mary of course) of being a “recalcitrant idiot” and tells 
her to “stop this nonsense and wasting everybody’s time. Nobody cares about your small 
town hero. Your attempt at sock-puppetry was also so lame.”65 Mary is incensed once 
again but this time round, she has performed her due diligence and apprised herself of 
some of her Wikipedian “rights”. She cites the “Do not bite the newbies policy”66 in the 
preface of her response to Richard on the talk page of her user page, before countering 
with another diatribe of her own, calling Richard “a stupid, illiterate dick” because he is 
“patently unable to comprehend the core Wikipedia policy of verifiability”, and that he is 
“probably another idiot from Yale”. Richard’s immediate retort on the same page is that 
he “will not deal anymore with losers who cannot even successfully hide behind 
anonymous IP addresses.” Perceiving her adversary to be escaping from the argument, 
Mary changes her user name to face off with Richard on his own terms. Her new user 
name is “The Vengeance of Mary”, and on her user page, she pins up a “user box” 
proudly stating that she is a student at Harvard Law School,67 and declares her “mission” 
                                                 
61 See Help: Page history – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Edit_history (last visited December 24, 2010). 
62 See Wikipedia: Recent changes patrol – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Recent_changes_patrol (last visited December 24, 2010). 
63 See Recent changes – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Special:RecentChanges (last visited December 24, 2010). 
64 See Wikipedia: Talk page – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Talk_page (last visited December 24, 2010). 
65 See Wikipedia: Sock puppetry – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Sock (last visited December 24, 2010): “A sock 
puppet is an alternative account used for fraudulent, disruptive, or otherwise deceptive purposes that violate 
or circumvent the enforcement of Wikipedia policies.” 
66 See Wikipedia: Please do not bite the newcomers – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Bite (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Wikipedia articles are improved through the hard work of regular editors, but also through numerous 
anonymous contributions made by newcomers. Remember: all of us were new editors at Wikipedia once, 
and in some ways (such as when editing an article on a topic outside our usual scope) even the most 
experienced among us are still newcomers. New members are prospective contributors and are therefore 
Wikipedia's most valuable resource. We must treat newcomers with kindness and patience — nothing 
scares potentially valuable contributors away faster than hostility.” 
67 See Wikipedia: Userboxes – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/User_box (last visited December 24, 2010). 
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is to “demonstrate the multiple inadequateness of the sad sod Richard”. Before Richard 
can respond, an administrator68 (let us call him “Max”) chances upon this heated dispute 
and intervenes. Max refers the two of them to a tenet of Wikipedia’s “code of conduct”, 
i.e. civility in interactions between editors,69 and requests Mary to edit the contents of her 
user page and Richard to give Mary a proper chance at familiarising herself with 
Wikipedia. He seems to ignore Mary’s hostile user page and Richard’s charge of sock-
puppetry for the moment and subtly warns that extreme breaches of civility may result in 
sanctions such as blocks.70 Placated by this act of balanced administrative intervention, 
both parties back off from exchanging insults with each other for the time being.  
 
(e) Vandalism; reversion; conflict of interest; illegality; harassment; threat of 
suit 
 
Meanwhile, the second round of “consensus building” commences on the deletion page 
of the article. 14 of the 16 editors who had voted on the first round return, and a further 4 
editors, including Richard and Mary, join in the fray for the first time. Richard is unable 
to rein in his need for confrontation and raises a new issue in the debate, viz., that Mary 
has created the article in spite of being in a “serious position” of conflict of interest71 – 
                                                 
68 See Wikipedia: Administrators – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Admin (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Administrators, commonly known as admins or sysops (system operators), are Wikipedia editors who 
have been trusted with access to restricted technical features... For example, administrators can protect and 
delete pages, and block other editors.” 
69 See Wikipedia: Civility – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Civility (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“editors should always endeavour to treat each other with consideration and respect. Even during heated 
debates, editors should behave politely, calmly and reasonably, in order to keep the focus on improving the 
encyclopedia and to help maintain a pleasant editing environment. This policy applies to all editing on 
Wikipedia, including user pages, talk pages, edit summaries, and any other discussion with or about fellow 
Wikipedians. Incivility consists of personal attacks, rudeness, and aggressive behaviours that disrupt the 
project and lead to unproductive stress and conflict. Editors are human, capable of mistakes, so a few, 
minor, isolated incidents of incivility are not in themselves a major concern. A behavioral pattern of 
incivility is disruptive and unacceptable, and may result in blocks if it rises to the level of harassment or 
egregious personal attacks. A single act of incivility can also cross the line if it is severe enough: for 
instance, extreme verbal abuse or profanity directed at another contributor, or a threat against another 
person can all result in blocks without consideration of a pattern. This policy is not a weapon to use against 
other contributors. To insist that an editor be sanctioned for an isolated, minor offense, or to treat 
constructive criticism as an attack, is itself potentially disruptive, and may result in warnings or even blocks 
if repeated.” 
70 See Wikipedia: Blocking policy – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:BLOCK (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Blocking is the method by which administrators may technically prevent users from editing Wikipedia. 
Blocks are used to prevent damage or disruption to Wikipedia, not to punish users. Blocks sometimes are 
used as a deterrent, to discourage whatever behavior led to the block and encourage a productive editing 
environment.” 
71 See Wikipedia: Conflict of interest – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Coi (last visited December 24, 2010): “A 
Wikipedia conflict of interest (COI) is an incompatibility between the aim of Wikipedia, which is to 
produce a neutral, reliably sourced encyclopedia, and the aims of an individual editor. COI editing involves 
contributing to Wikipedia in order to promote your own interests or those of other individuals, companies, 
or groups. Where advancing outside interests is more important to an editor than advancing the aims of 
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the conflict of interest being that Mary, as a Harvard law student (as proclaimed on her 
user page), is “blatantly perpetuating Harvard propaganda” on Wikipedia by “increasing 
(undue) coverage of an unknown football player.” He adds that “Williams will fail 
[[WP:ATHLETE]]72 anytime” and points to a few other recent articles on college athletes 
that had been deleted for lack of notability. Finally, Richard alleges, a photograph of 
James Williams (taken, as gleaned from the camera properties, by a premier DSLR 
camera setup) that Mary has uploaded unto the page breaches copyright as it can be 
directly attributed to a photograph taken by a student working for The Harvard Crimson 
website.73 Mary, putting her recently acquired legal skills to good effect, dismisses the 
first and third objections as “separate questions that are red herrings” and that the “only 
issue” is whether this particular James Williams warrants an independent entry on 
Wikipedia. To that end, she argues that with the provision of new quality references 
reporting on James Williams, the notability criterion should be satisfied; she further 
disputes the precedential value of the other articles that Richard cites, saying that the 
concept of precedent does not exist74 on Wikipedia and that his comparison of the articles 
was not a fair one to begin with anyway. Another editor then rebuts this, arguing that the 
new sources merely make passing mention of James Williams, and that the article 
currently portrays Williams to be “some sort of superstar (more so when we consider the 
appellation) when he is not (yet), so this is clearly a case of breaching  
WP:NOTCRYSTAL.”75 Mary again dismisses this as illogical reasoning, arguing that 
“nowhere is it suggested in the article that James Williams is supposed to be a future 
“star” – he is already a sufficiently noteworthy quarterback, as corroborated by at least 
two independent and reliable sources.” 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wikipedia, that editor stands in a conflict of interest. COI editing is strongly discouraged. When editing 
causes disruption to the encyclopedia through violation of policies such as neutral point of view, what 
Wikipedia is not, and notability, accounts may be blocked. COI editing also risks causing public 
embarrassment outside of Wikipedia for the individuals and groups being promoted. Editors with COIs are 
strongly encouraged to declare their interests, both on their user pages and on the talk page of any article 
they edit, particularly if those edits may be contested. Most Wikipedians will appreciate your honesty. 
Editors who disguise their COIs are often exposed, creating a perception that they, and perhaps their 
employer, are trying to distort Wikipedia. When investigating possible cases of COI editing, Wikipedians 
must be careful not to reveal the identity of other editors. Wikipedia’s policy against harassment takes 
precedence over this guideline on conflict of interest. An editor’s conflict of interest is often revealed when 
that editor discloses a relationship to the subject of the article to which the editor is contributing. Where an 
editor does not disclose an existing affiliation or other conflict of interest, carefully following Wikipedia's 
neutral point of view policy may help counteract biased editing.” 
72 Supra, Wikipedia: notability, note 49: “[Additional criteria for notability of athletes] are (1) People who 
have competed at the fully professional level of a sport, or a competition of equivalent standing in a non-
league sport such as swimming, golf or tennis; and (2) People who have competed at the highest amateur 
level of a sport, usually considered to mean the Olympic Games or World Championships.”  
73 See Wikipedia: Copyrights – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Copyrights (last visited December 24, 2010); Wikipedia: Copyright 
violations – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Copyvio (last visited 
December 24, 2010); and Wikipedia: Non-free content – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Non-free_content (last visited December 24, 2010). 
74 As shall be seen, however, this is not entirely accurate. 
75 Supra, Wikipedia: What Wikipedia is not, note 20: “Wikipedia is not a collection of unverifiable 
speculation. All articles about anticipated events must be verifiable, and the subject matter must be of 
sufficiently wide interest that it would merit an article if the event had already occurred... It is not 
appropriate for editors to insert their own opinions or analyses.” 
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Eventually, several other editors support the reasoning of Mary over the objectors’, and 
the result of the discussion was 12 for “keep”, 4 for “oppose”, and 2 for “neutral”. The 
article is therefore allowed to continue existing, much to the delight of Mary. Refusing to 
let the matter rest, Richard, on top of the “neutrality tag” already imposed on the article, 
slaps another 3 “tags” on the James Williams article: a generic “clean up” tag and two 
specific “verifiability” (for inadequate sources) and “copyright violation” (for the 
photograph) tags. Mary reverts this almost immediately by using the “undo” function,76 
implying that Richard has vandalised the page.77 The latter, who is raising his sentry duty 
over the page, “undoes” the “undo” just as quickly, while deploring Mary in the edit 
summary field and adding “take it to the talk page; in fact I am going to re-raise the issue 
with the naming convention of this article”. Mary reverses him, stating that the “burden 
of proof” is on Richard to back his claims, failing which to discharge means the tags are 
unwarranted. Richard “undoes” her a second time (accompanied with a counterclaim of 
“wikilawyering”),78 and when Mary reverses that, she is hit with a “3RR” warning by 
Richard on her user talk page,79 coupled with a threat to report her behaviour to an 
                                                 
76 See Help: Reverting – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Undo#Undo (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“The MediaWiki software allow editors to easily revert (or “undo”) a single edit from the history of a page, 
without simultaneously undoing all constructive changes that have been made since. To do this, view the 
page history or the diff for the edit, then click on “undo” next to the edit in question. The software will 
attempt to create an edit page with a version of the article in which the undesirable edit has been removed, 
but all later edits are retained.” 
77 See Wikipedia: Vandalism – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Vandalism (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Vandalism is any addition, removal, or change of content made in a deliberate attempt to compromise the 
integrity of Wikipedia. Vandalism cannot and will not be tolerated. Common types of vandalism are the 
addition of obscenities or crude humor, page blanking, and the insertion of nonsense into articles. Any 
good-faith effort to improve the encyclopedia, even if misguided or ill-considered, is not vandalism. Even 
harmful edits that are not explicitly made in bad faith are not vandalism. For example, adding a 
controversial personal opinion to an article once is not vandalism; reinserting it despite multiple warnings is 
(however, edits/reverts over a content dispute are never vandalism, see WP:EW). Not all vandalism is 
obvious, nor are all massive or controversial changes vandalism. Careful thought may be needed to decide 
whether changes made are beneficial, detrimental but well-intended, or outright vandalism.” 
78 See Wikipedia: Wikilawyering – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikilawyering (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Wikilawyering (and the related legal term pettifogging) is a pejorative term which describes various 
questionable ways of judging other Wikipedians' actions. It may refer to certain quasi-legal practices, 
including: 
• Using formal legal terms in an inappropriate way when discussing Wikipedia policy; 
• Abiding by the letter of a policy or guideline while violating its spirit or underlying principles; 
• Asserting that the technical interpretation of Wikipedia:Policies and guidelines should override the 
underlying principles they express; 
• Misinterpreting policy or relying on technicalities to justify inappropriate actions.” 
79 See Wikipedia: Edit warring – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:EW (last visited December 24, 2010): “The 
“three-revert rule” (“3RR”) is a bright-line rule concerning blatant overuse of reverting, a common kind of 
edit war behavior. It states that a user who makes more than three revert actions (of any kind) on any one 
page within a 24-hour period, may be considered to be edit warring, and blocked appropriately, usually for 
a 24-hour period for a first incident. 3RR draws a line where edit warring via reverts is clearly beyond a 
reasonable level and action will be taken if it has not already been.” 
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administrator. She is about to refute him on the grounds of bad faith and ill-purposive 
interpretation of the rule when Max, who presumably has been monitoring their conduct 
since their previous dispute, steps in once again. He explains that not only is this “edit 
war” pointless, it also comes with consequences, such as losing editing privileges 
indefinitely.80 He also suggests that Mary may have been subconsciously affected by 
“WP:OWN”,81 and urges them to find common ground between them so that the entry 
can be improved. 
 
Common ground was not forthcoming, however. In the weeks that Mary has spent editing 
on Wikipedia, she has also been editing other Harvard-related articles. To her horror, she 
discovers that Richard has been relentlessly following her editing trail, placing tags on 
articles that she has edited – and running the gamut from WP:WEASEL82 and 
WP:MOS83 to WP:NOR.84 She believes that she has due cause to plead either 
                                                 
80 Ibid: “Wikipedia pages develop by discussion, with users following editing policy and trying to work 
together to develop consensus, and by seeking dispute resolution and help if this isn't working. An edit war 
occurs when individual contributors or groups of contributors repeatedly override each other's 
contributions, rather than try to resolve the disagreement by discussion…. Edit warring activity is bad for 
the readers and editors of Wikipedia. Attempts to force one stance, or one version of an article, at the 
expense of another can lead to the loss of a neutral point of view, and creates animosity between editors 
that reduces the possibility of consensus. Users who continue to edit war after proper education, warnings, 
and blocks on the matter degrade the community and the encyclopedia, and may lose their editing 
privileges indefinitely.” 
81 See Wikipedia: Ownership of articles – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Own (last visited December 24, 2010): “Some 
contributors feel possessive about material they have contributed to this project. Some go so far as to 
defend it against all others. It is one thing to take an interest in an article that you maintain on your 
watchlist. Maybe you are an expert or you just care about the topic. But if this watchfulness starts to 
become possessiveness, then you may be overdoing it. Believing that an article has an owner of this sort is 
a common mistake people make on Wikipedia. You cannot stop everyone in the world from editing “your” 
stuff, once you have posted it to Wikipedia. As each edit page clearly states: 
• If you do not want your writing to be edited and redistributed at will, then do not submit it here. 
Also: 
• If you do not want your ideas (for article organization, categorization, style, standards, etc.) 
challenged or developed by others, then do not submit them.” 
82 See Wikipedia: Avoid weasel words – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Weasel (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Weasel words are phrases that are intentionally evasive, ambiguous or misleading. On Wikipedia, the term 
refers to evasive, ambiguous or misleading attribution. Weasel words can present an apparent force of 
authority seemingly supporting statements without allowing the reader to decide whether the source of the 
opinion is reliable, or they can call into question a statement.” 
83 The Manual of Style, or “MOS”, is the style guide to Wikipedia, covering subjects from article titles and 
headings to internal consistencies of articles and abbreviations: see Wikipedia: Manual of style – 
Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Mos (last 
visited December 24, 2010). 
84 See Wikipedia: No original research – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:No_original_research (last visited December 24, 
2010): “Wikipedia does not publish original research or original thought. This includes unpublished facts, 
arguments, speculation, and ideas; and any unpublished analysis or synthesis of published material that 
serves to advance a position. This means that Wikipedia is not the place to publish your own opinions, 
experiences, arguments, or conclusions. Citing sources and avoiding original research are inextricably 
linked. To demonstrate that you are not presenting original research, you must cite reliable sources that are 
directly related to the topic of the article, and that directly support the information as it is presented.” 
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harassment85 or complain about a troll,86 and sends a private message to Max to express 
her concern. To compound Mary’s horror, Richard somehow clairvoyantly anticipates 
this course of action and sends her a private message, stating that “you are a coward and I 
know what you are up to. Quit whining to admins.” Her legal reflex kicking in, Mary 
briefly considers threatening to sue Richard, but soon realises that it is not feasible (no 
sustainable cause of action), and that it actually violates a Wikipedia policy if she has not 
exhausted local remedies.87 Even so, she remains troubled that Richard knew that she had 
sent a private message to Max; only the invocation of the rarest of privileges by the rarest 
of users – CheckUser88 – will confirm or disconfirm her remote suspicion that Richard 
and Max might actually be the same person. 
 
                                                 
85 See Wikipedia: Harassment – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Harrassment (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Harassment is defined as a pattern of offensive behavior that appears to a reasonable observer to have the 
purpose of adversely affecting a targeted person or persons, usually (but not always) for the purpose of 
threatening or intimidating the primary target. The intended outcome may be to make editing Wikipedia 
unpleasant for the target, to undermine them, to frighten them, or to discourage them from editing 
entirely… “Wikistalking”, an older term, is discouraged because it can confuse minor online annoyance 
with a real world crime. Many users track other users’ edits, although usually for collegial or administrative 
purposes. Proper use of an editor’s history includes (but is not limited to) fixing errors or violations of 
Wikipedia policy or correcting related problems on multiple articles. In fact, such practices are 
recommended both for Recent changes patrol and WikiProject Spam. The contribution logs can be used in 
the dispute resolution process to gather evidence to be presented in requests for comment, mediation, 
WP:ANI, and arbitration cases... If “following another user around” is accompanied by tendentiousness, 
personal attacks, or other disruptive behavior, it may become a very serious matter and could result in 
blocks and other editing restrictions.”  
86 See What is a troll? – Wikimedia, http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/What_is_a_troll%3F (last visited 
December 24, 2010): “Trolling is any deliberate and intentional attempt to disrupt the usability of 
Wikipedia for its editors, administrators, developers, and other people who work to create content for and 
help run Wikipedia. Trolling is a violation of the implicit rules of Internet social spaces and is often done to 
inflame or invite conflict. It necessarily involves a value judgment made by one user about the value of 
another's contribution.” 
87 See Wikipedia: No legal threats – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:No_legal_threats (last visited December 24, 
2010): “Rather than immediately threatening to employ litigation, you should always first attempt to 
resolve disputes using Wikipedia’s dispute resolution procedures. If you must take legal action, we cannot 
prevent you from doing so. However, it is required that you do not edit Wikipedia until the legal matter has 
been resolved to ensure that all legal processes happen via proper legal channels. You should instead 
contact the person or people involved directly, by email or through any other contact methods the user 
provides. If your issue involves Wikipedia itself, you should contact Wikipedia’s parent organization, the 
Wikimedia Foundation. Do not issue legal threats on Wikipedia pages. If you make legal threats or take 
legal action over a Wikipedia dispute, you may be blocked from editing so that the matter is not 
exacerbated through other channels. Users who make legal threats will typically be blocked from editing 
while legal threats are outstanding.” 
88 See Wikipedia: CheckUser – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:CheckUser (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“On Wikipedia, CheckUser is a tool allowed to be used by a small number of users who are permitted to 
examine user IP information and other server log data under certain circumstances, for the purposes of 
protecting Wikipedia against actual and potential disruption and abuse. CheckUser itself simply produces 
log information for checking; it can require considerable skill and experience to investigate cases even with 
the tool.”  
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(f) The attempt to disrobe Max of administrator privileges: lacuna in the 
regulations; request for comment; mediation; arbitration 
 
The truth quickly dawns upon Mary when she receives an apologetic reply from Max via 
the private message function. It turns out that Richard and Max are not the same person 
but brothers in real life, and Max had informed Richard of Mary’s complaint. Mary is 
mortified at this revelation, and in her fit of anger, she trawls through the rules and 
policies of the project to found a basis for impeaching Richard’s post of administrator – 
and finds none. She is unable to even find something legitimately analogous that governs 
the situation, even though she perceives this subterfuge to be an egregious transgression 
for an administrator – a post which, in her view, requires a high degree of moral standing. 
In her paranoia, she wonders too if the brothers have ever teamed up to “game the 
system” in some way or another.89 But above all her concerns, she faces a very great 
difficulty in trying to get Max demoted: only either the Arbitration Committee or Jimmy 
Wales (or “Jimbo Wales”), the founder and de facto sovereign of Wikipedia – and not 
even high-level bureaucrats90 – can remove the adminstratorship of administrators.91 The 
visitation of first principles, however, grants Mary an epiphany: she would simply edit 
the rules pertaining to administrators so that they applied to her complaint. In other 
words, she will take the law into her own hands, just as she is entitled to. She is aware 
                                                 
89 See Wikipedia: Gaming the system – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:GAME (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Gaming the system means using Wikipedia policies and guidelines in bad faith to thwart the aims of 
Wikipedia and the process of communal editorship deliberately. Gaming the system is an abuse of process 
and disruptive. Related terms are wikilawyering and pettifogging, which refer to following an overly strict 
or contrived interpretation of the letter of policy to violate the principles of the policy. Gaming also refers 
to attempts to circumvent enforcement of Wikipedia policies and procedures by using various tricks to 
make bad faith edits and other disruptive behavior go unnoticed by other editors. An editor gaming the 
system is seeking to use policies with bad faith, by finding within their wording apparent justification for 
disruptive actions and stances that policy is clearly not at all intended to support. In doing this, the gamester 
separates policies and guidelines from their rightful place as a means of documenting community 
consensus, and attempts to use them selectively for a personal agenda.” 
90 See Wikipedia: Bureaucrats – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Bureaucrats (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Bureaucrats are Wikipedia users with the technical ability to:  
• promote other users to administrator or bureaucrat status; 
• grant and revoke an account’s bot status; and 
• rename user accounts. 
They are bound by policy and consensus to grant administrator or bureaucrat access only when doing so 
reflects the wishes of the community, usually after a successful request at Wikipedia:Requests for 
adminship. In like fashion, they are expected to exercise judgment in changing usernames, and in granting 
or removing bot flags on the advice of the Bot Approvals Group. They are expected to be capable judges of 
consensus, and are expected to explain the reasoning for their actions on request and in a civil manner. 
Bureaucrats do not have the technical ability to remove admin rights from users or to grant other levels of 
access (they cannot assign oversight or checkuser rights). These actions are performed by stewards, a small 
multilingual group that serves all Wikimedia projects.” 
91 Supra, Wikipedia: Administrators, note 68: “If an administrator abuses administrative powers, these 
powers can be removed. Administrators may be removed either by Jimmy Wales or by a ruling of the 
Arbitration Committee. At their discretion, lesser penalties may also be assessed against problematic 
administrators, including the restriction of their use of certain powers or placement on administrative 
probation. The technical ability to remove administrator status rests with stewards and Jimmy Wales.” 
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that there is a real lack of consensus among Wikipedians regarding the limited avenues 
for removal of adminship,92 but tries anyway. Her unilateral edit on the said page is 
almost instantly reverted, and although she presents her case on the talk page, she is 
peremptorily shut off by other editors who cynically question her sudden interest in 
administrator guidelines and her raising of “trivial concerns”. Mary responds to this by 
saying that the rules on administrators are incomplete, vague or inadequate, and 
accordingly, unjust. Much to her chagrin, nobody bothers to respond to this argument. 
She toys momentarily with the idea of creating multiple sock-puppet accounts to invade 
the space and rewrite the rules, but discovers just as quickly that such a horde will be 
easily found out in these parts. 
 
After a few days, an erudite administrator, Johan, empathises with Mary’s situation and 
sends her a private message. Mary explains what has happened, to which Johan remarks: 
“This seems like a hard case in the sense that it is a grey area. I don’t really think Max 
has done anything wrong though his brother quite clearly has. Sure, he could have done 
himself a favour by declaring earlier his relationship with Richard, but in this particular 
situation, I don’t think the obligation is a hard and fast one. Even if you can find some 
rule that applies to this case, I doubt it will be determinate in any of our dispute resolution 
platforms because I believe Max has a really good reputation in the community and is 
actively involved across various wiki platforms like Wikitionary and Wikimedia 
Commons. I truly suggest concilliation as your first port of call. If concilliation really 
fails, you can consider a “request for comment”93 to test the palatability of both your 
argument and proposed reformation of the policies. Speaking of concilliation, I know you 
probably don’t want to talk to Max directly for the time being, so mediation is also 
another viable alternative; in this respect, you can look to either the Mediation Committee 
or the Mediation Cabal.94 Of course, the last resort of arbitration is always available,95 but 
                                                 
92 See Wikipedia: Requests for de-adminship – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_de-adminship (last visited 
December 24, 2010): “A large number of Wikipedians are in agreement that RFA is broken. What they 
cannot agree on is how it is broken, or what to do in order to fix it. That being said, a great number of 
Wikipedians agree that the community needs some sort of desysopping process that does not involve 
having to go to Arbcom (with its attendant prerequisites) or Jimbo (with the attendant concerns about 
having a “constitutional monarch” become directly involved in day-to-day process). It is probably fair to 
state that a large number of people who say RFA is broken feel that way due to the possibly unfairly 
adversarial nature of the process. And it is probably fair to say further that one of the reasons the bar is set 
so high is the very lack of a robust desysopping process; admins are currently essentially promoted for life, 
and so a great deal of care must be taken--perhaps too much – when promoting them.” 
93 See Wikipedia: Requests for comment – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Rfc (last visited December 24, 2010): “Requests 
for comment (RfC) is an informal, lightweight process for requesting outside input, and dispute resolution, 
with respect to article content, user conduct, and Wikipedia policy and guidelines.” 
94 See Wikipedia: Mediation – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Mediation (last visited December 24, 2010): 
“Mediation is an activity in which a neutral third party, the mediator, guides and regulates structured 
discussion to facilitate reaching consensus on a disputed issue. The aspects of mediation commonly are: 
• a difference of positions between the respective parties; 
• a desire on the part of the parties to find a positive solution to the dispute and to accept a 
discussion about respective interests and objectives; 
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honestly, let’s try not to go there unless everything else fails (that’s a requirement 
anyway). We ought not to look at this in terms of sanctions for one another,96 but 
solutions on how to move forward. This is not meant to take away your rights and 
privileges or asking you to compromise, it’s just that practically speaking, it’s easier for 
everyone if we can all find a common space to continue to co-exist on this great project.” 
 
Mary is slightly ambivalent regarding her next course of action, and as she ponders her 
options, Max sends her another private message: “Dear Mary. I am really sorry for any 
misunderstanding that has occurred. Perhaps I should have made it clear from the outset 
that there was some conflict of interest in my intervening of your dispute with my 
brother, or perhaps I should have stayed away completely from the start. I send you this 
message not with the aim or hope that you will not avail of your right to complain against 
me… I sincerely believe that you are a good editor and that you are beginning to find 
your way around nicely around this encyclopedia, in the same way that Richard is also 
beginning to really understand how this whole project works. I will say nothing further 
but this: we are united in our cause to build the largest repository of knowledge, though 
                                                                                                                                                 
• the intention of achieving a positive result through the help of an independent, neutral third-party 
not connected with any of the involved parties; 
• the intention of achieving a stable result, preferably a long-lasting agreement between the parties. 
The mediated agreement is described as the consensus of the parties on a proposal that has been developed 
with the help of the mediator. The mediator may or may not set out a formal agreement for the parties to 
accept; some mediators prefer to help guide the parties towards developing their own agreement. 
Agreement to mediate does not obligate the parties to accept any proposed agreements.” 
95 Supra, Wikipedia: Arbitration, note 23: “The arbitration process within the Wikipedia community exists 
to impose binding solutions to Wikipedia disputes that neither communal discussion, administrators, nor 
mediation have been able to resolve. Arbitration matters are handled by a panel of experienced users, the 
Arbitration Committee. As well as hearing disputes, the Committee also handles issues where exceptional 
factors such as privacy may preclude public consideration. The Committee has considerable autonomy to 
address such issues, within the broad scope of Arbitration Policy.” 
96 See Wikipedia: Editing restrictions, Wikipedia – the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Editing_restrictions (last visited December 24, 
2010): “The Arbitration Committee may impose restrictions on users engaged in inappropriate behavior, 
usually following a request for arbitration. Such restrictions may be revoked by the Committee by passing a 
“motion in a prior case”… 
The following is a list of the most common types of restrictions. More unique restrictions which have been 
imposed in unusual circumstances are not listed: 
• Account restriction… 
• Civility restriction… 
• Probation (supervised editing)… 
• Revert limitation… 
• Topic ban…”;  
and Wikipedia: General sanctions – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:General_sanctions (last visited December 24, 
2010): “The Arbitration Committee may impose general sanctions on all editors working in a particular 
area, usually following a request for arbitration. Administrators employing these sanctions are reminded of 
the need to issue appropriate notifications and to log all sanctions as specified in each case. Such general 
sanctions may be revoked by the Committee by passing a “motion in a prior case”…: 
• Article probation… 
• Community article probation… 
• General restriction… 
• Discretionary sanctions…” 
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our methods and philosophies will differ. Rather than be adversarial and keep going at 
each other’s throats, let us be cooperative. Again, it was never my intention to put you in 
the position that you are in now. I really hope we can work this out amicably.” 
 
This turn of events makes Mary consider the path of confrontational dispute resolution 
even more carefully. On the one hand, she is confident that her legal background will put 
her in good steed in representing herself before the Arbitration Committee97 or any other 
high-level body (should it come to that) and challenging any unjust decision they render. 
Indeed, Mary had already prepared a draft case for an RFC,98 setting out what she 
thought should constitute the statement of the dispute, the evidence of improper 
behaviour, the applicable policies and guidelines, users that will corroborate her 
testimony and her possible responses to “outside views”;99 if need be, she also had her 
draft statement of the case (including her defence) for the Arbitration Committee ready. 
On the other hand, taking the diplomatic route may open more doors for her in this world, 
should she choose to continue participating in it. Moreover, she recalled reading 
somewhere that the Arbitration Committee has been mired in a controversy or two 
before,100 and is not too keen to take her chances with them – she remains firmly 
interested in continued contribution to the project. In the end, Mary decides to follow the 
path of concilliation and makes her peace with Max (and later, Richard); even though she 
got off to a rocky start to this project, she knows that she will be playing a part in making 
it even bigger than what it is now. And, like what we will attempt to do now, she will 
continue to ponder jurisprudential questions of law, morality and politics that permeate 
and demarcate this cyber world known as Wikipedia. 
 
III. Recap: classification of terms and concepts concerning the creation and 
management of a Wikipedia entry 
 
Having traipsed a good (but nevertheless small) part of the Wikipedian landscape from 
the perspective of Mary, let us recapitulate the various regulations we came across. As 
can be seen in the table below, the regulations can be divided into five broad categories, 
viz. etiquette, policies and guidelines, penal measures, dispute resolution procedures, and 
miscellaneous and legal issues. Although the table is by no means either a perfect 
classification of the entire citadel of regulations governing Wikipedia (not to mention that 
many rules could not be canvassed in the hypothetical) or a reflection of the terminology 
                                                 
97 Supra, Wikipedia: Arbitration, note 23. For the complete index of cases heard by the Arbitration 
Committee thus far, see Wikipedia: Arbitration/Index/Cases – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Arbitration/Index/Cases (last visited December 
24, 2010). 
98 Supra, Wikipedia: Requests for comment, note 93. For one of the most prominent RFCs to date, see 
Wikipedia: Requests for Comment/Tony1, Wikipedia – the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_comment/Tony1 (last visited 
December 24, 2010). “Tony1” was and remains the most prominent copyeditor and (to a lesser extent) 
policy-cum-guideline-change activist on the project. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Supra, The World and Wikipedia, note 8 at 139 to 142. In one of the controversies, a British Labour 
councillor had been anonymously editing Wikipedia, including many political articles in the UK. He was 
voted into the Arbitration Committee under rather suspicious circumstances, but resigned when his cover 
was blown. 
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that Wikipedia employs,101 it does serve a useful function in segregating regulations that 
have consequences that flow from a breach, from those that do not. Essentially, an editor 
can largely ignore (or disobey) regulations that fall under the rubric of “etiquette” and 
face no danger of his cyber existence on Wikipedia being threatened. But, for the 
regulations falling under the remaining categories, they have to varying degrees, some 
force of, or relation to, “law” in an approximate sense of the word. As a matter of 
intuition then, the latter categories may be where the answers to this paper can be found.  
 
1. Editing etiquette 
 
 Assuming good faith 
 Edit summaries 








 No original research 
 Consensus 
 Sourcing and verifiability 
 Biographies of living persons 
 Formatting and internal consistency 
 Conflicts of interest 
 Nomination for deletion 
 
3. Acts leading to penal measures such as blocking and banning 
 
 Vandalism and approach towards unregistered users 
 Incivility, harassment and personal attacks 
 Edit warring and the 3RR 
 Trolling 
 Disrupting and/or gaming the system 
 Sock and meat puppetry  
 
4. Dispute resolution procedures 
 
 Private settlement 
 Discussion on talk pages 
 Administrator intervention 
 Request for comment 
 Informal and formal mediation 
 Arbitration 
 
                                                 
101 Wikipedia does actually distinguish between policies, principles and guidelines – each with different 
degrees of necessary adherence, but it is submitted that the classification presented in this paper is a more 
nuanced and helpful one. 
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5. Legal and miscellaneous issues 
 
 Selection and removal of administrators 
 Threats of suing 
 Defamation 
 Copyright infringement 
 Varying degrees of page protection 
 Politicisation  
 Powers of checkuser and oversight 
 De facto sovereignty  
 
 
At this point it may also be helpful to make a further preliminary remark. On the internet 
– Wikipedia included – one can quite safely maintain a separate existence and identity 
from real life. If so, it may seem a technical impossibility to discuss related concepts like 
society, citizens, obedience and law, because the very concept of “citizen” (and therefore 
society and law) is meaningless if one can shed an old identity and adopt another at will. 
Two counterpoints can be made to this objection. The first is that the majority of the 
regular editors (those exposed to the regulations the most) on Wikipedia do act in good 
faith and do not adopt separate accounts to manipulate the system. Not only are the 
consequences for being found out severe, but it is also very inconvenient to maintain a 
separate existence for long without raising suspicion,102 and exhausting to keep up the 
façade. The second is that the regulations do already anticipate the use of multiple 
identities to abuse the system, so this problem of multiple identities should be seen as just 
another issue to be addressed by the regulations rather than as something that entirely 
subverts our jurisprudential analysis of the system. Moving along, it will be apposite now 
to consider the principal claims of our two legal theorists vis-à-vis the central question 
that confronts us in this essay: “what is law, and how do I know what is law?” 
 
IV. The principal claims of H.L.A. Hart 
 
“My aim in this book was to provide a theory of what law is which is both 
general and descriptive. It is general in the sense that it is not tied to any 
particular legal system or culture, but seeks to give an explanatory and clarifying 
account of law as a complex social and political institution with a rule-governed 
(and in that sense ‘normative’) aspect.”103 
 
(a)  Objectives and dismantling John Austin 
 
It should come as no surprise that Hart’s magnum opus, The Concept of Law,104 forms 
our starting point in the examination of his claims. The Concept of Law, of course, is 
considered as one of the most (if not the most) important literature in legal positivism. 
                                                 
102 Most sock or meat puppet accounts are created just to support the primary account’s edits on a select 
number of articles. By viewing the edit history of the sock or meat puppet accounts, it is usually not 
difficult to trace the edit trail to the primary account. And since sock puppet accounts are usually created to 
edit controversial articles, there will be many pairs of eyes looking out for suspicious activity. 
103 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 239. 
104 Ibid. 
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And Hart makes clear which side of the fence he stands out from the outset. In the 
preface, we are told that his book should be regarded “as an essay in analytical 
jurisprudence”, which is “concerned with the clarification of the general framework of 
legal thought, rather than with the criticism of law”; further, despite its concern with 
analysis, “the book may also be regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology”.105 Hence 
for Hart, law is a form of social phenomenon that is understood by reference to the actual 
social practices of a community (what we may call the social fact thesis), and there is no 
necessary connection between law and morality (what we may call the separability 
thesis).  
 
Hart is quick though to concede that his theory emerges directly from the ashes of John 
Austin’s command theory of law106 – a theory that the former methodically decimates in 
the first four chapters of The Concept of Law. Austin’s command theory essentially 
involved the following claims: (1) law comprises sovereign commands (general orders 
backed by threats); (2) such commands are given by a sovereign who is habitually obeyed 
by society; (3) the sovereign does not habitually obey others; and (4) sanctions will 
follow if the commands are not obeyed. Insofar as Hart’s theory builds on Austin’s, it is 
useful for us quickly recall some of the main flaws of Austin’s theory that Hart himself 
pointed out:107 
 
First, it became clear that though of all the varieties of law, a criminal statute… 
most resembles orders backed by threats given by one person to others, such a 
statute none the less differs from such orders in the important respect that it 
commonly applies to those who enact it and not merely to others. Secondly, there 
are other varieties of law… which cannot, without absurdity, be construed as 
orders backed by threats. Thirdly, there are legal rules which differ from orders 
in their mode of origin… Finally, the analysis of law in terms of the sovereign… 
failed to account for the continuity of legislative authority characteristic of a 
modern legal system… the notion of a tacit order, seemed to have no application 
to the complex actualities of a modern legal system… treating power-conferring 
rules as mere fragments of rules imposing duties, or treating all rules as directed 
only to officials, distort the ways in which these are spoken of, thought of, and 
actually used in social life. This had no better claim to our assent than the theory 
that all the rules of a game are ‘really’ directions to the umpire and the scorer. 
 
Declaring Austin’s theory a “failure”, Hart then proceeds to record a “fresh start” for his 
own theory.108 
 
(b) Union of primary and secondary rules 
 
Central to Hart’s theory (and his assault on Austin’s theory) is his conceptualisation of, 
and place for, rules. He starts off by using the “gunman model” to distinguish between a 
                                                 
105 Ibid at vi. 
106 See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, (1832).  
107 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 79 to 80 (emphasis in original). 
108 Ibid at 80. 
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person being “obliged” and being “obligated” to obey a command109 – a distinction that 
Austin’s theory did not seem to be able to sustain. Then, under the rubric of social 
practice, he draws further distinctions between: (1) habits and rules; (2) the internal and 
external aspects of rules; (3) conventions and obligations; (4) moral obligations and legal 
obligations; and (5) primary rules and secondary rules. It appears that the key to 
understanding some of the initial distinctions is the “internal” (as opposed to external) 
aspect of rules, manifested in one important form as the “critical reflective attitude”. On 
this, Hart wrote:110 
 
The internal aspect of rules is often misrepresented as a mere matter of ‘feelings’ 
in contrast to externally observable physical behaviour. No doubt, where rules 
are generally accepted by a social group and generally supported by social 
criticism and pressure for conformity, individuals may often have psychological 
experiences analogous to those of restriction… But such feelings are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the existence of ‘binding’ rules… What is necessary 
is that there should be a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour 
as a common standard, and that this should display itself in criticism… demands 
for conformity, and in acknowledgments that such criticism and demands are 
justified, all of which find their characteristic expression in the normative 
terminology of ‘ought’, ‘must’ and ‘should’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. 
 
What Hart was trying to achieve then was to filter out the unwanted elements that we 
might conflate with legal rules, such as habits (which only have an “external” aspect), 
mere social conventions (which are short of obligations and lack that “feeling” of 
compulsion), obligations as understood by Austin, and moral obligations (which have no 
centralised system and may be dependent merely on guilt). Having done this, he goes on 
to explain how while primitive societies probably only require primary rules (of 
obligation, like some basic form of criminal law or social custom) to operate,111 it cannot 
be the case for sophisticated and modern societies that have more developed legal 
systems:112  
 
It is plain that only a small community closely knit by ties of kinship, common 
sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable environment, could live successfully 
by… a regime of unofficial [primary] rules [governing restrictions on the free use 
of violence, theft and deception]. In any other conditions such a simple form of 
social control must prove defective and will require supplementation in different 
ways… The simplest form of remedy for the uncertainty of the regime of 
primary rules is the introduction of what we shall call a ‘rule of recognition’. 
This will specify some feature or features possession of which by a suggested 
rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to 
be supported by the social pressure it exerts. The existence of such a rule of 
recognition may take any of a huge variety of forms, simple or complex… The 
remedy for the static quality of the regime of primary rules consists in the 
introduction of what we shall call ‘rules of change’. The simplest form of such a 
                                                 
109 Ibid at 6, 82 and 85. 
110 Ibid at 57. 
111 Ibid at 91. 
112 Ibid at 92 and 94 to 97 (emphasis in original). 
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rule is that which empowers an individual or body of persons to introduce new 
primary rules for the conduct of the life of the group, or of some class within it, 
and to eliminate old rules… The third supplement to the simple regime of 
primary rules, intended to remedy the inefficiency of its diffused social pressure, 
consists of secondary rules empowering individuals to make authoritative 
determinations of the question whether, on a particular occasion, a primary rule 
has been broken. The minimal form of adjudication consists in such 
determinations, and we shall call the secondary rules which confer the power to 
make them ‘rules of adjudication’.  
 
In other words, it is the union of primary and secondary rules that gives a modern legal 
system its shape and form. And it is probably not controversial to suggest that among the 
3 secondary rules, understanding how the rule of recognition – Hart’s “ultimate rule” of a 
legal system113 – is the most crucial.  
 
(c) The rule of recognition and the two minimum conditions of a legal system 
 
Apart from its trait of remedying the uncertainty of primary rules as stated above, the 
description of the rule of recognition may be elaborated as follows:114 
 
[The rule of recognition] may, as in the early law of many societies, be no more 
than an authoritative list or text of the rules is to be found in a written document 
or carved on some public monument… what is crucial is the acknowledgement of 
reference to the writing or inscription as authoritative, i.e. as the proper way of 
disposing of doubts as to the existence of the rule… In a developed legal system 
the rules of recognition are of course more complex; instead of identifying rules 
exclusively by reference to a text or list they do so by reference to some general 
characteristic possessed by the primary rules. This may be the fact of their having 
been enacted by a specific body, or their long customary practice, or their 
relation to judicial decisions. Moreover, where more than one of such general 
characteristics are treated as identifying criteria, provision may be made for their 
possible conflict by their arrangement in an order of superiority, as by the 
common subordination of custom or precedent to statute, the latter being a 
‘superior source’ of law. 
 
Furthermore, the validity of the rule of recognition cannot be questioned, in that it “can 
neither be valid nor invalid but is simply accepted as appropriate for use in this way.”115 
Again, the “internal” aspect of rules plays a part in our understanding of this rule:116 
 
In the day-to-day life of a legal system its rule of recognition is very seldom 
expressly formulated as a rule… For the most part the rule of recognition is not 
stated, but its existence is shown in the way in which particular rules are 
identified, either by courts or other officials or private persons or their advisers. 
There is, of course, a difference in the use made by courts of the criteria provided 
by the rule and the use of them by others: for when courts reach a particular 
                                                 
113 Ibid at 105 to 107. 
114 Ibid at 94 to 95 (emphasis in original). 
115 Ibid at 109. 
116 Ibid at 101 to 102 (emphasis in original). 
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conclusion on the footing that a particular rule has been correctly identified as 
law, what they say has a special authoritative status conferred on it by other 
rules… The use of unstated rules of recognition, by courts and others, in 
identifying particular rules of the system is characteristic of the internal point of 
view. Those who use them in this way thereby manifest their own acceptance of 
them as guiding rules and with this attitude there goes a characteristic vocabulary 
different from the natural expressions of the external point of view. 
 
Hart, however, recognises that the union of primary and secondary rules is actually 
insufficient to “describe the relationships to law involved in the existence of a legal 
system”;117 obedience (cf. efficacy) needs to be more thoroughly accounted for. 
Therefore, he adds that:118 
 
There are… two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence 
of a legal system. On the one hand, those rules of behaviour which are valid 
according to the system’s ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, 
and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal 
validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as 
common public standards of official behaviour by its officials. The first condition 
is the only one which private citizens need satisfy: they may obey each ‘for his 
part only’ and from any motive whatever… The second condition must also be 
satisfied by the officials of the system. They must regard these as common 
standards of official behaviour and appraise critically their own and each other’s 
deviations as lapses. 
 
Accordingly, since law is a matter of social fact, in a situation like a coup d'état or social 
revolution where the officials no longer (according to their internal point of view) accept 
the rule of recognition, a legal system may not exist in the intervening periods. Under the 
normal run of things, however, the rule of recognition helps the legal system in question 
to: (1) establish a test for valid law; (2) confer validity on the other rules; and (3) unify 
the laws.119 In certain jurisdictions, the rule of recognition may even explicitly 
incorporate morality.120 
                                                 
117 Ibid at 114. 
118 Ibid at 116 to 117 (emphasis in original). But then Hart also says at 206: “the certification of something 
as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience… however great the aura of majesty or 
authority which the official system may have, its demands must in the end be submitted to a moral 
scrutiny” (emphasis added).  
119 See also Neil MacCormick , H.L.A. Hart (Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory), (2008) at 138 to 139. 
120 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 243, 247 and 250: “Even if… the participant’s internal 
perspective manifested in the acceptance of the law as providing guides to conduct and standards of 
criticism also included a belief that there are moral reasons for conforming to the law’s requirements and 
moral justification of its use of coercion, this would be something for a morally neutral descriptive 
jurisprudence to record but not to endorse or share… though my main examples of the criteria provided by 
the rule of recognition are matters of what Dworkin has called ‘pedigree’ [footnote omitted], concerned 
only with the manner in which laws are adopted or created by legal institutions and not with their content, I 
expressly state both in this book (p. 72) and in my earlier article on ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law 
and Morals’ [footnote omitted] that in some systems of law, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of 
legal validity might explicitly incorporate beside pedigree, principles of justice or substantive moral values, 
and these may form the content of legal constitutional constraints… the rule of recognition may incorporate 
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(d)  Minimum content of natural law 
 
But, Hart does not stop here. The insufficiency of the concept of the union of primary and 
secondary rules in accounting for a legal system is further supplemented by his 
formulation of the “minimum content of natural law”. He states that for a community 
(and a fortiori, a legal system) to survive (an indisputable goal of human society for 
Hart),121 certain rules constructed around the consequence of the “human condition” must 
exist as a matter of fact, and there are at least 5 aspects to this “minimum content of 
natural law”: (1) human vulnerability, viz., we are all susceptible to physical attacks; (2) 
approximate equality, viz., even the strongest us among us need to sleep at some point; 
(3) limited altruism, viz., we are, generally speaking, selfish; (4) limited resources, viz., 
we all need food, clothes and shelter but these are limited resources; and (5) limited 
understanding and strength of will, viz., we cannot be safely relied upon to cooperate with 
our fellow men all the time.122  
                                                                                                                                                 
as criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantive values…” (emphasis in 
original). 
121 Fuller and Aquinas would say of course, that if the highest aim of a captain were to preserve him ship, 
he would keep it in the port forever. That is, man’s desire to survive can only be the lowest common 
denominator of aspiration. 
122 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 193 to 198: “In considering the simple truisms which we set forth 
here, and their connection with law and morals, it is important to observe that in each the case the facts 
mentioned afford a reason why, given survival as an aim, law and morals should include a specific content. 
The general form of the argument is simply that without such a content laws and morals could not forward 
the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associating with each other. In the absence of this 
content men, as they are, would have no reason for obeying voluntarily any rules; and without a minimum 
of cooperation given voluntarily by those who find that it is in their interest to submit to an maintain the 
rules, coercion of others who would not voluntarily conform would be impossible… (i) Human 
vulnerability. The common requirements of law and morality consist for the most part not of active services 
to be rendered but of forbearances, which are usually formulated in negative form as prohibitions. Of these 
the most important for social life are those that restrict the use of violence in killing or inflicting bodily 
harm… If there were not these rules what point could there be for beings such as ourselves in having rules 
of any other kind?... (ii) Approximate equality. Men differ from each other in physical strength, agility, and 
even more in intellectual capacity. None the less it is a fact of quite major importance… that no individual 
is so much more powerful than others, that he is able, without cooperation, to dominate or subdue them for 
more than a short period… (iii) Limited altruism. Men are not devils dominated by a wish to exterminate 
each other… neither are they angels; and the fact that they are a mean between these two extremes is 
something which makes a system of mutual forbearances both necessary and possible… (iv) Limited 
resources. It is a merely contingent fact that human beings need food, clothes, and shelter; that these do not 
exist at hand in limitless abundance; but are scarce, have to be grown or won from nature, or have to be 
constructed by human toil. These facts alone make indispensable some minimum form of the institution of 
property (though not necessarily individual property), and the distinctive kind of rule which requires 
respect for it…. (v) Limited understanding and strength of will. The facts that make rules respecting 
persons, property, and promises necessary in social life are simple and their mutual benefits obvious… On 
the other hand, neither understanding of long-term interest, nor the strength or goodwill of will, upon which 
the efficacy of these different motives towards obedience depends, are shared by all men alike… except in 
very small closely-knit societies, submission to the system of restraint would be folly if there was no 
organisation for the coercion of those who would then try to obtain the advantages of the system without 
submitting to its obligations. ‘Sanctions’ are therefore required not as the normal motive for obedience, but 
as a guarantee that those who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those who would not… 
what reason demands is voluntary cooperation in a coercive system” (emphasis in original). 
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Hart’s concession to natural law (albeit in a limited and “minimum” sense),123 of course, 
is but part of his wider attack against the 3 main opponents to legal positivism of his day, 
natural law, formalism, and legal realism (or rule scepticism). This is canvassed briefly in 
the next two sub-sections. In his thrust and parry with natural law, he distinguishes 
between justice and morality, and law and morality, to demonstrate his point that there is 
no necessary connection between law and morality. He refutes the formalists’ claim that 
rules are the be all and end all when it comes to resolving legal disputes. Finally, 
responding to the realists’ charge that (legal) rules are indeterminate, Hart argues that the 
uncertainty over what rules apply and how they apply is not quite as large as the realists 
make it out to be; more often than not, rules play an important and consistent role in the 
disposition of legal disputes.124  
 
(e) Distinguishing between justice and morality, and law and morality 
 
As a precursor to his subsequent endeavour to “disentangle” law and morality, Hart found 
it necessary to distinguish the concepts of justice and morality:125 
 
The terms most frequently used by lawyers in the praise or condemnation of law 
or its administration are the words ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ and very often they write as 
if the ideas of justice and morality were coextensive… A man guilty of gross 
cruelty to his child would often be judged to have done something morally wrong 
bad, or even wicked or to have disregarded his moral obligation or duty to his 
child. But it would be strange to criticise his conduct as unjust… ‘Unjust’ would 
become appropriate if the man had arbitrarily selected one of his children for 
severer punishment than those given to others guilty of the same fault… Justice 
constitutes one [distinct] segment of morality primarily concerned not with 
individual conduct but with the ways in which classes of individuals are treated. 
It is this which gives justice its special relevance in the criticism of law and of 
other public or social institutions. It is the most public and the most legal of the 
virtues. But principles of justice do not exhaust the idea of morality; and not all 
criticism of law made on moral grounds is made in the name of justice. Laws 
may be condemned as morally bad simply because they require men to do 
particular actions which morality forbids individuals to do, or because they 
require men to abstain from doing those which are morally obligatory. It is 
therefore necessary to characterise, in general terms, those principles, rules and 
                                                 
123 See also ibid at 181: “We have, indeed, insisted that in all moral codes there will be found some form of 
prohibition of the use of violence, to persons or things, and requirements of truthfulness, fair dealing, and 
respect for promises. These things, granted only certain very obvious truisms about human nature and the 
character of the physical world, can be seen in fact to be essential if human beings are to live continuously 
together in close proximity; and it therefore would be extraordinary if rules providing for them were not 
everywhere endowed with the moral importance and status we have described. It seems clear that the 
sacrifice of personal interest which such rules demand is the price which must be paid in a world such as 
ours for living with others, and the protection they afford is the minimum which, for beings such as 
ourselves, makes living with others worth while. These simple facts constitute, as we argue in the chapter, a 
core of indisputable truth in the doctrines of Natural Law.” (emphasis in original). 
124 Although in his book Hart discussed formalism and rule-scepticism before going on to natural law, I 
have taken the liberty to reorder the discussion to better suit the structure of this paper. 
125 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 157 to 158 and 167 to 168 (emphasis in original). 
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standards relating to the conduct individuals which belong to morality and make 
conduct morally obligatory. Two related difficulties confront us here. The first is 
that the word ‘morality’ and all other associated or nearly synonymous terms like 
‘ethics’, have their own considerable area of vagueness or ‘open texture’. There 
are certain forms of principle or rule which some would rank as moral and which 
others would not. Secondly, even where there is agreement on this point… there 
may still be great philosophical disagreement as to their status or relation to the 
rest of human knowledge and experience. Are they immutable principles which 
constitute part of the fabric of the Universe, not made by man, but awaiting 
discovery by human intellect? Or are they expressions of changing human 
attitudes, choices, demands, or feelings? 
 
Having done that, Hart goes on to the second phase of his clarification exercise: 
removing morality from the equation. He does not deny that moral rules and legal rules 
have “certain striking similarities” (mirroring what he says about the “minimum content 
of natural law”) – bearing in mind too, that he does not deny that the rule of recognition 
can incorporate substantive justice and principles of morality.126 However, he points out 
that there are “certain characteristics which law and morals cannot share”:127 
 
Moral and legal rules of obligation and duty have… certain striking similarities 
enough to show that their common vocabulary is no accident. These may be 
summarised as follows. They are alike in that they are conceived as binding 
independently of the consent of the individual bound and are supported by 
serious social pressure for conformity; compliance with both legal and moral 
obligations is regarded not as a matter for praise but as a minimum contribution 
to social life to be taken as matter of course. Further both law and morals include 
rules governing the behaviour of individuals in situations constantly recurring 
throughout life rather than special activities or occasions, and though both may 
include much that is peculiar to the real or fancied needs of a particular society, 
both make demands which must obviously be satisfied by any group of human 
beings who are to succeed living together. Hence some forms of prohibition of 
violence to person or property, and some requirements of honesty and 
truthfulness will be found in both alike. Yet, in spite of these similarities, it has 
seemed obvious to many that there are certain characteristics which law and 
morals cannot share… [first], importance is not essential to the status of all legal 
rules as it is to that of morals… [second], morals and traditions cannot be directly 
changed, as laws may be, by legislative enactment… [third], legal responsibility 
is not necessarily excluded by the demonstration that an accused person could not 
have kept the law which he has broken; by contrast, in morals ‘I could not help 
it’ is always an excuse, and moral obligation would be altogether different from 
what it is if the moral ‘ought’ did not in this sense imply ‘can’… [fourth], the 
typical form of legal pressure may well be said to consist in… threats. With 
morals on the other hand the typical form of pressure consists in appeals to the 
respect for the rules, as things important in themselves, which is presumed to be 
shared by those addressed.  
 
                                                 
126 Supra, note 120. 
127 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 172, 175 to 176 and 178 to 180. 
  - 32 -
Because of the unshared characteristics, Hart disputes the necessary connection between 
law and morality. He further points out 6 supposed misconceptions that natural law 
advocates present as the necessary connection between law and morality – resulting in a 
blurring and our confusion over the concept of law – and much of what he says regarding 
this is worth quoting in extenso:128 
 
[I]t cannot be seriously disputed that the development of law, at all times and 
places, has in fact been profoundly influenced both by the conventional morality 
and ideals of particular social groups, and also by forms of enlightened moral 
criticism urged by individuals, whose moral horizon has transcended the morality 
currently accepted. But… it does not follow from it that the criteria of legal 
validity of particular laws used in a legal system must include, tacitly if not 
explicitly, a reference to morality or justice… the claim that there is some further 
way in which law must conform to morals beyond that we have exhibited as the 
minimum content of Natural Law, needs very careful scrutiny. Many such 
assertions either fail to make clear the sense in which the connection between law 
and morals is alleged to be necessary; or upon examination they turn out to mean 
something which is both true and important, but which it is most confusing to 
present as a necessary connection… (i) Power and authority. It is often said that 
a legal system must rest on a sense of moral obligation or on the conviction of the 
moral value of the system, since it does not and cannot rest on mere power of 
man over man… But the dichotomy of ‘law merely being based on power’ and 
‘law which is accepted as morally binding’ is not exhaustive. Not only may vast 
numbers be coerced by laws which they do not regard as morally binding, but it 
is not even true that those who do accept the system voluntarily, must conceive 
of themselves as morally bound to do so… (ii) The influence of morality on law. 
The law of every modern state shows at a thousand points the influence of both 
the accepted social morality and wider moral ideals… No ‘positivist’ could deny 
[this], or that the stability of legal systems depends in part upon such types of 
correspondence with morals. If this is what is meant by the necessary connection 
of law and morals, its existence should be conceded. (iii) Interpretation. Laws 
require interpretation if they are to be applied to concrete cases… the open 
texture of law leaves a vast field for a creative activity which some call 
legislative… Judicial decision, especially on matters of high constitutional 
import, often involves a choice between moral values… Yet if [this is] tendered 
as evidence of the necessary connection of law and morals, we need to remember 
that the same principles have been honoured nearly as much in the breach as in 
the observance… (iv) The criticism of law… the assertion that a good legal 
system must conform… to the requirements of justice and morality… is not a 
tautology, and in fact, in the criticism of law, there may be disagreements both as 
to the appropriate moral standards and as to the required points of conformity… 
(v) Principles of legality and justice. It may be said that the distinction between a 
good legal system which  conforms at certain points to morality and justice, and a 
                                                 
128 Ibid at 185, 202 to 208 and 211 (emphasis in original). Hart also says at 200: “The protections and 
benefits provided by the system of mutual forbearances which underlies both law and morals may, in 
different societies, be extended to very different ranges of persons. It is true that the denial of these 
elementary protections to any class of human beings, willing to accept the corresponding restrictions, 
would offend the principles of morality and justice to which all modern states pay, at any rate, lip-service… 
Yet it is plain that neither the law nor the accepted morality of societies need extend their minimal 
protections and benefits to all within their scope, and often they have not done so.”  
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legal system which does not, is a fallacious one, because a minimum of justice is 
necessarily realised whenever human behaviour is controlled by general rules 
publicly announced and judicially applied… in analysing the idea of justice, that 
its simplest form… consists in more than taking seriously the notion that what is 
to be applied to a multiplicity of different persons is the same general rule, 
undeflected by prejudice, interest or caprice… (vi) Legal validity and resistance 
to law…. What [positivists] were, in the main, concerned to promote was clarity 
and honesty in the formulation of the theoretical and moral issues raised by the 
existence of particular laws which were morally iniquitous but were enacted in 
proper form, clear in meaning, and satisfied all the acknowledged criteria of 
validity of a system. Their view was that, in thinking about such laws, both the 
theorist and unfortunate official or private citizen who was called on to apply or 
obey them, could only be confused by an invitation to refuse the title of ‘law’ or 
‘valid’ to them… A concept of law which allows the invalidity of law to be 
distinguished from its immorality, enables us to see the complexity and variety of 
these separate issues; whereas a narrow concept of law which denies legal 
validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to them. 
 
In dealing with unjust laws then, Hart would prefer the approach of passing retrospective 
legislation to denounce an unjust law, rather than have an unjust law declared as a non-
law from the outset.129 Having attempted to disambiguate the necessary elements of law, 
Hart ensures that the jurisprudential issues raised by the formalists and realists are also 
addressed. 
 
(f) The role of language and dealing with the uncertainty of rules 
 
For Hart, because rules are often given as general directions to classes of individuals, 
there are 2 principal devices in which rules are communicated: (1) communication by 
authoritative general language, or legislation; and (2) communication by authoritative 
example, or precedent.130 He does not deny that there can be uncertainty surrounding the 
                                                 
129 H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” in David Dyzenhaus and Arthur 
Ripstein (eds), Law and Morality, (2001) at 60. In contrast, Gustav Radbruch would, in the context of the 
Nazi grudge informer case that Hart was responding to, prefer that a law would be valid only if: (1) it had 
passed the tests contained in the formal criteria of legal validity of the system; and (2) it did not contravene 
basic principles of morality: see Michael Doherty, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy of Law, (2001) at 154. 
130 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 124 to 129: “In any large group general rules, standards, and 
principles must be the main instrument of social control, and not particular directions given to each 
individual separately. If it were not possible to communicate general standards of conduct, which 
multitudes of individuals could understand, without direction, as requiring from the certain conduct when 
occasion arose, nothing that we now recognise as law could exist. Hence the law must predominantly, but 
by no means exclusively, refer to classes of person, and to classes of acts, things and circumstances… Two 
principal devices, at first sight very different from each other, have been used for the communication of 
such general standards of conduct in advance of the successive occasions on which they are to be applied. 
One of them makes a maximal and the other a minimal use of general classifying words. The first is 
typified by what we call legislation and the second by precedent… Communication by example in all its 
forms, though accompanied by some general verbal directions… may leave open ranges of possibilities, 
and hence of doubt, as to what is intended even as to matters which the person seeking to communicate has 
himself clearly envisaged… In contrast with the indeterminacies of examples, the communication of 
general standards by explicit general forms of language… seems clear, dependable, and certain… Much of 
the jurisprudence of this century has consisted of the progressive realisation (and sometimes the 
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rules. For legislation (authoritative general language), there is uncertainty in language, 
and even all the canons of interpretation at our disposal cannot eliminate all uncertainties. 
The solution lies not in simply employing more language because we will still operate 
under 2 handicaps: (1) our relative ignorance of fact; and (2) our relative indeterminacy 
of aim. In discussing these 2 handicaps, Hart also takes aim at formalism,131 the antithesis 
to realism:132 
 
If the world in which we live were characterised only by a finite number of 
features, and these together with all the modes in which they could combine were 
known to us, then provision could be made in advance of every possibility. We 
could make rules, the application of which to particular cases never called for a 
                                                                                                                                                 
exaggeration) of the important fact that the distinction between the uncertainties of communication by 
authoritative example (precedent), and the certainties of communication by authoritative language 
(legislative) is far less firm than this naïve contrast suggests… Whichever device, precedent or legislation, 
is chosen for the communication of standards of behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the 
great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is in question, prove indeterminate; 
they will have been what has been termed an open texture… Natural languages like English are when so 
used irreducibly open-textured… we should not cherish, even as an ideal, the conception of a rule so 
detailed that the question whether it applied or not to a particular case was always settled in advance, and 
never involved, at the point of actual application, a fresh choice between open alternatives… the reason is 
that the necessity for such choice is thrust upon us because we are men, not gods. It is a feature of the 
human predicament (and so of the legislative one) that we labour under two connected handicaps… our 
relative ignorance of fact… our relative indeterminacy of aim… [the] rigidity of our classifications will 
thus war with our aims in having or maintaining the rule… In fact all systems, in different ways, 
compromise between two social needs: the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of conduct, 
safely be applied by private individuals to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up of 
social issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official choice, issues which 
can only be properly be appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete case. In some legal systems at 
some periods it may be that too much is sacrificed to certainty, and that judicial interpretation of statutes or 
of precedent is too formal and so fails to respond to the similarities and differences between cases which 
are visible only when they are considered in the light of social aims. In other systems or at other periods it 
may seem that too much is treated by courts as perennially open or revisable in precedents, and too little 
respect paid to such limits as legislative language, despite its open texture, does after all provide… 
Sometimes the sphere to be legally controlled is recognised from the start as one in which the features of 
individual cases will vary so much in socially important but unpredictable respects, that uniform rules to be 
applied from case to case without further official direction cannot usefully be framed by the legislature in 
advance. Accordingly, to regulate such a sphere the legislature sets up very general standards and then 
delegates to an administrative, rule-making body… even with very general standards there will be plain 
indisputable examples of what does, or does not, satisfy them… the rule-making authority must exercise a 
discretion… A second similar technique is used where the sphere to be controlled is such that it is 
impossible to identify a class of specific actions to be uniformly done or forborne and to make them the 
subject of a simple rule, yet the range of circumstances, though very varied, covers familiar features of 
common experience. Here common judgments of what is ‘reasonable’ can be used by the law. This 
technique leaves to individuals, subject to correction by a court, the task of weighing up and striking a 
reasonable balance between the social claims which arise in various unanticipatable forms.” (emphasis in 
original). 
131 The traditional exponents of this theory will be the likes of Christopher Langdell. But, consider too the 
more extreme version of formalism presented in John Maxey Zane, “German Legal Philosophy”, (1918) 16 
Michigan Law Review 287 at 292: “it must be perfectly apparent to anyone who is willing to admit the 
rules governing rational mental action that unless the rule of the major premise exists as antecedent to the 
ascertainment of the fact or facts put into the minor premise, there is no judicial act in stating the 
judgment.” 
132 Ibid at 129 to 130. 
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further choice. Everything could be known, and for everything, since it could be 
known, something could be done and specified in advance by rule. This would be 
a world fit for ‘mechanical’ jurisprudence. Plainly this is not our world… This 
inability to anticipate brings with it a relative indeterminacy of aim. When we are 
bold enough to frame some general rule of conduct… the language used in this 
context fixes necessary conditions which anything must satisfy if it is to be 
within its scope, and certain clear examples of what is certainly within its scope 
may be present to our minds… When the unenvisaged case does arise, we 
confront the issues at stake and can then settle the question by choosing between 
the competing interests in the way which best satisfies us… Different legal 
systems, or the same system at different times, may either ignore or acknowledge 
more or less explicitly… [the] need for further exercise of choice in the 
application of general rules to particular cases. The vice known to legal theory as 
formalism or conceptualism consists in an attitude to verbally formulated rules 
which both seeks to disguise and to minimise the need for such choices, once the 
general rule has been laid down.  
 
Hart’s assailment of formalism is complete when he points out that there exists 
uncertainty in the use of precedent (authoritative example) as well:133   
 
Any honest description of the use of precedent in English law must allow a place 
for the following pairs of contrasting facts. First, there is no single method of 
determining the rule… Notwithstanding this, in the vast majority of decided 
cases there is very little doubt… Secondly, there is no authoritative or uniquely 
correct formulation of any rule to be extracted from cases. On the other hand, 
there is often very general agreement, when the bearing of a precedent on a later 
case is in issue, that a given formulation is adequate. Thirdly, whatever 
authoritative status a rule extracted from precedent may have, it is compatible 
with the exercise by courts that are bound by it following two types of creative or 
legislative activity… Notwithstanding [the act of narrowing or widening the rule 
found in the precedent] left open by the binding force of precedent, the result of 
the English system of precedent has been to produce, by its use, a body of rules 
of which a vast number, of both major and minor importance, are as determinate 
as any statutory rule… the life of the law consists to a very large extent in the 
guidance both of officials and private individuals by determinate rules, which 
unlike the applications of variable standards, do not require from them a fresh 
judgment from case to case… In a system where stare decisis is firmly 
acknowledged, [the] function of the courts is very like the exercise of delegated 
rule-making powers by an administrative body. 
 
Yet as can be seen from the preceding passage, Hart also takes issue with the position 
taken by the realists or rule sceptics,134 who deny, inter alia, that rules can determine the 
outcome of a legal dispute.135 Although (as stated above) Hart acknowledges that there 
                                                 
133 Ibid at 134 to 135 (emphasis in original). 
134 Cf. fact sceptics. 
135 See e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law”, (1998) 78 Boston University Law Review 699 
at 705 to 706: “The training of lawyers is a training in logic.  The processes of analogy, discrimination, and 
deduction are those in which they are most at home. The language of judicial decision is mainly the 
language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is 
in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man.  Behind the 
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can be uncertainty surrounding which rules apply and how they apply, in the majority of 
cases, this does not present a real dilemma in the resolution of legal disputes. So while 
the inherent ambiguity of language renders rules with an “open texture”, there is still a 
“core” of cases wherein rules can be applied uncontroversially and there can be a safe 
prediction of the likely outcome.136 Concomitantly, within these confines, there is little 
discretion for the arbiter of the dispute (say, a judge).137 Situated outside the “core”, 
however, is the “penumbra” and this is where cases become harder and the judge is 
compelled to exercise a much greater degree of discretion, and may “make law” as a 
consequence, wherein he is usually guided by aims, purposes, and policies.138 The judge 
may be guided by various miscellaneous sources of law, such as foreign cases, but 
equally, he may base his decision on his own conception of fairness and justice.139 
                                                                                                                                                 
logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often 
an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole 
proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition in a contract. 
But why do you imply it?  It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or 
because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not 
capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical 
conclusions.”; and John Dewey, “Logical Method and Law”, (1914) 10 Cornell Law Quarterly 17 at 23: 
“As a matter of fact, men do not begin thinking with premises. They begin with some complicated and 
confused case, apparently admitting of alternative modes of treatment and solution. Premises only 
gradually emerge from analysis of the total situation. The problem is not to draw a conclusion from given 
premises; that can best be done by a piece of inanimate machinery by fingering a keyboard. The problem is 
to find statements, of general principle and of particular fact, which are worthy to serve as premises. As 
matter of actual fact, we generally begin with some vague anticipation of a conclusion… and then we look 
around for principles and data which will substantiate it or which will enable us to choose intelligently 
between rival conclusions.” (emphasis in original). 
136 See supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 135 to 144. 
137 See also ibid at 137: “It is possible that, in a given society, judges might always first reach their 
decisions intuitively or ‘by hunches’, and then merely choose from a catalogue of legal rules one which, 
they pretended, resembled the case in hand; they might then claim this was the rule which they regarded as 
requiring their decision, although nothing else in their actions or words suggested they regarded it as a rule 
binding on them. Some judicial decisions may be like this, but it is surely evident that for the most part 
decisions… are reached either by genuine effort to conform to rules consciously taken as guiding standards 
of decision or, if intuitively reached, are justified by rules which the judge was antecedently disposed to 
observe and whose relevance to the case in hand would generally be acknowledged.” 
138 See also supra, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, note 129 at 36 and 41: “If a penumbra 
of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then their application to specific cases in the penumbral area 
cannot be a matter of logical deduction, and so deductive reasoning, which for generations has been 
cherished as the very perfection of human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what judges, or indeed 
anyone, should do in bringing particular cases under general rules. In this area men cannot live by 
deduction alone. And it follows that if legal arguments and legal decisions are to be rational, their 
rationality must lie in something other than a logical relation to premises… the intelligent decision of 
penumbral questions is one made not mechanically but in the light of aims, purposes, and policies, though 
not necessarily in the light of anything we would call moral principles.” 
139 See also The Concept of Law, note 25 at 251 to 253: “It is of course true that an important function of 
the rule of recognition is to promote the certainty with which the law may be ascertained. This it would fail 
to do if the tests which it introduced for law not only raise controversial issues in some cases but raise them 
in all or most cases. But the exclusion of all uncertainty at whatever costs in other values is not a goal 
which I have ever envisaged for the rule of recognition… A margin of uncertainty should be tolerated, and 
indeed welcomed in the case of many legal rules, so that an informed judicial decision can be made when 
the composition of an unforeseen case is known and the issues at stake in its decision can be identified and 
so rationally settled… that there are such objective moral facts [as Dworkin would suggest] is a 
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Ronald Dworkin – most notably in Law’s Empire – has much to say to this (e.g., the 
“semantic sting”; supplementing rules with principles; law as interpretation; internal and 
external scepticism; the constraints of fit and value; law as a coherent web; and the “one 
right answer” thesis),140 but any meaningful discussion of his objections will be beyond 
the scope of this paper.141 Suffice to say for now, Dworkin’s main point is that judges are 
more constrained by rules (and principles) than Hart has claimed, and they therefore have 
less discretion than Hart has claimed. To do otherwise undermines both democracy and 
the expectations of litigants. 
 
Now that we have set out the principal claims of Hart, we can turn to Finnis. 
 
V. The principal claims of John Finnis 
 
“I have not presented natural law or the principles of practical reasonableness 
as expressions of God’s will. And I have positively declined to explain obligation 
in terms of conformity to superior will.”142 
 
(a) Justification of self-evidence 
 
The groundbreaking Natural Law and Natural Rights143 is our first port of call insofar as 
the endeavour of identifying Finnis’ central claims is concerned. It may perhaps be 
helpful to first obtain a helicopter view of his claims.144 For Finnis, the justification for 
law is the concept of self-evidence; self-evidence also being the methodology by which 
he identifies the 7 basic goods (knowledge, life, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, 
practical reasonableness, and religion) necessary for human flourishing:145 
 
The basic forms of good grasped by practical understanding are what is good for 
human beings with the nature they have. [Thomas] Aquinas considers that 
                                                                                                                                                 
controversial philosophical theory; if there are no such facts, a judge, told to apply a moral test, can only 
treat this as a call for the exercise by him of a law-making discretion in accordance with his best 
understanding of morality and its requirements and subject to whatever constraints on this are imposed by 
the legal system.” 
140 Supra, Law’s Empire, note 25 at 52 to 53, 65 to 72, 78 to 84, 90 to 96, 120 to 128, 160, 224 to 226, 235 
to 245, 255 to 260, and 272 to 273. See for instance the claim he makes about law as integrity at 225, 238 to 
239 and 245: “According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the 
principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of 
the community’s legal practice… Law as integrity asks a judge… to think of himself as an author in the 
chain… He knows that other judges have decided cases that, although not exactly like his case, deal with 
relation problems; he must think of their decisions as part of a long story he must interpret and then 
continue, according to his own judgment of how to make the developing story as good as it can be… Law 
as integrity, then, requires a judge to test his interpretation of any part of the great network of political 
structures and decisions of his community by asking whether it could form part of a coherent theory 
justifying the network as a whole.” 
141 See also Lon Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart”, (1958) 71 Harvard 
Law Review 630 at 662: “The most obvious defect of his theory [of the core and penumbra] lies in its 
assumption that problems of interpretation typically turn on the meaning of individual words.” 
142 Supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 403. 
143 Ibid. 
144 See Tan Seow Hon, “Justification and Validity in Finnis’ Natural Law Theory”, (1999) at 7 to 8. 
145 Supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 34. 
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practical reasoning begins not by understanding this nature from the outside, as it 
were, by way of psychological, anthropological, or metaphysical observations 
and judgments defining human nature [footnote omitted], but by experiencing 
one’s nature, so to speak, from the inside, in the form of one’s inclinations. But 
again, there is no process of inference. One does not judge that ‘I have [or 
everybody has] an inclination to find out about things’ and then infer that 
therefore ‘knowledge is a good to be pursued’. Rather, by a simple act of non-
inferential understanding one grasps that the object of the inclination which one 
experiences is an instance of a general form of good, for oneself (and others like 
one). 
 
In other words, Finnis argues that using self-evidence146 to identify such goods – which 
the legal system can then be modified to secure – avoids the problems of religious 
exclusivity, non-cognitivism (and accordingly, moral relativism), deductive syllogism 
and the so-called “Humean guillotine”.147 Indeed, this concept of self-evidence forms part 
of the larger strategy that Finnis employs in restating classical natural law theory,148 and 
                                                 
146 See also ibid at 33 to 34: “[I]t is simply not true that ‘any form of a natural-law theory of morals entails 
the belief that propositions about man’s duties and obligations can be inferred from propositions about his 
nature’ [footnote omitted]. Nor is it true that for [Thomas] Aquinas ‘good and evil are concepts analysed 
and fixed in metaphysics before they are applied in morals’ [footnote omitted]. On the contrary, Aquinas 
asserts as plainly as possible that the first principles of natural law , which specify the basic forms of good 
and evil and which can be adequately grasped by anyone of the age of reason (and not just by 
metaphysicians) are per se nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable [footnote omitted]. They are not inferred 
from speculative principles. They are not inferred from facts. They are not inferred from metaphysical 
propositions about human nature, or about good and evil, or about ‘the function of a human being’, 
[footnote omitted] nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of nature, [footnote omitted] or any 
other conception of nature. They are not inferred or derived from anything. They are underived (though not 
innate). Principles of right and wrong, too, are derived from these first, pre-moral principles of practical 
reasonableness, and not from any facts whether metaphysical or otherwise.”; and Joseph Boyle, “Natural 
Law and the Ethics of Traditions” in Robert George (ed), Natural Law Theory, (1992) at 23: “What defines 
a [self-evident] proposition… is that it is a necessary truth in which the connection between the terms is 
immediate, unmediated by the middle term of a demonstrative syllogism. So… there is no absurdity in 
saying that a proposition is self-evident, that is, known through itself, and that some people do not see that 
it is self-evident…” 
147 See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (1739) at 469: “In every system of morality, which I 
have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary 
ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; 
when all of a sudden I am surpris’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is 
not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is 
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new 
relation or affirmation, ‘tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a 
reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction 
from others, which are entirely different from it.” 
148 Hart saw classical natural law theory as such: “The doctrine of Natural Law is part of an older 
conception of nature in which the observable world is not merely a scene of… regularities, and knowledge 
of nature is not merely a knowledge of them. Instead, on this older outlook every nameable kind of existing 
thing, human, animate, and inanimate, is conceived not only as tending to maintain itself in existence but as 
proceeding toward a definite optimum state which is the specific good – or the end… appropriate for it… 
This is the teleological conception of nature as containing in itself levels of excellence which things 
realise”: supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 188 to 189. Finnis, though, may not have seen himself as 
such a neoclassical natural law theorist: “[Principles of natural law refer to] (i) a set of basic practical 
principles which indicate the basic forms of human flourishing as goods to be pursued or realised, and 
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it has led legal theorists to consider him as being responsible for reviving natural law 
theory.149 The relevance of self-evidence and the basic goods, then, is that the objective 
of a legal system is to provide a framework that helps an individual secure the 7 basic 
goods, and such a framework is arrived at by employing the 9 requirements of practical 
reasonableness.  
 
(b) Unjust laws as laws? 
 
But as an advocate of natural law theory, does Finnis go as far as to deny unjust laws are 
laws? Will an unjust law bind a citizen beyond the moral sense? One commentator has 
accurately captured the characterisation:150 
 
In his important book, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis distinguishes 
what he calls the ‘focal’ meaning of law from its ‘secondary’ meaning (Finnis, 
1980, p11). The focal conception of law is an ideal form of law, a form to which 
actual law is an approximation. The central case of law is the law of what Finnis 
calls ‘a complete community’, where a complete community is ‘an all-round 
association’ in which are co-ordinated ‘the initiatives and activities of 
individuals, of families, and of the vast network of intermediate associations’ 
(Finnis, 1980, p 147). Its ‘point or common good’ is to secure ‘a whole ensemble 
of material and other conditions that tend to favour the realisation, by each 
individual in the community, of his or her personal development’ (Finnis, 1980, p 
154). Thus when ‘law’ is used in its focal or central meaning it describes rules 
which secure the common good by co-ordinating the different goods of 
                                                                                                                                                 
which are in one way or another used by everyone who considers what to do, however unsound his 
conclusions; and (ii) a set of basic methodological requirements of practical reasonableness (itself one of 
the basic forms of human flourishing) which distinguish sound from unsound practical thinking and which, 
when all brought to bear, provide the criteria for distinguishing acts that… are reasonable-all-things-
considered… and acts that are unreasonable-all-things-considered, i.e. between ways of acting that are 
morally right or morally wrong – thus enabling one to formulate (iii) a set of general moral standards… the 
principles of natural law explain the obligatory force (in the fullest sense of ‘obligation’) of positive laws, 
even when those laws cannot be deduced from those principles”: supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 
note 25 at 23 to 24. 
149 See e.g., Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence, (2009) at 28; and Ian MacLeod, Legal Theory, 
(2007) at 106. 
150 Denise Meyerson, Understanding Jurisprudence, (2007) at 39 (emphasis in original). See also supra, 
Natural Law Theory, note 146 at 114: “[Finnis] rejects the traditional view that natural law validates 
positive law, so that positive law which is incompatible with natural law is not truly law at all… preferring 
the view that natural law provides a means for assessing the merit or demerit of positive law. In other 
words, Finnis’ view is that natural law is evaluative, rather than constitutive, of positive law.”; and supra, 
Justification and Validity in Finnis’ Natural Law Theory, note 144 at 110 to 111: “Finnis appears more 
positivistic… in his view as to the effect of immorality of the impugned law on its legal validity. Finnis 
contends that unjust laws are laws, and that there is a legal obligation in the legal sense, but sometimes not 
a legal obligation in the moral sense, to obey them. This is qualified by an overarching moral obligation to 
obey laws insofar as to avoid the situation of the whole system being thrown into contempt. He agrees that 
in some cases laws may be so iniquitous that obedience may be withheld, but… so do the positivists Austin 
and Bentham. His only point of departure from positivism seems to be his elaboration of the definition of 
law in the central or focal sense, where he argues law should incorporate his principles of practical 
reasonableness, be tailored to help one secure the basic goods, and be consistent with the rule of law. He 
also argues that true authority must come from acting in favour of the common good. But again, it is 
questionable if positivists would disagree.” 
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individuals, this is the true purpose of law. It follows from this, says Finnis, that 
unjust laws are not laws in the focal sense of the term. They are not ‘true’ laws, 
or law ‘in the fullest sense’, in the same way that a neglectful parent may be 
described as ‘no parent’. They are defective as laws and therefore, judged from 
the perspective of law’s focal meaning, ‘less’ legal than laws that are just (Finnis, 
1980, p 279). But there are also, in Finnis’s view, secondary meanings of the 
term ‘law’: here we are talking about instances of law which are ‘undeveloped, 
primitive, corrupt, deviant or otherwise “qualified sense” or “extended sense” 
instances of the subject-matter’ (Finnis, 1980, p11). When we are concerned with 
law in such a secondary sense – when we are concerned with what is merely ‘in a 
sense’ law – there is no point in saying that unjust laws lack legal validity. 
Rather, they are valid laws which fall short of the moral ideals which are 
contained in the concept of law in its fullest sense. 
 
At the same time, however, it is worth mentioning that Finnis has questioned before the 
usefulness of positivism – of the variety espoused by Hart – and even labelled the 
enterprise “redundant”:151 
 
Positivism never coherently reaches beyond reporting attitudes and convergent 
behaviour… It has nothing to say to officials or private citizens who want to 
judge whether, when, and why the authority and obligatoriness claimed and 
enforced by those who are acting as officials of a legal system, and by their 
directives, are indeed authoritative reasons for their own conscientious action. 
Positivism, at this point, does no more than repeat (i) what any competent lawyer 
– including every legally competent adherent of natural law theory – would say 
are (or are not) intra-systematically valid laws, imposing “legal requirements” 
and (ii) what any streetwise observer would warn are the likely consequences of 
non-compliance. It cannot explain the authoritativeness, for an official’s or a 
private citizen’s conscience (ultimate rational judgment) of these alleged and 
imposed requirements, nor their lack of such authority when radically unjust. 
Positivism is not only incoherent. It is also redundant. 
 
Thus on the one hand, Finnis has decried positivism as redundant, and on the other hand, 
he will not deny the use of Hart’s test in identifying law in a legal system as valid152 – a 
                                                 
151 John Finnis, “Natural Law: The Classical Tradition” in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, (2004) at 21 (emphasis in original). Positivists, 
naturally, had something to say in response – see e.g., Joseph Raz, “The Problem About the Nature of Law” 
in Guttorm Floistrad, Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, Volume 3, (1986) at 123 to 124: “If a 
theory of adjudication is a theory of law, if all the considerations to be used by courts are legal 
considerations, the theory of the nature of law is a moral theory. A different conclusion emerges if one 
follows the… institutional approach. Since law belongs to the executive stage, it can be identified without 
resort to moral arguments, which belong by definition to the deliberative stage. The doctrine of the nature 
of law yields a test for identifying law the use of which requires no resort to moral or any other evaluative 
argument. But it does not follow that one can defend the doctrine of the nature of law itself without using 
evaluative (though not necessarily moral) arguments. Its justification is tied to an evaluative judgment 
about the relative importance of various features of social organizations, and these reflect our moral and 
intellectual interests and concerns.”   
152 See also supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 351: “[A] theory of natural law need not 
have as its principal concern, either theoretical or pedagogical, the affirmation that ‘unjust laws are not 
law’. .. The principal concern of a theory of natural law is to explore the requirements of practical 
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test which may potentially consider an unjust law as law. Perhaps then, if Hart is (as he 
acknowledges) a soft positivist,153 Finnis should be considered a soft natural law theory 
advocate.154 Yet one is left with the sense that the necessity of the connection between 
law and morality – or lack of – is more fatal in the case of Finnis. Labels may not always 
matter, but it may be useful to bear these distinctions in mind before we move on.155 For 
                                                                                                                                                 
reasonableness in relation to the good of human beings who, because they live in community with one 
another, are confronted with problems of justice and rights, of authority, law and obligation. And the 
principal jurisprudential concern of a theory of natural law is thus to identify the principles and limits of the 
Rule of Law… and to trace the ways in which sound laws, in all their positivity and mutability, are to be 
derived… from unchanging principles…” 
153 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 250. 
154 See e.g., supra, Justification and Validity in Finnis’ Natural Law Theory, note 144 at 115: “[Natural 
Law and Natural Rights], while not being a version of true natural law, may indeed be the inchoate version 
of, or launchpad for, a more complete theory of natural law.” Moreover, whereas his fellow natural law 
theory advocate Lon Fuller would condemn a system that lacks the 8 minimum desiderata (see Lon Fuller, 
The Morality of Law, (1969) at 39: “The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, sot 
that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes are: (2) a failure to publicise, or at 
least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive 
legislation, which cannot itself guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since 
it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to make rules understandable; (5) the 
enactment of contradictory rules of (6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; 
(7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them; and, 
finally, (8) a failure to achieve congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration.”) as a “bad system of law… [and] something that is not properly called a legal system at 
all”, Finnis does not seem to go as far, preferring (impliedly) to describe a legal system that lacks the rule 
of law as being in bad shape (supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 270), although he does 
make the effort to supplement Fuller’s theory of the internal morality of law: supra, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, note 25 at 270 to 276; and supra, note 152. For a critique of Fuller’s theory, however, see 
H.L.A. Hart, Book Book Review of The Morality of Law, (1965) 78 Harvard Law Review 1281 at 1285 to 
1286: “[Fuller’s insistence in the Morality of Law] on classifying these principles of legality as a ‘morality’ 
is a source of confusion both for him and his readers... [T]he crucial objection to the designation of these 
principles of good legal craftsmanship as morality, in spite of the qualification ‘inner’, is that it perpetrates 
a confusion between two notions that it is vital to hold apart: the notions of purposive activity and morality. 
Poisoning is no doubt a purposive activity, and reflections on its purpose may show that it has its internal 
principles. (‘Avoid poisons however lethal if they cause the victim to vomit’...) But to call these principles 
of the poisoner’s art ‘the morality of poisoning’ would simply blur the distinction between the notion of 
efficiency for a purpose and those final judgments about activities and purposes with which morality in its 
various forms is concerned.” 
155 Consider, at this juncture, the comment made in Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, (2008) at 132: 
“Finnis is a social theorist who wants to use law to improve society. His arguments for law thus, not 
surprisingly, centre on its instrumental value. The focal meaning of law concentrates on what it achieves, 
not what it is… we are left with the suspicion that Finnis gives us no substantial reason why social ordering 
through law is the most appropriate way of organising political life, that it has, in other words, the greatest 
moral value.” See also supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 290: “[T]he concern of the 
[natural law] tradition… has been to show that the act of ‘positing’ law (whether judicially or legislatively 
or otherwise) is an act which can and should be guided by ‘moral’ principles and rules; that those moral 
norms are a matter of objective reasonableness, not of whim, convention, or mere ‘decision’; and that those 
same moral norms justify (a) the very institution of positive law, (b) the main institutions, techniques, and 
modalities within that institution (e.g. separation of powers), and (c) the main institutions regulated and 
sustained by law (e.g. government, contract, property, marriage, and criminal liability). What truly 
characterises the tradition is that it is not content merely to observe the historical or sociological fact that 
‘morality’ thus affects ‘law’, but instead seeks to determine what the requirements of practical 
reasonableness really are, so as to afford a rational basis for the activities of legislators, judges, and 
citizens.”  
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if Finnis is not saying that his 7 basic goods and 9 requirements of practical 
reasonableness allow us to identify a legal system but rather, one should merely aspire 
that a legal system possess these characteristics, he may not be sitting opposite Hart on 
the table of jurisprudence. Then again, this situation is replicated if Hart’s rule of 
recognition somehow (for the sake of argument) demands that the legal system is 
structured around Finnis’ 7 goods and 9 requirements – they will not be opposing each 
other. I think the conundrum can be resolved this way: this paper is not only concerned 
with analysing which theory better accounts for what Wikipedia is, but also how and why 
Wikipedians behave the way they do. So if indeed the Wikipedian community is 
structuring its regulations around basic goods and requirements of practical 
reasonableness, then it goes to show that Finnis’ normative account of law has given us 
resources the account for questions relating to the how and why, and such aspiration 
actually exists.   
 
(c) The 7 basic goods necessary for human flourishing 
 
Finnis prefaces his identification of the 7 basic goods – which are not to be quite thought 
of as moral values yet156 – as follows:157  
 
It is now time to revert, from the descriptive or ‘speculative’ findings of 
anthropology and psychology, to the critical and essentially practical discipline in 
which each reader must ask himself: What are the basic aspects of my well-
being. Here each one of us, however extensive his knowledge of the interests of 
other people and other cultures, is alone with his own intelligent grasp of the 
indemonstrable (because self-evident) first principles of his own practical 
reasoning. From one’s capacity to grasp intelligently the basic forms of good as 
‘to-be-pursued’ one gets one’s ability, in the descriptive disciplines of history and 
anthropology, to sympathetically… see the point of actions, life-styles, 
characters, and cultures that one would not choose for oneself. 
 
Finnis acknowledges that there are other things which people would wish to see included, 
but opines that these are likely to be qualities which facilitate the pursuit of the 7 basic 
goods rather than themselves being goods; in any event, it is entirely possible for 
someone to come up with a shorter or longer list, employing different nomenclature.158 
The goods also cannot be “analytically reduced to being merely an aspect of any of the 
others, or to being merely instrumental in the pursuit or any of the others… there is no 
objective hierarchy amongst them.”159 The pursuit of the goods, however, requires a 
community; it is by an appeal to the common good that Finnis develops his concept of 
justice:160 
                                                 
156 Ibid at 62 and 86. 
157 Ibid at 85 (emphasis in original). 
158 Ibid at 90 to 92. Finnis denies, however, at 95 to 97, that “pleasure” can be the “point of it all”, agreeing 
with Robert Nozick’s conclusions regarding the thought experiment about the “experience machine”. 
159 Ibid at 92. 
160 Ibid at 219 to 220. He also says at 161 to 163: “In its full generality, the complex concept of justice 
embraces three elements… The first element might be called other-directedness: justice has to do with 
one’s relations and dealings with other persons; it is ‘inter-subjective’ or inter-personal. There is a question 
of justice and injustice only where there is a plurality of individuals and some practical question concerning 
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There is, I think, no alternative but to hold in one’s mind’s eye some pattern, or 
range of patterns, of human character, conduct, and interaction in community, 
and then to choose such specifications of rights as tends to favour the pattern, or 
range of patterns. In other words, one needs some conception of human good, of 
individual flourishing in a form (or range of forms) of communal life that fosters 
rather than hinders such flourishing. One attends not merely to character types 
desirable in the abstract or in isolation, but also to the quality of interaction 
among persons; and one should not seek to realise some pattern ‘end-state’ 
imagined in abstraction from the processes of individual initiative and 
interaction, processes which are integral to human good and which make the 
future, let alone its evaluation, is incalculable. 
 
Moving on to the values proper, life is identified by Finnis as a first basic value,161 a 
value that corresponds to our drive for self-preservation. Life includes bodily and 
cerebral health, “freedom from the pain that betokens organic malfunctioning or injury”, 
and “the transmission of life by procreation of children.”162  
 
Finnis’ second basic value – which he devotes an entire chapter of his book to – is that of 
knowledge, “considered as desirable for its own sake, not merely instrumentally.”163 He 
first clarifies that the knowledge in question is “speculative knowledge”, as opposed to 
knowledge sought only “instrumentally”, and that speculative knowledge is “one form of 
human activity, the activity of trying to find out, to understand, and to judge matters 
correctly.”164 He next makes the compelling argument that the “sceptical assertion that 
knowledge is not a good is operationally self-refuting. For one who makes such an 
assertion intending it as a serious contribution to rational discussion, is implicitly 
committed to the proposition that he believes his assertion is worth making, and worth 
making qua true… But the sense of his original assertion was precisely that truth is not a 
good worth pursuing or knowing.”165 
 
The third basic value, play, is considered by Finnis to be a “large and irreducible element 
in human culture… [which is sometimes] enjoyed for its own sake”; and it may be 
                                                                                                                                                 
their situation and/or interactions vis-à-vis each other… The second element… is that of duty, of what is 
owed (debitum) or due to another, and correspondingly of what that other person has a right to… The third 
element… can be called equality… it may be better to think of proportionality [footnote omitted], or even 
of equilibrium or balance.” (emphasis in original). 
161 Ibid at 85. 
162 Id. 
163 Ibid at 87. 
164 Ibid at 59 to 60. 
165 Ibid at 74 to 75. But see supra, Legal Theory, note 149 at 115 to 116: “First, on the question of 
knowledge as a good generally, it is possible to argue that the distinction between speculative and 
instrumental knowledge is false, with the goodness of all knowledge depending on the use (if any) to which 
it is put. For example, knowledge which confers the ability to unleash nuclear power may be a good when 
applied to generating electricity cheaply, and yet be an evil when applied to creating weapons of mass 
destruction… Secondly, to say that denying that knowledge is a good is ‘operationally self-refuting’ is 
merely to set up an Aunt Sally in order to knock it down. All that is required by way of reply to Finnis on 
this point is a rewording of the proposition… so that it becomes a denial that all knowledge is necessarily a 
good…” (emphasis in original). 
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“solitary or social, intellectual or physical, strenuous or relaxed, highly structured or 
relatively informal, conventional or ad hoc”.166 
 
The fourth basic value, aesthetic experience, is actually linked to the third value of play. 
Finnis points out the subtle difference between them as follows: “Many forms of play… 
are the matrix or occasion of aesthetic experience. But beauty is not an indispensable 
element of play. Moreover, beautiful form can be found and enjoyed in nature. Aesthetic 
experience, unlike play, need no involve an action of one’s own; what is sought after and 
valued for its own sake may simply be the beautiful form ‘outside’ one, and the ‘inner’ 
experience of appreciation of its beauty.”167 
 
The fifth basic value is sociability, “which in its weakest form is realised by a minimum 
of peace and harmony amongst men, and which ranges through the forms of human 
community to its strongest form in the flowering of full friendship… friendship involves 
acting for the sake of one’s friend’s purposes, one’s friend’s well-being.”168 
 
The sixth basic value is practical reasonableness, it being the “good of being able to bring 
one’s own intelligence to bear effectively (in practical reasoning that issues in action) on 
the problems of choosing one’s actions and lifestyle and shaping one’s own character.”169 
This value involves freedom and reason, and integrity and authenticity.170 
 
The seventh and final basic value is religion. Although Finnis’ personal faith 
(Catholicism) may lead us to believe that “religion” involves belief in some sort of 
uncaused cause (like God),171 “religion” is used here by Finnis in a broader and extended 
sense. He proposes that all humans are concerned to know how things come about, 
whether there might be something superior to human intellect to which humans are 
subject to, and the place of humanity within this cosmos.172 Again, the basic goods have 
no moral force per se; it is the 9 requirements of practical reasonableness that structure 
our pursuit of the goods, and provide the criteria for distinguishing ways of acting that are 
morally right or wrong. Together, these 2 aspects of Finnis’ theory constitute the 
universal and immutable principles of natural law.173 
                                                 
166 Ibid at 87. 
167 Ibid at 87 to 88. 
168 Ibid at 88. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 But see supra, Justification and Validity in Finnis’ Natural Law Theory, note 144 at 112: “Finnis does 
not seem to be sure whether his theory… can truly be understood without his apparent [footnote omitted] 
‘conclusion’ of God.” 
172 Supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 89 to 90. 
173 See also ibid at 223 to 225: “Are there then no limits to what may be done in pursuit of protection of 
human rights or of other aspects of the common good? Are there no fixed points in that pattern of life 
which one must hold in one’s mind’s eye in resolving problems of rights? Are there no ‘absolute’ rights, 
rights that are not to be limited or overridden for the sake of any conception of the good life in community, 
not even ‘to prevent catastrophe’?... it is always unreasonable to choose directly against any basic value, 
whether in oneself or in one’s fellow human beings. And the basic values are not mere abstractions; they 
are aspects of the real well-being of flesh-and-blood individuals. Correlative to the exceptionless duties 
entailed by this requirement are, therefore, exceptionless or absolute human claim-rights – most obviously, 
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(d) The 9 basic requirements of practical reasonableness  
 
The requirements of practical reasonableness serve a number of purposes. They: (1) 
enable us to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable acts, “[guiding] the 
transition from judgments about human goods to judgments about the right thing to do 
here and now”;174 (2) provide the “deep structure of moral thought” and that everything 
required by virtue of them “is required by natural law”;175 and (3) “provide the 
fundamental principles of any legal system that meets the requirements of reason, and 
sound human laws will respect them and seek to implement them.”176 
 
The first requirement is having a coherent plan of life, which Finnis says is inspired by 
John Rawls’ “rational plan of life”.177 Since life is short and we all need to make choices, 
choices should be internally consistent. It will be a mistake simply to live for the moment 
and make choices on that basis.178 
 
The second requirement is avoiding arbitrary preferences among values. As Finnis 
explains: “Any commitment to a coherent plan of life is going to involve some degree of 
concentration on one or some of the basic forms of good, at the expense… of other forms 
of good. But the commitment will be rational only if it is on the basis of one’s assessment 
of one’s capacities, circumstances… it will be unreasonable if it is on the basis of a 
devaluation of any of the basic forms of human excellence…”179 
 
The third requirement is avoiding arbitrary preferences amongst persons. There is 
“reasonable scope for self-preference. But when all allowance is made for that, this third 
                                                                                                                                                 
the right to have one’s life taken directly as a means to any further end; but the right not to be positively 
lied to in any situation… in which factual communication… is reasonably expected; and the related right 
not to be condemned on knowingly false charges; and the right not to be deprived, or required to deprive 
oneself, of one’s procreative capacity; and the right to be taken into respectful consideration in any 
assessment of what the common good requires.” 
174 Ibid at 70. 
175 Ibid at 124 and 127. 
176 Supra, Understanding Jurisprudence, note 150 at 40. See also supra, Understanding Jurisprudence, 
note 149 at 49 to 50: “Consider for a moment some of the many difficulties that face the moral or legal 
philosopher attempting to answer [moral questions]. First, moral or ethical evaluation is itself problematic. 
Merely by postulating the view that the exercise has some point, one is resisting ethical nihilism or non-
cognitivism. And by suggesting, as one would clearly wish to do, that the matter may in several important 
senses, be universalised, one is rejecting relativist, emotivist, and existentialist arguments and by claiming 
that it has some practical value – which I assume it does – one is embracing some of prescriptivism… 
Secondly, a number of fundamental moral judgments turn on which conception of ethics on adopts. I think 
that this issue is best confronted by way of a deontological, or action-centred (rather than outcome-centred) 
approach. Thirdly… the selection of any society as a model is not free of difficulty. It requires, at the very 
least, an accurate account of its political and legal system… the predicament of the judge in such a system 
depends on several empirical observations about the regime which are neither uncomplicated nor 
uncontroversial. Fourthly, it may be that the value of any consideration of the judge’s moral dilemma is 
likely to be diminished without a credible theory of the judicial function in a common law context.” 
(emphasis in original). 
177 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (2005) at 408 to 423. 
178 Supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 103 to 105. 
179 Ibid at 105. 
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requirement remains, a pungent critique of selfishness, special pleading, double 
standards, hypocrisy, indifference to the good of others whom one could easily help… 
and all the other manifold forms of egoistic and group bias.”180 
 
The fourth and fifth requirements are complementary, and they are detachment and 
commitment respectively. Finnis elaborates: “[Detachment means there is] no good 
reason to take up an attitude to any of one’s particular objectives, such that if one’s 
project failed and one’s objective eluded one, one would consider one’s life drained of 
meaning… [commitment means] having made one’s general commitments one must not 
abandon them lightly… [although] one should be looking creatively for new and better 
ways of carrying out one’s commitments”.181  
 
The sixth requirement is efficiency within reason. One is to “bring about good in the 
world (in one’s own life and the lives of others) by actions that are efficient for their 
(reasonable) purpose(s). One must not waste opportunities by using inefficient methods. 
One’s actions should be judged by their effectiveness, by their fitness for their purpose, 
by their utility, by their consequences”.182 Finnis also declares utilitarianism and 
consequentialism to be irrational strategies of moral reasoning: “‘Good(s)’ should be 
measured and computed in the manner required by consequentialist ethics only if (a) 
human beings had some single, well-defined goal or function… or (b) the differing goals 
which men in fact pursue had some common factor, such as ‘satisfaction of desire’. But 
neither of these conditions obtains. Only an inhumane fanatic thinks that man is made to 
flourish in only one way or for only one purpose.”183 
 
The seventh requirement is respect for every basic value in every act, and one 
formulation of this requirement is that “one should not choose to do any act which of 
itself does nothing but damage or impede a realisation or participation of any one or more 
of the basic forms of human good… consequentialist reasoning is arbitrary and 
senseless… [each basic value] is objectively basic, primary, incommensurable with the 
others in point of objective importance.”184 
 
The eighth requirement is that of promoting the common good (of the community).185 
The common good is the “ensemble of conditions which would enable each to pursue his 
own objective… [it refers to] the factor or set of factors… which, as considerations in 
someone’s practical reasoning, would make sense of or given reason for his collaboration 
with others and would likewise, from their point of view, give reason for their 
collaboration with each other and with him.”186 
 
The ninth and final requirement is following one’s conscience, that is, “one should not do 
what one judges or thinks or ‘feels’-all-in-all should not be done… If one were by 
                                                 
180 Ibid at 107. 
181 Ibid at 109 to 110. 
182 Ibid at 111. 
183 Ibid at 112 to 113. 
184 Ibid at 118 to 119 (emphasis in original). 
185 Ibid at 125. 
186 Ibid at 154. 
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inclination generous, open, fair and steady in one’s love of human good, or if one’s 
milieu happened to have settled on reasonable mores, then one would be able, without 
solemnity, rigmarole, abstract reasoning, or casuistry, to make the particular practical 
judgments… that reason requires. If one is not so fortunate in one’s inclinations or 
upbringing, then one’s conscience will mislead one”.187 
 
With the claims of the two jurists established, we can now consider their validity in the 
Wikipedian context. The analysis will be made along the following lines: (1) types of 
rules; (2) authority and obedience; (3) lawmaking; and (4) law enforcement, unjust laws 
and dispute resolution.  
 
VI. Analysing the claims vis-à-vis the world of Wikipedia 
 
“When we face heavy regulation, we see and shape our behaviour more in 
relation to reward and punishment by an arbitrary external authority, than 
because of a commitment to the kind of world our actions can help bring 
about.”188 
 
(a) The different types of rules for community living 
 
Some preliminary observations are in order before a discussion of the different types of 
rules that exist on Wikipedia. By now, it should be apparent that Wikipedia, analysed as a 
community governed by some conception of law, is both familiar and sui generis at the 
same time. It is familiar because some of the rules and consequences flowing from those 
rules are the very same found in conventional, municipal legal systems.189 The 
regulations concerning, for instance, basic honesty, incivility, disruptive behaviour, 
copyright infringement and dispute resolution procedures come to mind – bearing in 
mind that these regulations do not simply govern one-off transactions and interactions, 
but day-to-day community living. And it is sui generis because Wikipedia is (in theory) 
among other reasons, neither a democracy that has the conventional tripartite elements of 
the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary, nor a community comprising “citizens” 
of a fixed or determinate locale – although at present, it is a community comprising 
                                                 
187 Ibid at 125. Consider too, the views of proponents of legal idealism, that “Persons may be brought to act 
through a variety of ways… [they can be] moved to a particular course of action by bringing about a state 
of affairs such that, in conjunction with a correct moral argument, that course of action is morally 
required.”: see Charles Fried, “The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History”, 
(1964) 77 Harvard Law Review 1258 at 1259. 
188 Supra, The Future of the Internet, note 26 at 128. 
189 See also supra, A Theory of Justice, note 177 at 235 and 240: “A legal system is a coercive order of 
public rules addressed to rational persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the 
framework for social cooperation. When these rules are just they establish a basis for legitimate 
expectations. They constitute grounds upon which persons can rely on one another and rightly object when 
their expectations are not fulfilled… By enforcing a public system of penalties government removes the 
grounds for thinking that others are not complying with the rules. For this reason alone, a coercive 
sovereign is presumably always necessary, even though in a well-ordered society sanctions are not severe 
and may never need to be imposed. Rather, the existence of effective penal machinery serves as men’s 
security to one another.” 
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Americans more than any other nationality.190 Then there is the interesting notion that 
there are no barriers other than standing in the community as to who can become an 
official on Wikipedia. One final noteworthy difference is purpose: whereas a 
conventional legal system that governs a conventional system is built in such a way so as 
to let people live (in the broadest sense of the term), the regulations of Wikipedia are 
made with the view to facilitating the creation of an encyclopedia, or the compiling of 
existing human knowledge. One thing is for sure: Wikipedia is as “recent” as it gets in 
terms of a brand new community designing its rules of living from scratch. Professor 
Jonathan Zittrain describes the foundational legal philosophy of the project 
authoritatively in the following terms:191  
 
Wikipedia began with three attributes. The first was verkeersbordvrij. Not only 
were there few rules at first – the earliest ones merely emphasized the idea of 
maintaining a “neutral point of view” in Wikipedia’s contents, along with a 
commitment to eliminate materials that infringed copyright and an injunction to 
ignore any rules if they got in the way of building a great encyclopedia – but 
there were also no gatekeepers…  This is a far cry from the elements of perfect 
enforcement: there are few lines between enforcers and citizens; reaction to 
abuse is not instantaneous; and missteps generally remain recorded in a page 
history for later visitors to see if they are curious. The second distinguishing 
attribute of Wikipedia was the provision of a discussion page alongside every 
main page. This allowed people to explain and justify their changes… 
Controversial changes made without any corresponding explanation on the 
discussion page could be reverted by others without having to rely on a judgment 
on the merits… The third crucial attribute of Wikipedia was a core of initial 
editors… who shared a common ethos and some substantive expertise…. Like 
the development of the Internet’s architecture, then, Wikipedia’s original design 
was simultaneously ambitious in scope but modest in execution, devoted to 
making something work without worrying about every problem that could come 
up if its extraordinary flexibility were abused. It embodied principles of trust-
your-neighbor and procrastination, as well as “Postel’s Law”, a rule of thumb 
written by one of the Internet’s founders to describe a philosophy of Internet 
protocol development: “[B]e conservative in what you do; be liberal in what you 
accept from others [footnote omitted].” 
 
What Professor Zittrain described – the behavioural and legal traits during the genesis of 
Wikipedia – have since undoubtedly evolved into something quite different. The number 
of regulations has only headed northwards exponentially, and do not appear to be 
navigating elsewhere anytime soon. Discussions on the rules and policies (and how they 
should be shaped) among Wikipedians are no longer happening mainly on article talk 
pages, but also with appreciable enthusiasm happening across various project pages,192 
                                                 
190 Andrew Lih, The Wikipedia Revolution, (2009) at 136. 
191 Supra, The Future of the Internet, note 26 at 133 to 134. The “verkeersbordvrij” is a traffic sign that 
means “free of traffic signs” in the Dutch language. 
192 See e.g., Wikipedia: SGpedians’ notice board – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:WikiProject_Singapore (last visited December 
24, 2010). 
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notice boards,193 requests for comments,194 proposal pages,195 community polls,196 (the 
now defunct) “Quickpolls”,197 and even global conventions,198 to name a few examples. 
 
(1) Measuring against Hart 
 
Preliminary observations aside, we come then to the question of whether Wikipedia’s 
regulations comport better with the legal theory of Hart or Finnis. At first blush, there 
may be a compelling parallel drawn between Hart’s conception of rules (law as strictly 
comprising rules and not non-rules),199 and Wikipedia’s distinctions between the various 
regulations as outlined earlier on.200 Like Hart’s system, Wikipedia’s regulations 
comprise rules of varying degrees of obligation; not all regulations, when not adhered to, 
matter in terms of legal consequences.201 Some are mere conventions (e.g., edit 
summaries)202 and some are mere moral exhortations (e.g., assuming good faith).203 
Hart’s rule of recognition will help sort this out. But, some problems arise precisely when 
we look at things from the angle of secondary rules. Much as the very nature of 
Wikipedia (and thus, its regulations) is constant change, the following probably 
statements accurately capture a longstanding community practice – a regulation that has 
the highest “legal status” in the form of policy:204 
 
                                                 
193 See Wikipedia: Noticeboards – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Noticeboard (last visited December 24, 2010). 
194 See e.g., Wikipedia: Requests for comment/Biographies of living people – Wikipedia, the free 
Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_comment/Biographies_of_living_
people (last visited December 24, 2010); and Wikipedia: Requests for comment/Biographies of living 
people – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia,  
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_comment/Biographies_of_living_
people/Phase_II (last visited December 24, 2010). 
195 See e.g., Global Sysops Proposal – Wikimedia, http://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Global_sysops/Vote (last 
visited December 24, 2010). 
196 Supra, The Wikipedia Revolution, note 190 at 128 to 131. See also Wikipedia: Requests for 
Comment/Biographies of Living People – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:RFC/BLP (last visited December 24, 2010). 
197 These were described as “an ad hoc “night court” for the community to quickly decide, in twenty-four 
hours, how to discipline problem users… In a community that prided itself on assuming good faith and 
thoughtful consensus, Quickpolls made an unusual spectacle of these cases, creating a virtual village mob: 
supra, The Wikipedia Revolution,  note 190 at 126 to 127. 
198 See Wikimania – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikimania (last visited December 24, 2010). 
199 Supra, section IV(b). 
200 Supra, section III. 
201 Supra, Wikipedia: Policies and guidelines, note 19. 
202 Supra, Help: Edit summary, note 59. 
203 Supra, Wikipedia: Vandalism, note 77; supra, Wikipedia: Gaming the system, note 89. 
204 Supra, Wikipedia: What Wikipedia is not, note 20. See also supra, Wikipedia: Guidelines and policies, 
note 19: “Wikipedia policies and guidelines are developed by the community to describe best practice, 
clarify principles, resolve conflicts, and otherwise further our goal of creating a free, reliable encyclopedia. 
Although Wikipedia does not employ hard-and-fast rules, its policy and guideline pages describe its 
principles and best-known practices. Policies describe standards that (within the limits of common sense) 
all users should normally follow, and guidelines are meant to contain best practices for doing so.” 
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Wikipedia is not governed by statute: it is not a moot court, and rules are not the 
purpose of the community. Written rules do not themselves set accepted practice, 
but rather document already existing community consensus regarding what 
should be accepted and what should be rejected. When instruction creep is found 
to have occurred, it should be removed. While Wikipedia’s written policies and 
guidelines should be taken seriously, they can be misused. Do not follow an 
overly strict interpretation of the letter of policy without consideration for the 
principles of policies. If the rules truly prevent you from improving the 
encyclopedia, ignore them. Disagreements are resolved through consensus-based 
discussion, rather than through tightly sticking to rules and procedures. 
Furthermore, policies and guidelines themselves may be changed to reflect 
evolving consensus. A procedural error made in posting anything, such as a 
proposal or nomination, is not grounds for invalidating that post. 
 
To remove all doubt, this policy is repeated in several places, most notably and most 
succinctly in the article Wikipedia: Ignore all rules. In a sentence (and nothing more), we 
are told that “If a rule prevents you from improving or maintaining Wikipedia, ignore 
it.”205 If the preceding quotes from Wikipedia: What Wikipedia is not and Wikipedia: 
Ignore all rules are correct, then perhaps the (overarching) rule of recognition on 
Wikipedia is this: there are rules, but they can be ignored sometimes because these rules 
either were borne out of convenience or only have a temporary quality; “common sense” 
or anything done in furtherance of improving the encyclopedia can prevail if 
necessary.206 Is this possible, given that the rule of recognition is supposed to remedy 
uncertainty?207 Indeed, while Hart’s conception of the rule of recognition bears several 
marks, the content of the rule is concededly more open-ended and may of course 
incorporate morality and justice.208 Yet even his theory may not have countenanced a rule 
of recognition that in effect says, “rules may not apply, and there is really no telling how 
when and how they may occur”.209 On the bases of human nature and the function of 
language, he was expecting uncertainty in rules to be at a premium.210 Here, however, the 
core and the penumbra no longer take predictable forms;211 the core may become the 
penumbra and vice versa as and when it happens, since rules may be disregarded when 
                                                 
205 Wikipedia: Ignore all rules – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Ignore_all_rules (last visited December 24, 
2010). C.f. Felix Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach”, (1935) 35 Columbia 
Law Review 809 at 833: “the really creative legal thinkers of the future will not devote themselves… to the 
taxonomy of legal concepts and to the systematic explication of principles… buttressed by ‘correct’ 
cases… Creative legal thought will more and more look behind the traditionally accepted principles of 
‘justice’ and ‘reason’ to appraise in ethical terms the social values at stake in any choice between two 
precedents…”; and supra, Logical Method and Law, note 135 at 25: “statutes have never been kept up with 
the variety and subtlety of social change… which is due not only to carelessness but also to the intrinsic 
impossibility of foreseeing all possible circumstances, since without such foresight definitions must be 
vague and classifications indeterminate.” 
206 A complementary rule of recognition may be that parties to adjudicated disputes (such as arbitration) 
will accept and conform to the outcome of the decision. 
207 Supra, note 112. 
208 Supra, note 114 ,115, and 116. 
209 Admittedly, this is also reminiscent of Hans Kelsen’s concept of the “grundnorm”. 
210 See also supra, note 130. 
211 Supra, note 138. 
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“common sense” or some grander “purpose” is invoked.212 The uncertainty here is not a 
child of uncertain language; in addition, if this formulation of the rule of recognition is 
correct, the penultimate rule asks that rules be dispensed with.213 This, to my mind, also 
far exceeds the sort of very limited discretion that Hart’s theory permits to be given to 
officials to overrule precedents.214 After all, Hart situates himself as being in between 
formalism and rule-scepticism, not belonging to either extreme.215 
 
One may consult the rule of change for a way out,216 only to find another obstacle: the 
function of the rule of change is to allow the introduction of new primary rules of 
conduct, and to eliminate old rules. This is very distinct from the notion that rules are 
sometimes binding and sometimes not.217 Moreover, using common sense as a trump card 
does not eliminate the old rule or become a new rule in itself, it merely serves as the 
governing rule for the particular dispute at hand. Or, can we find a rebuttal in Hart’s 
“minimum conditions” for a legal system?218 To recapitulate, the conditions are that: (1) 
the rules that are validated by the rule of recognition must be generally obeyed by 
citizens and officials; and (2) the secondary rules must be effectively accepted as 
common public standards of official behaviour by the officials. We have already 
addressed the issue of which regulations have the force of “law” and which do not, thus 
answering the question about the acceptance of the rule of recognition. So the next issue 
to be resolved is how general must the obedience be? The fact that Wikipedia has 
continued to burgeon in every sense of the word without showing any visible sign of 
collapse suggests, prima facie, that it is a thriving community, brought about no less by a 
stable legal order, which in turn has to be brought about either by preponderant obedience 
or efficient enforcement (obedience and enforcement will be discussed in separate 
sections below).219 As for the secondary rules, nothing we have seen so far suggests that 
the officials (e.g., the administrators, the bureaucrats, and the arbitration committee) do 
not accept the secondary rules as common public standards of official behaviour. 
Adjudicators, adjudicatory processes and the process of selecting adjudicators are not 
without controversy,220 but the acceptance of them is not in question in Wikipedia, as 
evidenced by their continued and likely-to-be-continued existence. Finally, the dynamic, 
ever-changing nature of Wikipedia itself suffices to ensure the upholding of the rule of 
change.  
                                                 
212 See also supra, note 133. 
213 Yet another way to look at the issue is through the lens of “consensus”. Consensus is also the 
underpinning concept in international law, to which Hart believes his theory can somewhat account for (as 
opposed to traditional positivism which could not): see supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at Chapter X. 
But international law is not analogously predicated on the lack of rules; the legal structures of international 
law are certainly more defined and rigid than “rules may or may not apply”. 
214 Supra, note 133. 
215 Supra, IV(f). 
216 Supra, note 112. 
217 See also supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 117: “In [a primitive legal system], since there are no 
officials, the rules must be widely accepted as setting critical standards for the behaviour of the group. If, 
there, the internal point of view is not widely disseminated there could not logically be any rules.” 
218 Supra, note 116. 
219 Infra, VI(b) and VI(d). 
220 Supra, The Wikipedia Revolution, note 190 at 183 to 200; and supra, The World and Wikipedia, note 8 
at 174 to 195. 
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Perhaps then the easiest reconciliation is that the rule of recognition can indeed be as 
open-ended as the one suggested above. Nonetheless, the tentative nature of the answers 
to the challenge presented principally to the rule of recognition so far may conveniently 
prompt us to dismiss the comparison of Wikipedia to a legal system – but, we will have 
to march on for now to see if it does bear too many other important marks of a legal 
system before we can do that. Nor can we accuse the Wikipedia community for not being 
sophisticated enough to come up with sufficient rules such that common sense can be 
invoked so easily as a trump – given the enormity and complexity of the project, as well 
as the extent of the participation, the status quo appears to be a situation arrived at 
deliberately.221 In addition, there is nothing peculiar about the policy claiming that the 
“purpose” of Wikipedia is not rules – which community’s is? 
 
(2) Measuring against Finnis 
 
Does Finnis fare any better in this respect? Does his theory, for instance, offer any legal 
restraint on the ostensible unpredictability surrounding the application and non-
application of rules? Are there any self-evident truths about human behaviour and human 
nature that rein in the potential mayhem that should be an inevitable consequence of there 
being no clear direction as to when rules should apply? And even if there are, do they 
form part of his formulation of rules? To be sure, Finnis does offer a definition of law:222 
 
[Law, in the focal sense, refers] primarily to rules made, in accordance with 
regulative legal rules, by a determinate and effective authority (itself identified 
and, standardly, constituted as an institution by legal rules) for a ‘complete’ 
community, and buttressed by sanctions in accordance with the rule-guided 
stipulations of adjudicative institutions, this ensemble of rules and institutions 
being directed to reasonably resolving any of the community’s co-ordination 
problems (and to ratifying, tolerating, or overriding co-ordination solutions from 
any other institutions or sources of norms) for the common good of that 
community, according to a manner and form itself adapted to that good common 
by features of specificity, minimisation of arbitrariness, and maintenance of a 
quality of reciprocity between the subjects of the law both amongst themselves 
and in their relations with the lawful authorities.  
 
From the above extract, although Finnis also uses the terminology of rules and 
institutions (but probably does not apply them as precisely as Hart would for the different 
                                                 
221 The project did start off with some sort of bohemian cum nihilistic philosophy: see supra, The Wikipedia 
Revolution, note 190 at 112: “When Wikipedia was launched, it started out with very few fixed rules. The 
wiki culture was still new to everyone involved, and Larry Sanger [the other founder of Wikipedia] was 
simply trying to gather critical mass for the project. One of the most famous original and innovative rules 
was his: Ignore all rules (IAR). It is not as nihilistic as it sounds. The earliest incarnation read: If rules 
make you nervous and depressed, and not desirous of participating in the Wiki, then ignore them and go 
about your business [footnote omitted].”” 
222 Supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 276 to 277. 
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types of Wikipedia regulations),223 what sets Finnis apart from Hart is the requirement of 
furthering the “common good” of the community. It is submitted that this “common 
good” for human beings is simply a reference to Finnis’ 7 basic goods,224 his 
indispensable precursor to deciphering community morality.225 But assuming that we are 
dealing with penumbral situations, is this any different or better than Hart’s theory, which 
tells us to look to aims, policies and purposes?226 Is it any more sensible and 
explanatorily adequate to equate “common sense” or “purpose” with “common 
purpose”?227 Professor Zittrain offers some clues:228 
 
When disputes come up, consensus is sought before formality, and the lines 
between subject and regulator are thin. While not everyone has the powers of an 
administrator, the use of those special powers is reserved for persistent abuse 
rather than daily enforcement. It is the editors – that is, those who choose to 
participate – whose decision and work collectively add up to an encyclopedia – 
or not… This is the essence of law: something larger than an arbitrary exercise of 
force, and something with meaning apart from a pretext for that force, one 
couched in neutral terms only for the purpose of social acceptability. It has been 
rediscovered among people who often profess little respect for their own 
sovereigns’ “real” law, following it not out of civic agreement or pride but 
because of a cynical balance of the penalties for being caught against the benefits 
of breaking it. Indeed, the idea that a “neutral point of view” even exists, and that 
it can be determined among people who disagree, is an amazingly quaint, perhaps 
even naïve notion. Yet it is invoked earnestly and often productively on 
Wikipedia… Wikipedia shows, if perhaps only for a fleeting moment under 
particularly fortuitous circumstances, that… the fewer the number of 
prescriptions, the more people’s sense of personal responsibility escalates.  
 
If indeed we can interpret this to mean that the Wikipedia community, in its aversion to 
formal rules (despite the proliferation of rules), in effect prefers to be unshackled from 
the rigidity of rules and allow some form of “free morality”229 (constrained, presumably, 
                                                 
223 See also Ibid at 270: “So it is that legal order has two broad characteristics, two characteristic modes of 
operation, two poles about which jurisprudence and ‘definitions of law’ tend to cluster… they can be 
summed up in two slogans: ‘law is a coercive order’ and ‘the law regulates its own creation’.” 
224 Ibid at 155: “For there is a ‘common good’ for human beings, inasmuch as life, knowledge, play, 
aesthetic experience, friendship, religion, and freedom in practical reasonableness are good any and every 
person. And each of these human values is itself a ‘common good’ inasmuch as it can be participated in by 
an inexhaustible number of persons in an inexhaustible variety of ways or an inexhaustible variety of 
occasions. These two senses of ‘common good’ are to be distinguished from a third, from which, however, 
they are not radically separate. This third sense of ‘common good’ is the one commonly intended 
throughout this book, and it is: a set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for 
themselves reasonable objectives, or to realise reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which 
they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a community.” 
225 Ibid at 126. 
226 Supra, note 138. 
227 See also supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 153. 
228 Supra, The Future of the Internet, note 26 at 144. 
229 “Free morality” is essentially morality found external to the morality found within the law, the latter 
being analysed in a more structured and disciplined manner. See e.g., Owen Fiss, “Objectivity and 
Interpretation” in Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux (eds), Interpreting Law and Literature, (1991) at 
239: “The prescriptive element in adjudication and legal texts does not preclude objective interpretation. 
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by reason and logic) as the ultimate dictate for disputes (difficult or otherwise),230 it is 
ironic, because both Wikipedia and positivism (in the main, clarity and certainty of rules) 
are in my view associated with the left on the political spectrum. This irony also speaks 
to a discordance between a modern and an ancient assertion: respectively, that the left is 
not anti-rational; and natural law is rational.231 That of course is a minor (and debatable) 
point and the larger point is that Wikipedia may well be governed not so much by rules, 
but some abstract notion of morality, and a morality that exceeds Hart’s minimalist 
natural law concept that is tied to survival.232 And if we presuppose (which we can, I 
think) that its existing regulations are borne out of moral considerations, then law is about 
morality in Wikipedia, and this brings it at odds with Hart’s insistence on the conceptual 
separation of law and morality.233 The necessity of this conclusion comporting with 
Finnis’ theory of whether humans idealise toward law in a focal sense will depend on 
what sort of morality is in question. After all, Finnis’ version is about timeless and 
objective morality,234 which necessarily shelters itself from the winds of culturally 
relativistic and popular/prevailing moral claims, and is distinct from amoral concerns like 
efficacy and efficiency (important values in a project like Wikipedia).235 And it would 
seem that the most direct way to answer this query is to ask if the regulations (including 
the rule that common sense can act as a trump) are designed, designated, and structured 
around securing the basic goods using principles of practical reasonableness. To this end, 
I would think that the salient goods to be secured in this context would be knowledge, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Prescriptive texts are as amenable to interpretation as descriptive ones… Interpretation does no require 
agreement or consensus, nor does the objective character of legal interpretation arise from agreement. What 
is being interpreted is a text, and the morality embodied in that text, not what individual people believe to 
be the good or right. An individual is… morally free to dispute the claim of the public morality…”  
230 See also supra, The Wikipedia Revolution, note 190 at 83: “The power of Wikipedia’s model is that it is 
free-form – anyone can edit any page at any time. Contributors work on a micro-level… The community 
trusts individuals to behave responsibly. Lessons learned from dealing with vandals, troublemakers, and 
noisy individuals in Usenet were applied by Wikipedia’s toolmakers and community members. Obnoxious 
users could be blocked from editing, and articles could be locked to prevent vandalism. And changes to 
whole sets of articles could be done through software robots… as Wikipedia took off, the community found 
most people were remarkably well behaved and productive, something not everyone would have thought 
about a site that encouraged anyone to edit any page at any time.” 
231 See e.g., Susan Jacoby, The Age of American Unreason, (2009) at xi to xii: “it is difficult to suppress the 
fear that the scales of American history have shifted heavily against the vibrant and varied intellectual life 
so essential to functional democracy. During the past four decades, America’s endemic anti-intellectual 
tendencies have been grievously exacerbated by a new species of semi-conscious anti-rationalism, feeding 
on and fed by an ignorant popular culture of video images and unremitting noise that leaves no room for 
contemplation or logic. This new form of anti-rationalism, at odds not only with the nation’s heritage of 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment reason but with modern scientific knowledge, has propelled a surge of 
anti-intellectualism capable of inflicting vastly greater damage than its historical predecessors inflicted on 
American culture and politics.” 
232 Supra, IV(d). 
233 Supra, IV(e). 
234 Supra, note 153. 
235 But see Allen Arthur Leff, “Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law”, (1979) Duke Law Journal 1229 at 
1249: “All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we have. Given what we know about ourselves and each 
other, this is an extraordinarily unappetizing prospect; looking around the world, it appears that if all men 
are brothers, the ruling model is Cain and Abel. Neither reason, nor love, nor even terror, seems to have 
worked to make us “good”, and worse than that, there is no reason why anything should. Only if ethics 
were something unspeakable by us, could law be unnatural, and therefore unchallengeable. As things now 
stand, everything is up for grabs.” 
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play, aesthetic experience, sociability, and practical reasonableness – not all goods have 
to be pursued to fulfill the theory.236 As for the 9 basic requirements of practical 
reasonableness, the theoretical answer is probably yes, the community does try in 
principle to build a moral framework along similar lines prescribed by those 
requirements. In theory, all editors are treated as equals, neutrality is a virtue, hostility is 
frowned upon, and consensus a non-negotiable imperative. The problem is that in reality, 
some editors are more equal than others,237 Wikipedia is saddled with countless agendas 
that affects its neutrality,238 hostility/incivility is not well managed239 and consensus is a 
chimera.240 Be that as it may, it remains a fact that the community demonstrably strives to 
attain the ideal, much as it demonstrably fails on many fronts. 
 
(b) Authority and obedience 
 
So much for the different forms of rules. Authority and obedience, two interconnected 
concepts flowing from rules as discussed above, form our next ground of analysis. People 
do not conform to some sort of legal order just because the demand is made; people do so 
in part because the order (be it rules or leaders) has authority over their lives, and in part 
because they personally see the purpose or utility of obedience in the context in question. 
                                                 
236 Supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 100 and 103 to 105. 
237 See e.g., Essjay controversy – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Essjay_controversy (last visited December 24, 2010); and 
see supra, The Wikipedia Revolution, note 190 at 199: “[Wikipedia founder] Wales, traveling in India at the 
time and likely working off imperfect information, defended Essjay in public and to the press. Shortly after, 
Essjay was elevated by Wales to the ranks of serving on the Arbitration Committee, the highest level of 
service for deciding on community matters. Wales stated later, “Essjay has always been, and still is, a 
fantastic editor and trusted member of the community… He has been thoughtful and contrite about the 
entire matter, and I consider it settled.” [footnote omitted]… Debate raged as ad hoc straw polls were taken 
as to what to do with Essjay. Wale’s early support was crucial to keep Essjay’s standing intact, but as the 
pressure built, Jimbo changed his mind. “I have asked Essjay to resign his positions of truest within the 
community,’ he later said [footnote omitted].” See also Wikipedia biography controversy – Wikipedia, the 
free Encyclopedia, https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Seigenthaler_incident (last visited 
December 24, 2010); and see supra, The Wikipedia Revolution, note 190 at 194: “The Seigenthaler incident 
caused some soul searching in the community, and brought about a big policy change. After the dust had 
settled, the English Wikipedia prevented anonymous users from creating new articles in Wikipedia, thereby 
preventing “drive-by” page creation. This would, in theory, up the quality of new content. It was 
controversial at the time. Some users complained that it was anti-wiki, that the encyclopedia that “anyone 
can edit” would be missing out on converting users into editors. In the end, Wales’s social capital won out, 
and page creation was turned off for anonymous users.” (emphasis added). 
238 Ibid at 169 to 200; and supra, The World and Wikipedia, note 8 at 72 to 81 and 174 to 195. See also e.g., 
Talk: Jesus – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Talk:Jesus 
(last visited December 24, 2010); Talk: Barack Obama – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Talk:Barack_Obama (last visited December 24, 2010); and 
Talk: Thierry Henry – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Talk:Thierry_Henry (last visited December 24, 2010). One 
cannot help but notice too that the porn industry (or at least its supporters) has made a dramatic impact on 
the project – there is an incredible amount of coverage given to porn stars, including detailed write-ups, 
“helpful” external links, and quality photographs. For the most part, they operate well within the “law”, but 
it is difficult to resist the notion that with increased internet presence comes increased revenue for the 
industry. 
239 Ibid at 185 to 188. 
240 Ibid at 119 to 122 and 222 to 223. 
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Wikipedians are no different, though certainly in Wikipedia, those aforementioned 
rationales may not apply equally because of the fact that “citizenship” – or, netizenship – 
is really virtual in that “real” legal systems in the “real world” are here reduced to words, 
anonymous identities, and, well, an internet connection.241 And there is no question that 
there exist well-behaved editors who play by the rules just to gain a quasi-moral clout 
more than anything else; thus, in edit conflicts (either over content or regulations) 
involving their interests, they tend to get greater backing from fellow editors, and can use 
false “consensus” to quell even logically sustainable objections to their tyranny.242 While 
that may be true, it has never been clear if this is representative behaviour of the majority 
of the community. At any rate, we return to the original question: what makes 
Wikipedians obey the regulations? 
 
The best we have is anecdotal accounts, some parts corroborated by the writings of 
Professor Zittrain, Lih and Dalby that we have explored earlier on. And from my 
experience (including reading about others’) and understanding of certain key facts, I can 
make the following conclusions with some certitude: (1) millions of people visit 
Wikipedia everyday; (2) of these millions, an overwhelming majority do not make edits 
but only trawl for information, and thus, they have nothing to do with the regulations and 
vice versa; (3) of the remainder who do make edits, a significant portion of these are 
unregistered users, who may not necessarily retain the same IP address in subsequent 
edits;243 (4) a significant portion of editors, both registered and unregistered, do not make 
any legitimate contributions – they are either set up to disrupt the system in some way or 
just to perform vandalism; (5) for such editors, a majority of them do not stay the course 
and often leave within days, weeks, or months and do not return, and thus if they should 
be considered as part of the Wikipedia community, they should be at the very fringe; (6) 
the editors who have passed through all the preceding filters form the core of the 
Wikipedia community, and a great majority of them are registered users; (7) a majority of 
these core editors prefer to respect existing regulations if they can.  
 
By that, I mean most of these core editors will not commit the more egregious offences 
like harassment, stalking, threats (including that of suit), defamation, conflict of interest, 
and sock-puppetry, despite the veil of user names. Many are likely to, however, from 
time to time breach regulations like the 3-revert-rule, the prohibition against name-calling 
(a more specific form of incivility), the fair use rationale,244 maintenance of neutrality, 
and of course, consensus. These breaches of so-called lesser offences are largely 
attributable to the fact that editing sensitive or controversial subject matter tends to bring 
out the worst in editors, as well as compel them to push the envelope where it is not so 
clear if something constitutes an offence. The long and short of it all is that obedience 
and authority on Wikipedia are simultaneously shaped by 3 distinct assumptions: (1) 
Wikipedians who obey the regulations do so because it affords them the best opportunity 
                                                 
241 See also supra, III. 
242 See again the complex nuances of how consensus on Wikipedia is “achieved”: supra, Wikipedia: 
Consensus, note 21. 
243 “Significant portion” is used in contradistinction to “majority” because the percentages are less clear to 
me. 
244 See Wikipedia: Non-free content – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Fair_use (last visited December 24, 2010). 
  - 57 -
to remain as productive contributors to the project; (2) major transgressions usually result 
in expulsion from the project, while minor ones are more greatly tolerated and/or ignored, 
hence there is far greater obedience of the regulations surrounding major transgressions; 
and (3) because the authoritative force of the rules is brought about by the declarations 
and practices of previous and existing “core” groups of editors,245 it can either have the 
colour of self-serving elitism, or well established “consensus”.246 An important 
parenthetical comment ought to be made here: another possible reason for non-obedience 
is the perception of a law as unjust. This will be dealt with in a separate section below,247 
after I elaborate on some of the repercussions of false consensus.248 With that, the time is 
now ripe to compare this with the theories of Hart and Finnis. 
 
(1) Measuring against Hart 
 
One of the building blocks of Hart’s theory is that obedience of the law “often suggests 
deference to authority and not merely compliance with orders backed by threats.”249 This 
has already been mentioned in part above.250 According to Hart, it is also important to 
distinguish between social rules and habits in several ways: (1) a habit is about 
convergent behaviour of a group, but unlike a rule, deviation from the regular course 
need not be a matter for any form of criticism, and threatened deviation is not met with 
great pressure for conformity;251 (2) when a person is criticised for deviating from a rule, 
criticism is considered legitimate or justified;252 and (3) a social rule has an “internal 
aspect”, such that the relevant participants, possessing the “reflective critical attitude”, 
regard a pattern of behaviour as a standard for all the people in the group or activity to 
uphold.253  
 
Hart further explains how obedience and authority dovetail in his chapter on laws and 
morals; incidentally, this also forms the prelude to his warning to keep law and morality 
conceptually separate:254 
 
[A] society with law contains those who look upon its rules from the internal 
point of view as accepted standards of behaviour, and not merely as reliable 
predictions of what will befall them, at the hands of officials, if they disobey. But 
                                                 
245 Supra, note 191. 
246 See also James Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many are Smarter than the Few and How 
Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations, (2005) at 186: “[All] the evidence 
suggests that the order in which people speak has a profound effect on the course of a discussion. Earlier 
comments are more influential, and they tend to provide a framework within which the discussion occurs. 
As in an information cascade, once that framework is in place, it’s difficult for a dissenter to break it down. 
This wouldn’t be a problem if the people who spoke earliest were also more likely to know what they were 
talking about. But the truth is that, especially when it comes to problems where there is no obvious right 
answer, there’s no guarantee that the most-informed speaker will also be the most influential.” 
247 Infra, VI(d). 
248 Infra, VI(c). 
249 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 51. 
250 Supra, IV(b). 
251 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 55. 
252 Ibid at 55 to 56. 
253 Ibid at 56 to 57. 
254 Ibid at 201 to 202. 
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it also comprises those upon whom, either because they are malefactors or mere 
helpless victims of the system, these legal standards have to be imposed by force 
or threat of force; they are concerned with the rules merely as a source of 
possible punishment. The balance between these two components will be 
determined by many different factors. If the system is fair and caters genuinely 
for the vital interests of all those from whom it demands obedience, it may gain 
and retain the allegiance of most for most of the time, and will accordingly be 
stable. On the other hand, it may be a narrow and exclusive system run in the 
interests of the dominant group, and it may be continually more repressive and 
unstable with the latent threat of upheaval. Between these two extremes various 
combinations of these attitudes to law are to be found, often in the same 
individual. Reflection on this aspect of things reveals a sobering truth: the step 
from the simple form of society, where primary rules of obligation are the only 
means of social control, into the legal world with its centrally organised 
legislature, courts, officials and sanctions brings its solid gains at a certain cost… 
the cost is the risk that the centrally organised power may well be used for the 
oppression of numbers with whose support it can dispense, in a way that the 
simpler regime of primary rules could not.  
 
This rings a familiar tune. Hart is suggesting that authority and obedience go hand in 
hand because if the authority is built on morally vacuous foundations, obedience and 
instability are almost guaranteed. But this does not transpose itself altogether perfectly in 
the Wikipedia world. There, the problem of “sometimes rules apply, and sometimes they 
do not, and nobody really knows when, how, or why” rears its head again. We have a fair 
and yet uncertain mix of benevolent regulations, oppressive elites (though not always 
centrally organised),255 genuine respect and unpredictable application of the regulations 
all happening at the same time. The problem is somewhat ameliorated (and better 
pronounced) by taking a more nuanced view of how often regulations are applied/adhered 
to: that is, there is a pretty strong correlation between the often-ness and the 
severity/importance of the regulation in question. Hart’s theory is better preserved and 
represented when seen in this light, for initial doubt of the prominence and influence of 
regulations (or rules) is mitigated. Still, it is submitted that there is a lingering and subtle 
doubt over the possibility that the community is truly governed neither by a sovereign 
(Jimmy Wales) nor a team of officials (e.g., Wales, the Arbitration Committee, 
                                                 
255 It may be argued of course that the Wikipedia regulations are more a result of the wisdom of crowds in 
action. See supra, The Wisdom of Crowds, note 246 at 10: “[There are] four conditions that characterise 
wise crowds: diversity of opinion (each person should have some private information, even if it’s just an 
eccentric interpretation of the known fact), independence (people’s opinions are not determined by the 
opinions of those around them), decentralisation (people are able to specialise and draw on local 
knowledge), and aggregation (some mechanism exists for turning private judgments into a collective 
decisions). If a group satisfies those conditions, its judgment is likely to be accurate. Why? At heart, the 
answer rests on a mathematical truism. If you ask a large enough group of diverse, independent people to 
make prediction or estimate a probability, and then average those estimates, the errors each of them makes 
in coming up with an answer cancel themselves out. Each person’s guess, you might say, has two 
components: information and error. Subtract the error, and you’re left with the information.” Therefore, 
even though there is a gloss of free-wheeling mayhem and madness to the methods of the Wikipedia 
community, crowd wisdom may have the transcendent effect of creating a stable legal order even if the 
rules are unclear and unclearly applied. The core community simply adjusts, adapts, recalibrates, and 
moves on. 
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bureaucrats and administrators): the community governs itself. That is a tempting and 
possibly the main explanation as to why rules can sometimes be ignored. This thread of 
reasoning will be explored in greater detail in the next section, after this sub-section on 
Finnis. 
 
(2) Measuring against Finnis 
 
For Finnis, he rests upon once again on his conceptions of community living, shared 
objectives, and the common good (all of which are built on the backs of the 7 basic goods 
and 9 basic requirements of practical reasonableness):256 
 
The more the coordination of the relevant persons is pursuant to some value or 
open-ended commitment, or , if directed to some definite and realisable project, 
is nevertheless controlled by concern for some value(s) that requires adaptation 
of the coordination in response to contingencies, the more likely we are to be 
willing to think of the participants as constituting a group. And… the more likely 
it is that the participants themselves will think of themselves as a group, and look 
about for practices, usages, conventions, or ‘norms’ for solving their coordination 
problems, and/or for someone with authority to select among available solutions. 
Such norms will then be though of as norms of and for the group, and the 
leader(s) will be thought of as having authority in and over the group. The 
‘existence’ of the group, the ‘existence’ of social rules, and the ‘existence’ of 
authority tend to go together. And what makes sense of these ascriptions of 
existence is in each case the presence of some more or less shared objective, or, 
more precisely, some shared conception of the point of continuing cooperation. 
This point we may call the common good. 
 
Indeed, one aspect of Finnis’ theory that may have slipped our attention is the idea of 
leaders who are “thought of as having authority in and over the group”; and underlying 
and necessitating this idea is the formation of a group identity. The general comparison to 
a community and its leaders is apparent, as is the specific comparison to a community 
governed by (inter alia, legal) rules and having leaders such as the executive and the 
judiciary. Finnis talks more about this on his chapter on authority in Natural Law and 
Natural Rights:257 
 
                                                 
256 Supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 153 (emphasis in original). See also 148 to 149: “the 
common understanding of the unqualified expressions ‘law’ and ‘the law’ indicates, the central case of law 
and legal system is the law and legal system of a complete community… it is characteristic of legal systems 
that (i) they claim authority to regulate all forms of human behaviour… (ii) they… claim to be the supreme 
authority for their respective community, and to regulate the conditions under which the members of that 
community can participate in any other normative system… (iii) they characteristically purport to ‘adopt’ 
rules and normative arrangements… from other associations within and without the complete community, 
thereby ‘giving them legal force’ for that community… All these defining features, devices, and postulates 
of law have their foundation, from the viewpoint of practical reasonableness, in the requirement that the 
activities of individuals, families and specialised associations be co-ordinated. This requirement itself 
derives partly from the requirements of impartiality between persons, and of impartiality as between the 
basic values and openness to all of them…” 
257 Ibid at 245 to 246 and 250 to 251 (emphasis in original). 
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The need for somebody, or some body, to settle co-ordination problems with 
greater speed and certainty is apparent in any community where people are 
energetic and inventive in pursuit of their own or of common goods… 
Authority… in a community is to be exercised by those who can in fact 
effectively settle co-ordination problems for that community. This principle… is 
the first and most fundamental… It remains true that the sheer fact that virtually 
everyone will acquiesce in somebody’s say-so is the presumptively necessary and 
defeasibly sufficient condition for the normative judgment that the person has… 
authority in that community. But to this perhaps scandalously stark principle 
there are two significant riders. First: practical reasonableness requires… that, 
faced with a purported ruler’s say-so, the members of the community normally 
should acquiesce or withhold their acquiescence, comply or withhold their 
compliance, precisely as he is, or is not, designated as the lawful bearer of 
authority… The second rider is this: while ‘consent’ as distinct from 
acquiescence is not needed to justify or legitimate the authority of rules, the 
notion of consent may suggest a sound rule of thumb for deciding when someone 
should be obeyed even though general acquiescence is not likely, and for 
deciding when someone whose stipulation will be generally acquiesced in should 
nevertheless be treated as having no authority in practical reason. 
 
The suggestion has already been made earlier258 that Wikipedia is an endeavour 
consistent with the pursuit of some of the 7 basic goods, and the regulations are, in a 
broad but nevertheless accurate sense, consistent with the employing of the 9 basic 
requirements of practical reasonableness to structure a socio-legal system which 
facilitates that pursuit. Insofar as that is true, such an endeavour will likely lead to the sort 
of “complete community” that Finnis contemplates, and such a community, if properly 
governed, will be governed by those who have authority – authority as he characterises it, 
no less.259  
 
But, like Hart’s theory, Finnis’ theory may not be a perfect fit if the community, 
notwithstanding the presence of quasi-sovereigns, administrators, tribunals and what not, 
is ultimately (or predominantly) still a legislative authority itself and upon itself,260 and if 
so, our analysis is potentially halted by such conclusions. There is a break in the tradition 
of concentrating the powers of authority in (democratic or otherwise) a select or 
appointed group, although one way we can get around this is to consider the 
administrators, bureaucrats, Jimmy Wales, and the Arbitration Committee et cetera as 
sharing the powers of the judiciary and the executive, while the community possesses 
legislative power like some sort of legislature or parliament – enough power even to 
overrule any decisions made by the judiciary and the executive. This is not too 
implausible since apart from “common sense”, “consensus” is the other big word that can 
be wielded around to magical effect in Wikipedia (but with greater magical effect if you 
are an administrator, bureaucrat, Jimmy Wales, or the Arbitration Committee). The 
                                                 
258 Supra, VI(a)(2). 
259 See also supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 260: “The authority of the law depends… on 
its justice or at least its ability to secure justice.” 
260 This may probably be the only exception to the “rules” of “common sense prevails” and “no hard-and-
fast rule”.  
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drawback to this approach is that judicial powers (e.g., interpreting the law)261 and 
executive powers (e.g., enforcing the law)262 are endeavours not strictly confined to the 
province of the officials – non-official Wikipedians do take it upon themselves to 
interpret policies and try to get misdemeanours punished even though they lack the 
official power to do so. Whichever the case, it seems apposite to now move on and 
consider this related issue of lawmaking in Wikipedia. We might get a more complete 
picture of the netizen dynamics in the realms of Wikipedia. 
 
(c) Lawmaking  
 
There are at least 2 aspects to the question of lawmaking: who does it; and how is it done. 
As always we have to confront the theoretical position. Theoretically, in Wikipedia, 
norms adopt the coercive, binding characteristic of regulations when there is, inter alia, 
clear and consistent community practice – and, as we have seen, not necessarily just 
because the Arbitration Committee passes a judgment over a dispute,263 the 
administrators make some executive decisions over troublemakers, or the bureaucrats 
authorise some high-level security bypass to probe into user behaviour:264  
 
We live under the rule of law when people are treated equally, without regard to 
their power or station; when the rules that apply to them arise legitimately from 
the consent of the governed; when those rules are clearly stated; and when there 
is a source of dispassionate, independent application of those rules [footnote 
omitted]. Despite this apparent mess of process and users, by these standards 
Wikipedia has charted a remarkable course. Although different users have 
different levels of capabilities, anyone can register, and anyone, if dedicated 
enough, can rise to the status of administrator. And while Jimbo Wales may have 
extraordinary influence, his power on Wikipedia depends in large measure on the 
consent of the governed – on the individual decisions of hundreds of 
administrators, any of whom can gainsay each other for him, but who tend to 
work together because of a shared vision for Wikipedia. The effective 
implementation of policy in turn rests on the thousands of active editors who may 
exert power in the shape of the tens of thousands of decisions they make as 
Wikipedia’s articles are edited and reedited. Behaviours that rise to the level of 
consistent practice are ultimately described and codified as potential policies, and 
some are then affirmed as operative ones, in process that is itself constantly 
subject to revision. 
 
In truth, the reality is actually a little more discomforting than that. It is not so much the 
case that it is the community that decides, but an elite sector (usually defined by the 
seniority and experience of the users) within the community that does so.265 Professor 
                                                 
261 E.g., infra, VI(d). 
262 Id. 
263 Some Wikipedians’ user page bear the infobox “This user elected ArbComm to resolve disputes, not 
govern.” This is ironic, because chances are these are the same people who are part of some group who 
push for legislative reform under the guise of consensus. 
264 Supra, The Future of the Internet, note 26 at 142. 
265 In contradistinction to Surowiecki (supra, note 246), Caplan is much more skeptical about the collective 
wisdom of crowds. He cites emotionalism as a difficult barrier for a crowd to surmount – see Bryan 
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Zittrain partly alludes to this in the preceding paragraph and confirms this again in a later 
part:266 
 
Yet Wikipedia’s awkward and clumsy growth in articles, and the rules governing 
their creation and editing, is so far a success story. It is in essence a work in 
progress, once whose success is defined by the survival – even growth – of a core 
of editors who subscribe to and enforce its ethos, amid an influx of users who 
know nothing of that ethos. Wikipedia’s success, such as it is, is attributable to a 
messy combination of constantly updated technical tools and social conventions 
that elicit and reflect personal commitments from a critical mass of editors to 
engage in argument and debate about topics they care about. Together these tools 
and conventions facilitate a notion of “netizenship”: belonging to an Internet 
project that includes other people, rather than relating to the Internet as a 
deterministic information location and transmission tool or as a cash-and-carry 
service offered by a separate vendor responsible for its content. 
 
The euphemism of “critical mass” is used but the simple truth is there is an “elite”267 
group of like-minded people that calls the shots.268 Suffice to say this delegation of 
lawmaking to an elite core is antithetical to the notion that Wikipedia, including its 
regulations, is a product of community consensus (cf. democracy), or even more 
ambitiously, the so-called collective wisdom of crowds.269 Never mind unconventional 
                                                                                                                                                 
Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies, (2008) at 100 to 102: 
“The connection between error and lack of information is obvious. But is lack of information the root of all 
error? Introspection and personal testimony advance another candidate: emotional commitment [footnote 
omitted]. Holding fast to beloved opinions increases subjective well-being… Introspection about uncovers 
mixed cognitive motives. Recall the last argument you had on a topic you feel strongly about. You 
probably made an effort to give the other side a fair hearing. Why was it necessary, though, to make an 
effort? Because you knew that your emotions might carry you away; you might heatedly proclaim yourself 
the victor even if the evidence was against you… Irrationality is therefore all around us, and not just 
according to a demanding test like rational expectations… If ignorance were the sole cause of error, 
sufficiently large does of information would be a cognitive panacea. You could fix any misconception with 
enough facts… if the evidence were one-sided, the fraction convinced would rise to 100% with all the 
relevant information. Their emotional attachment to their beliefs is too intense: “Don’t confuse me with the 
facts.”” (emphasis in original).   
266 Id. 
267 “Elite” is a deliberate misnomer. People who are drawn to the wrangling and wrestling of policy 
dictation either do it out of compassion, or more commonly, out of a sense empowerment virtual reality 
affords them. “Elite” in this context is not meant in any way to convey intellectual or ability superiority. 
268 The group itself can be amorphous at times but the concept (of group domination) does not change. 
269 See also supra, The Wisdom of Crowds, note 246 at 267: “[T]he idea that the right answer to complex 
problems is simply “ask the experts” assumes that experts agree on the answers. But they don’t, and if they 
did, it’s hard to believe that the public would simply ignore their advice. Elites are just as partisan and no 
more devoted to the public interest than the average voter. More important, as you shrink the size of a 
decision-making body, you also shrink the likelihood that the final answer is right. Finally, most political 
decisions are not simply decisions about how to do something. They are decision about what to do, 
decisions that involve values, trade-offs, and choices about what kind of society people should live in. there 
is no reason to think that experts are better at making those decisions than the average voter.” Contrast this 
again with Caplan’s position – see supra, The Myth of the Rational Voter, note 265 at 180 to 181:  “Experts 
are not an antidote to voter irrationality. But for better and worse, they loosen the link between public 
opinion and policy. The electorate’s blind spots open loopholes for politicians, bureaucrats, and the media 
to exploit. But if the public was working against its own interests in the first place, the welfare effect of 
“exploitation” is ambiguous. Faith in leaders is the clearest example. Its dangers are obvious… But political 
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democracy, this falsified consensus is a tight slap in the face to the project’s pretentiously 
noble proclamation270 that its policies have “have wide acceptance among editors” and 
that its guidelines “are sets of best practices that are supported by consensus”.271 The 
(admittedly unofficial) aversion to “wikilawyering” only helps to foreclose rational 
debate272 about the content and application of guidelines and policies.273 Exacerbating all 
these problems is the fact that editors who have been around the project long enough 
already know that “consensus” is often more illusory than not. Countless good editors 
have left and will not return because of the unceasing political tractions and agenda-
pushing that distract them from the more vital matters at hand (e.g., adding encyclopedic 
information in a professional manner), the lack of community support for valuable 
contributors and solid ideas, the system’s tendency to side with recalcitrant people who 
have brought nothing (or worse, nothing but negative contributions) to the table, the 
unflinching systemic bias against genuine minorities or non-English cultures,274 and the 
system’s unwillingness to admit that all the “five pillars” are constantly breached and 
contradicted left, right and centre, thus precluding any agitation to solve these deeply 
fundamental problems.  
 
Furthermore, over the years, purported “consensus-building” exercises on policies and 
guidelines for the project as well as controversial article pages, have become 
                                                                                                                                                 
faith also allows leaders – if they are so inclined – to circumvent their supporters’ misconceptions. Faith 
creates slack, and slack in the right hands leads to better outcomes. All you need are better leaders who are 
somewhat well intentioned and less irrational than their followers… Bureaucracy also has mixed effects. If 
the public lets them, politicians pass the buck, blaming their mistakes and misdeeds on subordinates. 
Before we condemn buck-passing, however, we should remember how many good ideas and socially 
beneficial actions the public classifies as “mistakes” and “misdeeds”. Last, consider propaganda. We tend 
to think that causes twist the facts and appeal to emotions when truth is not on their side. Nazism and 
Communism are obvious examples. But in theory, propaganda can be used to fight error as well. If a person 
clings to his mistakes despite the evidence, irrational persuasion is his only hope.” (emphasis in original).  
270 See e.g., the date auto-formatting debate on Wikipedia: Manual of Style (dates and numbers)/Three 
proposals for change to MOSNUM – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Manual_of_Style_%28dates_and_numbers%29/
Three_proposals_for_change_to_MOSNUM (last visited December 24, 2010); the BC/BCE debate on 
Talk: Jesus/Archive details – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Talk:Jesus/Archive_details (last visited December 24, 
2010); the “failed” featured article bid for the article on the “Roman” Catholic Church on Wikipedia: 
Featured article candidates/Roman Catholic Church/archive 5 – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Featured_article_candidates/Roman_Catholic_C
hurch/archive5 (last visited December 24, 2010); and the debate on whether to call “football”, well, 
“football” on Talk: Association football – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Talk:Association_football (last visited December 24, 2010). 
271 Supra, Wikipedia: Policies and guidelines, note 19. The more accurate term should be “widespread 
indifference” or “widespread lack of objections”. It should be added that within each wikiproject, project 
members have considerable autonomy in setting out their own project conventions – without overriding 
Wikipedia policies. 
272 Though to be frank, those accused of wikilawyering often are those who pretend more than they should 
that they are experts in the art of argument. 
273 Supra, note 78. 
274 For instance, if one should try to create an article on say, a local culinary dish of a small country, that 
article is likely to be deleted if found out, because it is unlikely to have any English-based sources to back it 
up. There are countless many other examples that can be gleaned from trawling the archives for “articles 
for deletion”. 
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unnecessarily protracted, complicated, and emotional,275 leading those longstanding 
editors (who have interests outside Wikipedia) who still remain to contribute in their own 
editing enclaves (usually their pet areas of interest), while keeping a very wide berth of 
all the arguing and politicking in discussion spaces. Some of these editors do not even go 
beyond minor edits anymore,276 preferring to keep a more manageable number of items 
on their watchlist free of vandalism or irresponsible edits. All said, there is a whole lot of 
dishonesty and hypocrisy going on in Wikipedia, but faithful editors who have managed 
to persevere continue to plug away and stay away from the politics, fixing errors in the 
system, copyediting, and systematically documenting information on the world around 
us. That is, keeping the project alive longer than they should. Is this really an unfamiliar 
phenomenon? It is highly doubtful. The amount of abuse and exploitation the project has 
had to tolerate is nothing short of incredible. That it continues to sustain itself (in fact, 
make progress) is even more incredible.  
 
(1) Measuring against Hart 
 
Hart’s secondary rules are usually able to tell us how laws come into being, the most 
likely rule being the rule of recognition. For instance, it is not uncommon for the rule of 
recognition to be associated with the following (non-exhaustive) series of notions: (1) 
whatever bill is properly enacted by the legislature will have the force of law; (2) 
whatever decision that is passed by the apex court in the judiciary is binding on the other 
courts; or (3) whatever subsidiary legislation that is passed by the executive or whatever 
new law or decision that is passed must pass constitutional muster.277 The function of the 
rule of recognition, after all, is to remedy the uncertainty as to what constitutes law. It 
helps separate the law from the non-law, such as “irrelevant” moral considerations and 
moral constraints.  
 
In view of the legislative actualities of Wikipedia, we can add another layer to our 
previous formulation of the rule of recognition in our section on rules.278 On top of the 
rule that “rules may or may not apply, depending on common sense”, we can formulate 
the chronologically prior rule that “rules can be called rules if nobody objects; and 
likewise, rules can be made by anybody, if nobody objects”.279 We explored earlier if the 
former rule passed the test of the “minimum conditions” of a legal system – specifically, 
whether the secondary rules are accepted by the officials.280 If we consider the officials to 
be the administrators, bureaucrats, and so forth, I think most of them will also accept our 
                                                 
275 One only needs to refer to any of the discussion pages of policies and guidelines reform, or controversial 
subjects, for a sampling. No doubt the discussions are rich and detailed, but they are always carried out by 
the same few people associated with the subject matter in question. To be precise, some of these “same few 
people” leave after a while, but they are soon replaced with newer kids on the block who possess the same 
sort of  political stamina and desire. 
276 Because they may have to deal with constant disputes over substantive edits to the contents of the 
articles. 
277 Supra, Understanding Jurisprudence, note 149 at 104. 
278 Supra, VI(a)(1). 
279 Specifically, if nobody “important” objects. 
280 Supra, VI(a)(1). 
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subsidiary formulation of the rule of recognition. The longstanding status quo of how 
official behaviour on Wikipedia has been attests to that.281  
 
What if, however remote this might sound, there are actually no real “officials” (in a 
superior versus subordinate sense) on Wikipedia? If the community acts as the lawmaker, 
does that make every member of the community some form of official as well? That is, 
we have to recall that there is no distinct hierarchy between Wikipedians because 
Wikipedians do not have to wait for democratic processes to oust the politically 
disfavoured and reform the law indirectly from there (since the legislators and not the 
citizens per se rewrite the laws), but simply need to band together in sufficient numbers 
to present some argument against the disputed law in question to declare the law as 
changed.282 This notion – that there are no officials – may sound like a stretch, but it is 
not inconsistent with the Wikipedia ethos that they are not a community strictly governed 
by rules;283 instead, the community as a whole decides for itself what the prevailing 
position on a particular issue should be. They are the rule-makers as much as they are the 
rule-abiders.284 As it were, it is certainly not unheard of to have a legal system that has no 
centralised legislature: the international law regime comes to mind as the most obvious 
example.285 On this point, it is noteworthy that Hart claims his theory can, unlike 
orthodox positivism of his day, account for the non-centralised lawmaking aspect of 
international law.286 And this is where we begin to see an interesting coincidence 
developing between the one key attribute of both Wikipedia and international law: 
Wikipedia, like international law, is about an international community. Since probing into 
this coincidence might be beneficial, we ought to examine how Hart first addressed the 
conundrum posed by international law by identifying the main reasons why even his 
theory may not be able to account for international law:287 
 
[T]he absence [in international law] of an international legislature, courts with 
compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally organised sanctions have inspired 
misgivings… The absence of these institutions means that the rules for states 
resemble that simple form of social structure, consisting only of primary rules of 
obligations… It is indeed arguable… that international law not only lacks the 
secondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legislature and 
courts, but also a unifying rule of recognition specifying ‘sources’ of law and 
providing general criteria for the identification of its rules. 
                                                 
281 That is, the officials will usually uphold established guidelines and policies when making their decisions 
when there are disputes. 
282 Other groups may come in and oppose this of course, and if this becomes a really complex battle, the 
higher powers-to-be may intervene and impose a more structured framework to determine the policy 
content, such as a project-wide poll or vote. 
283 Yet this seems like a self-contradiction: if they are not governed by rules, but are required (as a rule) to 
use “consensus” to reformulate the rule, they are ultimately still relying on rules. 
284 This is beginning to sound like a radical reformulation of Austin’s command theory of law: see supra,  
note 106. 
285 There remains, of course, people firmly opposed to the notion that international law is even law to begin 
with: see e.g., Lori Damrosch, Louis Henkin, Sean Murphy and Hans Smit, International Law, (2009) at 2 
and 32 to 35. 
286 Supra, note 213.  
287 Ibid at 214. 
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And Hart’s rebuttal to these objections commences with dispelling two major 
doubts of the legal character of international law:288 
 
To argue that international law is not binding because of its lack of organised 
sanctions is tacitly to accept the analysis of obligation contained in the theory 
that law is essentially a matter of orders backed by threats. This theory… 
identifies ‘having an obligation’ or ‘being bound’ with ‘likely to suffer the 
sanction or punishment threatened for disobedience’. Yet… this identification 
distorts the role played in all legal thought and discourse of the ideas of 
obligation and duty… The sceptic may point out that there are in a municipal 
system… certain provisions which are justifiably called necessary; among these 
are primary rules of obligation… are they not equally so for international law?... 
In societies of individuals, approximately equal in physical strength and 
vulnerability, physical sanctions are both necessary and possible… because of 
the inequality of states, there can be no standing assurance that the combined 
strength of those on the side of international order is likely to preponderate over 
the powers tempted to aggression. Hence the organisation and use of sanctions 
may involve fearful risks and the threat of them add little to the natural 
deterrents… there is general pressure for conformity to the rules; claims and 
admissions are based on them and their breach is held to justify… reprisals and 
counter-measures. When the rules are disregarded, it is not on the footing that 
they are not binding; instead efforts are made to conceal the facts… [The other 
persistent source of perplexity] about the obligatory character of international law 
has been the difficulty felt in accepting… that a state which is sovereign may also 
be ‘bound’ by… international law… there are many different types and degrees 
of dependence (and so of independence) between territorial units which possess 
an ordered government… the social contract theories of political science… 
explain the facts that individuals, ‘naturally’ free and independent, were yet 
bound by municipal law… all international obligation arises from the consent of 
the party to be bound… 
 
The rebuttal then continues in the following terms:289 
 
What predominate in the arguments, often technical, which states address to each 
other over disputed matters of international law, are references to precedents, 
treaties, and juristic writings; often no mention is made of moral right or wrong, 
good or bad… A legislature cannot introduce a new rule and give it the status of 
a moral rule by its fiat, just as it cannot, by the same means, give a rule the status 
of a tradition… There is nothing in the nature or function of international law 
which is similarly inconsistent with the idea that the rules might be subject to 
legislative change… It is… a mistake to suppose that a basic rule or rule of 
recognition is a generally necessary condition of the existence of rules of 
obligation or ‘binding’ rules. This is… a luxury of advanced social systems… 
once we emancipate ourselves from the assumption that international law must 
contain a basic rule, the question to be faced is one of fact. What is the actual 
character of the rules as they function in the relations between states?... It is true 
                                                 
288 Ibid at 217 to 222, 224 and 226. 
289 Ibid at 228, 230, and 235 to 236 (emphasis in original). 
  - 67 -
that, on many important matters, the relations between states are regulated by 
multilateral treaties… such treaties would in fact be legislative enactments and 
international law would have distinct criteria of validity for its rules… Perhaps 
international law is at present in a stage of transition towards acceptance of this 
and other forms which would bring it nearer in structure to a municipal system. 
 
What should we make of all this? That Wikipedia is a primitive sort of society? That 
Wikipedia still uses a primitive form of lawmaking? That Wikipedia comprises 
individuals not of approximate strength and equality? Regarding the first possibility, the 
community has been pretty sophisticated in developing its regulations. But the main 
problems are still that first, everything is potentially unravelled (and has been as past 
practice shows) by an overly flexible set of rules of recognition; and second, even the rule 
of change is unable to account for common sense as a trump card.290 Perhaps a way out is 
to identify “consensus” as a stronger trump card (than common sense) when the 
application of the regulations is uncertain. This gives the system a more stable look. 
Regarding the second possibility, one is entitled to disagree with Hart’s evaluation that a 
municipal legal system is so unequivocally more sophisticated than the international law 
regime. The former is sometimes faster in passing laws and resolving disputes and hence 
more efficient, yes, but not necessarily more sophisticated. The municipal legal system is 
in no way the established and undisputed standard-bearer and accordingly should not be 
hailed as one. In fact, it may be said that the Wikipedia community uses not a primitive 
form of lawmaking, but an avant-garde one.291 Practically, it may be doomed to failure, 
but theoretically, its appeal lies in giving equal power to every single participant in the 
community. The participant’s power and right goes beyond suffrage, and right into 
lawmaking itself. Thus, while Hart is able to explain why even entities who are “more 
equal than others” may nevertheless still obey the law (the third possibility), the crack 
that is still to be found is in the Wikipedia phenomenon of self-governance.   
 
(2) Measuring against Finnis 
 
Finnis’ account on lawmaking needs to be first seen in the context of the foundations of 
his theory of law. He tells us that the “central case of law and legal system is the law and 
legal system of a complete community, purporting to have authority to provide 
comprehensive and supreme direction for human behaviour in that community, and to 
grant legal validity to all other normative arrangements affecting the members of that 
community”.292 He also tells us that law “needs to be coercive (primarily by way of 
punitive sanctions, secondarily by way of preventive interventions and restraints)… [It] 
brings definition, specificity, clarity and thus predictability into human interactions, by 
way of a system of rules and institutions so interrelated that rules define, constitute, and 
                                                 
290 Supra, VI(a)(1). 
291 As is consistent with international law trends, the degree of influence of the state (and concomitantly, 
the municipal legal system) has been waning since the advent of international and non-governmental 
organisations following World War II. Some people have even speculated that there will be a true order of 
“global governance”, and Wikipedia will conceivably be situated in one of the strata of such a scheme. 
292 Supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 260. See also supra, note 150. 
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regulate the institutions, while institutions create and administer the rules, and settle 
questions about their existence, scope, applicability, and operation.”293 He continues:294 
 
The primary legal method of showing that a rule is valid is to show (i) that there 
was at some past time… an act… which according to the rules in force… 
amounted to a valid and therefore operative act of rule-creation, and (ii) that… 
the rule thus created has not determined… by virtue either of its own terms or of 
any act of repeal valid according to the rules of repeal in force… It is a working 
postulate of legal thought… that whatever legal rule or institution… has  been 
once validly created remains valid, in force or in existence, in contemplation of 
law, until it determines according to its own terms or to some valid act or rule of 
repeal… rules of law regulate not only the creation, administration, and 
adjudication of such rules, and the constitution, character and termination of 
institutions, but also the conditions under which a private individual can modify 
the incidence or application of the rules… [The law] brings what precision and 
predictability it can into the order of human interactions by a special technique: 
the treating of… past acts… as giving, now, sufficient and exclusionary reason 
for acting a way then ‘provided for’… this technique is reinforced by the 
working postulate… that every present practical question or co-ordination 
problem has, in every respect, been so ‘provided for’ by some past juridical act or 
acts…” 
 
Finnis reminds us again of the distinction between mere acts of positing law, and laws 
that conform to moral norms:295 
 
The tradition of ‘natural law’ theorising is not characterised by any particular 
answer to the questions: ‘Is every “settled” legal rule and legal solution settled by 
appeal exclusively to “positive” sources such as statute, precedent, and custom? 
Or is the “correctness” of some judicial decisions determinable only by appeal to 
some “moral” (“extra-legal”) norm? And are the boundaries between the settled 
and the unsettled law, or between the correct, the eligible, and the incorrect 
judicial decision determinable by reference only to positive sources or legal 
rules?’ The tradition of natural law theorising is not concerned to minimise the 
range and determinacy of positive law or the general sufficiency of positive 
sources as solvents of legal problems. Rather, the concern… has been to show 
that the act of ‘positing’ law (whether judicially or legislatively or otherwise) is 
an act which can and should be guided by ‘moral’ principles and rules; that those 
moral norms are a matter of objective reasonableness, not of whim, convention, 
or mere ‘decision’… 
 
These additional points of information, however, do not shake off Finnis’ theory’s 
seeming reliance on good leadership in the community. In other words, the leaders (or 
officials, whichever terminology is preferred) are the still the ones who make the law,296 
and if they make good law, such law will be authoritative and will advance the common 
                                                 
293 Ibid at 266 and 268.  
294 Ibid at 268 to 269 (emphasis in original). 
295 Ibid at 290. 
296 It is important to remember the distinction between making policies and guidelines for the entire 
community, and winning trivial battles over the content of a limited space like an article or project page. 
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good of the community; a law is also most easily identified by citizens when it bears 
certain marks of pedigree. Still, his scenario, ideal or otherwise, does not really 
contemplate the community to play the role of the government and lawmaker.297 And it is 
unlikely that anyone should be surprised at this: anthropologically and historically, men 
have always been led and governed by a select group of leaders. Laws may bind the 
lawmakers as well,298 but there has been always a distinct top-down, hierarchical 
dimension to societies in that the citizen is not exactly simultaneously the government (a 
more horizontal dynamic to the relationship between government and citizen).299 So one 
will necessarily be hard-pressed to blame Finnis for couching a positive truth (leadership 
is needed in all societies) as a normative ideal.  
 
At any rate, the main point to take away from this is that maybe the (theoretical) 
lawmaking processes of Wikipedia are still consistent with his conception of the common 
good. Applying the most generous interpretation possible, these processes can be said to 
represent the pinnacle of “empowerment of the people”, democracy,300 or even equality – 
equality being a value that Finnis certainly considers as a subset of the common good.301 
Another facet to this interpretation may be that good leadership should not be viewed as 
an end (or a good on its own), but simply an instrument and a means to an end. If a 
community is somehow able to reach a stage where the absence of rigid rules302 
nevertheless enables it to fulfill the pursuit of the 7 basic goods on the basis of the 9 basic 
requirements of practical reasonableness, then we may be in the clear if we are in the 
business of mapping Finnis’ theory successfully. But Finnis does not suggest anywhere 
alternative embodiments of the law other than rules, and does not suggest anywhere 
alternative embodiments of the maker and promulgator of rules other than distinct bodies 
of leaders.303  
 
(d) Law enforcement, unjust laws and dispute resolution 
 
As they are all closely related issues, it is best if we consider how the Wikipedia 
community regards the questions of law enforcement, unjust laws, and dispute resolution 
                                                 
297 See also supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 351 to 352: “The ultimate basis of a ruler’s 
authority is the fact that he has the opportunity, and thus the responsibility, of furthering the common good 
by stipulating solutions to a community’s co-ordination problems… Normally, though not necessarily, the 
immediate source of this opportunity and responsibility is the fact that he is designated by or under some 
authoritative rule as bearer of authority in respect of certain aspects of these problems… In any event, 
authority is useless for the common good unless the stipulations of those in authority (or which emerge 
through the formation of authoritative customary rules) are treated as exclusionary reasons, i.e. as sufficient 
reason for acting notwithstanding that the subject would not himself have made some stipulation and 
indeed considers the actual stipulation to be in some respect(s) unreasonable, not fully appropriate fr the 
common good…”; and infra, VI(d)(2).  
298 Unless one buys into Austin’s command theory: supra, note 106. 
299 To be clear, there is every possibility and it has been the case for the most part that many Wikipedians 
do not avail themselves of their lawmaking powers. But this should not detract from the fact that they 
possess what seems to a rather unique power. 
300 Again, however, Wikipedia has said it is not supposed to be a democracy: supra, note 20. 
301 E.g., supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 173 to 175. 
302 And, extending the reasoning trajectory, the absence of strong leadership as well as centralised 
lawmaking. 
303 See also supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 359 to 360. 
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as one single issue. Let us take examine the Wikipedia positions on the 3 sub-issues in 
seriatim.  
 
The Wikipedia page on the enforcement of the regulations makes this proclamation in no 
uncertain terms:304 
 
Enforcement on Wikipedia is similar to other social interactions. If an editor 
violates the community standards described in policies and guidelines, other 
editors can persuade the person to adhere to acceptable norms of conduct, over 
time resorting to more forceful means, such as administrator and steward actions. 
In the case of policy pages, they are likely to resort to more forceful means fairly 
rapidly. You’ll need to do some pretty fast talking to get away with not adhering 
to the consensus within policy pages, though this is not impossible, if you 
somehow happen to know something that many years of collective wisdom 
hasn’t discovered yet. This means that individual editors (including you) enforce 
and apply policies and guidelines. In cases where it is clear that a user is acting 
against policy (or against a guideline in a way that conflicts with policy), 
especially if they are doing so intentionally and persistently, that user may be 
temporarily or indefinitely blocked from editing by an administrator.  
 
Thus, sanctions may not always befall a violator of the regulations: fellow editors may 
take the “soft” route of persuading the editor to be more cooperative, or they may report 
his behaviour straightaway to the “authorities”. When that happens, it is not always clear 
how much sanctions will be meted out, or if at all. The officials have considerable 
discretion in many instances, with the amount of discretion usually being inversely 
proportionate to the seriousness of the regulation violated. It may also not be immediately 
clear how this situation tallies with the assertion made in the extract above (“individual 
editors… enforce and apply policies and guidelines.”), since only the officials hold the 
power to deliver sanctions such as blocking. What the extract probably means though is 
that it is the editors who shape policy (so they apply the law indirectly) and it is the 
editors who report unacceptable behaviour (so they “enforce” the law this way; they can 
post “warnings” on talk pages as well but such warnings do not truly serve any practical 
purpose).  
 
As for “unjust” regulations, Wikipedia does not have a specific page on that or anything 
to that effect; presumably, it is implied that either unjust regulations will be internally 
resolved by the community itself,305 or one can seek redress by going to the officials. 
That is from the perspective of consequence/conclusion of course. From the perspective 
of premise, we may either infer that unjust regulations simply do not even exist on 
Wikipedia (perhaps on the assumption that the community will naturally remove them or 
gravitate towards morally sound or community-accepted policies), or the issue of unjust 
regulations is not worth addressing at all by the community (at least not in the form of a 
dedicated policy page where the issues can be thrashed out). Editors who feel they have 
been unfairly treated by administrators are at liberty of course to: (1) avail themselves of 
                                                 
304 Supra, Wikipedia: Policies and guidelines, note 19 (emphasis in original). 
305 That is, editors will be the drivers for reform, using any of the available platforms for “consensus” 
building. 
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the various dispute resolution procedures, including the most drastic option of arbitration; 
(2) lodge a report at the administrators’ notice board where other officials can intervene if 
necessary; or (3) submit a request for comment regarding the use of administrator 
privileges.306 Similarly, there are a number of policy pages that deal with how to avoid 
administrator tools/privileges being abused, and what happens when such abuse takes 
place.307 But all these pages only touch on the unfair application of the regulations, and 
not unfair regulations per se. Even so, this produces a different corollary from a situation 
where a citizen in a municipal legal system faces an unjust law. In the eyes of the law in 
the latter, a citizen cannot refuse to recognise (other than through his own moral 
convictions in which such convictions do not act as a legal defence for disobedience) an 
unjust law as a binding law. He may try to have a court strike down the law as 
unconstitutional, but before all of that can happen, the law is still the law and non-
conformity can lead to sanctions or legal consequences. In Wikipedia, the door is 
seemingly left open for an editor to disregard a regulation as binding ab initio, on the 
basis that the regulation is unjust, makes no “sense”, contradicts “consensus”, or anything 
along those lines. Sanctions or legal consequences can be avoided if the editor makes a 
legitimate enough argument. And all of this is in tandem with and in the spirit of “we are 
not governed by rules” and “ignore all rules”.308  
 
Lastly, with regard to dispute resolution (vis-à-vis unfair treatment, as well as disputes 
with other editors either over article content or the application of regulations), there is an 
established 4-step process which editors are expected to follow: (1) first, consider if 
“positive methods” exist for helping avoid the dispute (e.g., discussion with the other 
party); (2) if those methods do not help, consider getting help in resolving the dispute 
(e.g., asking for a third opinion,309 or seeking mediation); (3) if the situation is urgent and 
quicker measures are required, administrators can be notified (e.g., oversight requests,310 
or reporting sock-puppetry); and (4) if all reasonable steps have already been taken to 
resolve the dispute, and the dispute is not about article content, arbitration can be 
requested.311 There appears to be sufficient regulations in place to ensure that disputes are 
resolved in a procedurally fair manner. For example, the procedures for investigating and 
                                                 
306 Supra, Wikipedia: Administrators, note 68. 
307 Id. See also Wikipedia: Administrators’ how-to-guide – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators%27_how-to_guide (last visited 
December 24, 2010); and Wikipedia: Administrators’ reading list – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators%27_reading_list (last visited 
December 24, 2010). 
308 Supra, VI(a), VI(b) and VI(c).  
309 Wikipedia: Third opinion – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Third_opinion (last visited December 24, 2010). 
310 Wikipedia: Requests for oversight – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_oversight (last visited December 
24, 2010). 
311 Wikipedia: Dispute resolution – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Dispute_resolution (last visited December 24, 
2010). 
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defending against sock-puppetry accusations are fairly clear and detailed.312 In arbitration 
– the highest and most complex form of dispute resolution in Wikipedia – there is 
similarly quite a high degree of accountability in the process and also when the decision 
is rendered.313 However, no guarantees as to substantive fairness are made. It bears 
repeating as well that editors are expected to exhaust local remedies before they should 
turn to the officials for help; and it is only in the most extreme cases that arbitration is 
convened.  
 
(1) Measuring against Hart 
 
The initial impression is that there is not much to comment about law enforcement in 
Hart’s world. In a generally efficacious and authoritative legal system, the rules confer 
the power on officials to act when citizens breach their legal obligations. The citizens 
recognise that the officials are empowered to do so. Likewise in Wikipedia, the 
regulations make it clear to the editors as to who possess the real powers of enforcement 
(the officials; so much for power to the editor). Where the difference sets in is perhaps in 
the role of the editor leading up to sanctions being imposed on the offender. To illustrate, 
imagine an editor is in a dispute with another over whether a biography contains 
sufficient coverage of a person’s “negative aspects”, like scandals and controversies in 
the person’s life (thus calling for an interpretation of WP:BLP).314 The dispute will 
primarily involve issues of referencing, weight, and maybe edit-warring. In more extreme 
cases, there may be issues of sock-puppetry, conflicts of interest, and threatening 
incivility. As all editing behaviours are logged, the editor who wishes to put the other in 
his place will be using these logs as the bases of his complaint to the administrator. He 
then becomes the gatherer of evidence and the advocate at the same time. He takes a 
much more active (albeit still indirect) role in law enforcement than in Hart’s world, 
where presumably a citizen will at most lodge a complaint and testify for the prosecution. 
Another difference is that for Hart, there is much more certainty in outcomes in law 
enforcement. The citizen is usually aware of the legal consequences of his actions, and 
his conduct is restrained accordingly (the efficiency and efficacy of the law enforcement 
agency being a separate issue). In Wikipedia, a society populated mostly by civil and 
educated people, law enforcement can be very arbitrary and politically driven. You may 
                                                 
312 Wikipedia: Sockpuppetry investigations – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Sockpuppet_investigations (last visited 
December 24, 2010). 
313 Wikipedia: Arbitration/policy – Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, 
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Wikipedia:Arbitration_policy (last visited December 24, 
2010): “During deliberations, the [Arbitration] Committee will construct a consensus opinion made out of 
principles (general statements about policy), findings of fact (findings specific to the case), remedies 
(binding decrees on what should be done), and enforcements (conditional Decrees on what can further be 
done if the terms are met). Each part will be subject to a simple-majority vote amongst active non-recused 
Arbitrators – the list of active members being that listed on Wikipedia:Arbitration Committee. Dissenting 
votes for and opinions on parts that pass will be noted. Arbitrators who abstain from a particular part will 
be treated as having recused from that part of the decision, which may lower the majority needed to pass 
that part. In the event of no options for action gaining majority support, no decision will be made, and no 
action will be taken.” Presumably, when no rules are found to apply to the dispute at hand, “common 
sense” will be used. 
314 Supra, Wikipedia: Biographies of living person, note 42. 
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be let go if you are a regular (immediately recognisable or otherwise), if you are a friend 
of many of the administrators, if you are in breach of less regulations than the other 
offender involved in the same dispute, or if a dispute is a highly sensitive one that lends 
itself easily to emotional arguments. Sometimes, you are simply presumed guilty because 
of your past conduct (which will all be logged). Again, this is not taking place in some 
primitive society with unsophisticated rules; and all this is without mentioning the 
unpredictability of the applicability of rules to begin with. 
 
For unjust laws, Hart is very upfront about positivism’s approach when faced with them: 
“it can be claimed for the simple positivist doctrine that morally iniquitous rules may still 
be law”.315 In The Concept of Law at least, he does not believe it is the place or role of 
legal positivism to offer us any resources or guidelines on how we can reform and 
respond to unjust laws, although he does have a theory on the minimum content of 
natural law.316 It is a bigger question mark if his theory accommodates the rather unique 
Wikipedia notion of a citizen disregarding a law ab initio, on the basis that it is unjust, 
makes no “sense”, or contradicts the prevailing community sentiments (“consensus”) on 
the issue. On the one hand, if everybody in a society were to behave like this, Hart will 
claim that the legal system has ceased to exist, for there is, inter alia, a total shift in the 
internal point of view (although it will be a curiosity as to how the officials will react in 
such a situation). On the other hand, certainly not everybody on Wikipedia behaves like 
this (nor has it ever happened before), and as I should repeat the actual situation: most 
people obey most of the regulations most of the time, and there is little to suggest, despite 
many grievances that can be and have been levelled against the project, that this is set to 
change anytime soon. Yet theory and reality should not be analytically divorced all the 
time if one is to be principled. That being the case, there will be a gap in the account. One 
way out is to consider unjust laws from the perspective of objectivity rather than 
subjectivity, but the escape will still not be complete because Hart does not even try to 
head anywhere in that direction. It is unclear if such an imposition will have been 
palatable to him anyway. 
 
Hart’s theory on dispute resolution focuses more on judicial adjudication. Specifically, he 
believes that adjudicators are rationally constrained to rely on rules for the most part (the 
“core” cases), and when the rules run out (the “penumbral” cases), they have a much 
larger measure of discretion to exercise.317 The reason he offers for this is that many 
words have a settled meaning such that when rules are formulated, people do not have 
real problems understanding what they require. As a subset of this, many cases will not 
get to be adjudicated because people are able to predict what and how the adjudicators 
will decide. There are 3 obvious criticisms that can emerge and they will be quickly 
mentioned here. First, uncertainty in rules is not confined to uncertainty in singular 
words, but is also found in phrases, sentences, and contexts, of which rules comprise. 
Uncertainty often manifests as spokes radiating from the centre of a wheel. Second, and 
again on the ground of limited dimension, Hart does not account for the fact that the 
choice to be made is not just as between different interpretations of a rule, but also as 
                                                 
315 Supra, The Concept of Law, note 25 at 212. See also supra, IV(e). 
316 Supra, IV(d). 
317 Supra, IV(f). 
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between competing norms.318 If competing norms are read broadly, all are applicable; if 
norms are read narrowly, there are gaps in the law. Third, many cases do not get 
adjudicated not simply because of the ease of prediction of outcomes. A case may not be 
adjudicated because a person lacks the resources to pursue such a long-drawn battle; a 
case may also not be adjudicated because it is in the human nature, for many at least, not 
to take every dispute to a litigious and adversarial setting. Despite these criticisms, Hart’s 
rules of adjudication have decent mileage in explaining how officials are authorised to 
decide disputes in Wikipedia. Furthermore, the internal point of view and secondary rules 
are helpful in explaining the editors’ acceptance of the outcomes of the disputes as 
binding (and final in some instances). In deciding cases in an unjust manner (substance 
over form), however, Hart, as he would for unjust laws, has no objections and believes 
the enterprise of criticising such laws is and should be separable from legal positivism. 
Perhaps too, he believes judges will be constrained by rules more often than not, and that 
the margin for injustice in the penumbra is an acceptable one. With a further 
incorporation of the minimum content of natural law, the likelihood of an eminently 
unjust system becomes slightly more remote.  
 
(2) Measuring against Finnis 
 
Finnis’ account of law enforcement has to be analogous as opposed to direct, and we will 
see a repetition of the points made in his take on authority and obedience.319 We saw 
earlier on that “the more likely it is that the participants themselves will think of 
themselves as a group, and look about for practices, usages, conventions, or ‘norms’ for 
solving their coordination problems, and/or for someone with authority to select among 
available solutions. Such norms will then be though of as norms of and for the group, and 
the leader(s) will be thought of as having authority in and over the group.”320 So for 
Finnis, persons who have the ability to “co-ordinate” participants in a group have the 
moral authority to lead; presumably, flowing from such authority is the appointment of 
executive agencies to enforce the law. We know of course that enforcement on Wikipedia 
has a different meaning than what Finnis is saying here; but if we characterise both the 
premise and conclusion of Finnis’ theory of law to be the pursuit of the common good, 
the difference may be narrowed if we can further demonstrate, for instance, that pro-
activity on the part of the editor on enforcing regulations comports with an amenable 
conception of the common good. Such demonstration, however, while clearly to be done 
within the analytical framework of the 9 basic goods and 7 basic requirements of 
practical reasonableness, does not clearly yield a straightforward application. The morass 
of all these ideals postulated by Finnis needs a consolidating and unifying force. 
Moreover, we get the same feeling as we did for Hart that a clearer (though not expressly 
in absolute terms) separation of powers and responsibilities was envisioned by Finnis, in 
the sense that it is neither realistic nor ideal for citizens to play a significant role in law 
enforcement.321  
                                                 
318 As is the case in real life litigation, a dispute on Wikipedia can involve competing norms, all of which 
can apply with considerable relevance to the issue at hand.  
319 Supra, VI(b). 
320 Supra, note 256 (emphasis in original). 
321 See also infra, note 322. 
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On the issue of unjust laws, Finnis helpfully identifies 4 different types of injustice in 
law:322 
 
First, since authority is derived solely from the needs of the common good, a 
ruler’s use of authority is radically defective if he exploits his opportunities by 
making stipulations intended by him not for the common good but for his own or 
his friends’ or party’s or faction’s advantage, or out of malice against some 
person or group… Secondly, since the location of authority is normally 
determined by authoritative rules dividing up authority and jurisdiction amongst 
separate office-holders, an office-holder may wittingly or unwittingly exploit his 
opportunity to affect people’s conduct, by making stipulations which stray 
beyond his authority. Except in ‘emergency’ situations… an ultra vires act is an 
abuse of power and an injustice to hose treated as subject to it… Thirdly, the 
exercise of authority in conformity with the Rule of Law normally is greatly to 
the common good… it is an important aspect of the commutative justice of 
treating people as entitled to the dignity of self-direction… and of the distributive 
justice of affording all an equal opportunity of understanding and complying with 
the law… Fourthly, what is stipulated may suffer from none of these defects of 
intention, author, and form, and yet be substantively unjust. It may be 
distributively unjust… commutatively unjust…” 
 
Finnis says that the foregoing injustices have an effect on our obligation to obey the law. 
There are 4 senses to the phrase “obligation to obey the law”, and it is the third sense that 
is relevant to us: “Given that legal obligation presumptively entails a moral obligation, 
and that the legal system is by and large just, does a particular unjust law impose upon 
me any moral obligation to conform to it?”323 Finnis provides 3 answers to this 
question:324 
 
Notoriously, many people (let us call them ‘positivists’) propose that this 
question should not be tackled in ‘jurisprudence’ but should be left to ‘another 
discipline’… Firstly, the proposed division is artificial to the extent that the 
arguments and counter-arguments which it is proposed to expel from 
jurisprudence are in fact… to be found on the lips of lawyers in court and of 
judges giving judgment… One will not understand either the ‘logic’ or the 
‘sociology’ of one’s own or anyone else’s legal system unless one is aware… 
how both the arguments in the courts, and the formulation of norms by 
‘theoretical’ jurists are affected, indeed permeated, by the vocabulary… of the 
‘ethics’ or ‘political philosophy’ of that community… [secondly] a jurisprudence 
which aspires to be more than the lexicography of a particular culture cannot 
solves its theoretical problems of definition or concept-formation unless it draws 
upon at least some of the considerations of values and principles of practical 
reasonableness which are he subject of ‘ethics’… [thirdly, the works of 
positivists] are replete with more or less undiscussed assumptions such as that the 
formal features of legal order contribute to the practical reasonableness of 
making, maintaining, and obeying law; that these formal features have some 
                                                 
322 Supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 352 to 354. 
323 Ibid at 357. 
324 Ibid at 357 to 359 (emphasis in original). 
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connection with the concept of justice and that, conversely, lawyers are justified 
in thinking of certain principles of justice as principles of legality [footnote 
omitted]; and that the fact that a stipulation is legally valid gives some reason, 
albeit not conclusive, for treating it as morally obligatory or morally permissible 
to act in accordance with it [footnote omitted].  
 
We have already clarified that Finnis accepts the difference between a focal theory of law 
and a mere theory of law,325 but in contradistinction to Hart, it is apparent that Finnis was 
more prepared to countenance the scenario of disobeying a regulation ab initio without 
necessarily having to pay a price in terms of legal consequences. 
 
Finally, we come to dispute resolution. Finnis devotes considerable length to expounding 
the concept of the rule of law, and there is every indication that under his theory (in the 
focal sense), legislators and adjudicators alike are excepted to uphold some substantive 
sense of the rule of law.326 He also explains:327 
 
Consider the act of the judge in giving judgment. The subject-matter of his 
judgment may be a matter of distributive justice… or again the subject-matter for 
adjudication may be a matter of commutative justice. But, whether the subject-
matter of his act of adjudication be a problem of distributive or commutative 
justice, the act of adjudication itself is always matter for distributive justice. For 
the submission of an issue to the judge itself creates a common subject matter… 
which must be allocated between parties, the gain of one party being the loss of 
the other. The biased or careless judge violates distributive justice by using an 
irrelevant criterion… in apportioning the merits and awarding judgment… But, 
finally, we can also consider the judge’s duty simply in so far as it is a duty to 
apply the relevant legal rules; in this respect his duty is one of commutative 
justice: faithful application of the law is simply what is fitting and required of 
him in his official dealings with others.  
 
We have seen that for the more complex dispute resolution procedures in Wikipedia, the 
regulations are designed to ensure at least procedural fairness or a procedural conception 
of the rule of law. That much Finnis has covered. For substantive fairness, Wikipedia 
does not devote much resources to what it means, save to imply that the constant 
engagement of reason as between editors will produce fair and equitable regulations and 
decisions. Finnis on the other hand suggests that engagements on such a horizontal plane 
will be less fruitful than if we have distinct legislative and adjudicative bodies that have 




Despite its claim that it is not a society governed by rules and that self-government is 
central to its identity, Wikipedia is still highly dependent on editor-conformity to its 
whole plethora of regulations to be a sustainable project.  Indeed, the distinct features of 
                                                 
325 Supra, V(b). 
326 E.g., supra, Natural Law and Natural Rights, note 25 at 270 to 279, 286 to 290. 
327 Ibid at 179 to 180. 
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the project, insofar as the relevant socio-legal questions are concerned, merit reiteration 
as we conclude: (1) there are many different types of regulations, ranging from mere 
etiquette to sanction-warranting offences; (2) regulations may or may not apply when 
disputes arise, with the applicability being potentially pitted against the invocation of 
“common sense” or the prevailing “consensus” on the issue;328 (3) although there are 
officials among the editors who possess the sole power to deliver sanctions and 
adjudicate over disputes, lawmaking (and the shaping of right about any regulation) is an 
activity that every editor can theoretically be a direct and active part of; (4) regulations 
can be made and/or changed by any editor at any time if there is no real objection; (5) old 
editors leave the project perhaps as often as new ones join the project, but there is always 
an “elite” core of editors who have that extra stamina and appetite to run the system (i.e. 
shaping policies and determining the direction of articles); (6) most of the editors adhere 
to most of the regulations most of the time,329 but there is a distinct pattern of avoiding 
violations of egregious offences while taking greater chances and pushing the envelope 
with less egregious offences;330 (7) regulations surrounding the more egregious offences 
are more nuanced and complex; (8) the development of the system of regulations in 
Wikipedia finds a modern parallel in various facets and trends of international law; and 
(9) perhaps most importantly, instead of a rigid insistence on rules or embarking on the 
impossible task of formulating all rules in advance, community members are expected to 
reason with one another in all interactions and it is only when that fails, that a stronger 
insistence on rules is called upon.  
 
Hart did claim his theory covered most appropriately municipal legal systems.331 Even so, 
there are obviously many aspects of his theory that help explain the social phenomenon 
of law as a wider concept. His conception of rules – how to separate legal rules from non-
legal rules, the internal point of view, what happens when rules run out, and the 
connection between rules and morality – is able to account to a significant extent how 
regulations on Wikipedia work. His theory is not so successful in accounting for the 
Wikipedia system in the following ways: (1) even the secondary rules do not sit 
comfortably with two key policies of Wikipedia, i.e., “ignore all rules” and “anybody can 
make the rules”; (2) his theory on obedience and authority does not seem to have 
contemplated the sort of self-governing societies like Wikipedia; (3) his theory on 
lawmaking also does not seem to have contemplated self-governing societies, and it is 
submitted, inaccurately assumes that anything that does not resemble a municipal legal 
system is less sophisticated; (4) his theory of secondary rules has no answer to arbitrary 
                                                 
328 Incidentally, Ronald Dworkin’s separation of rules and principles may have considerable explanatory 
effect in this context: that principles are not applied in an all-or-nothing fashion; are not treated as 
valid/invalid; merely state a reason to argue in a particular direction; and possess a dimension of weight or 
importance. 
329 We pay homage here to the well-known quote on international law made by Professor Henkin in Louis 
Henkin, How Nations Behave, (1979) at 47: “It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost 
all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” 
330 One very plausible reason as to why greater tolerance of the breach of rules is exercised towards editing 
disputes is that in cyberspace, with the cloak and shield of anonymity and the lack of face-to-face 
confrontation, it is inevitable that people dare to do things they would not in real life (such as name calling 
and behaving belligerently). 
331 Supra, note 25. 
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and politically driven law enforcement in what is otherwise a longstanding and stable 
legal order; (5) his theory does not permit a citizen’s disregarding a law ab initio on 
normative grounds without legal consequences; and (6) his theory of the core and the 
penumbra does not go far enough in explaining more complex disputes. In so doing, the 
core may be smaller and the penumbra larger as he might have conceived.   
 
As for Finnis, insofar as the predominant ethos of Wikipedia is the use of reason and 
logic to bridge differences and bind people together, we find resonance of this in Finnis’ 
conception of the common good (which is supposed to be a powerful end product of 
reason). The main point of divergence is that Finnis (and Hart as well) imagines a world 
where leaders (such as legislators and judges) are required to “co-ordinate” society – to 
provide moral leadership. This is not so much imagination perhaps, because such social 
structures are have been a mainstay in many societies anyway. Other aspects of the socio-
legal structure of Wikipedia that Finnis’ theory is unable to speak much to include: (1) 
whether the common good is compatible with the aforementioned policies of “ignore all 
rules” and “anybody can make the rules”; (2) whether the common good can be pursued 
at the level Finnis imagines it when the community is self-governing, self-legislating, and 
to a lesser extent, self-judging. It seems that good moral leadership is integral to key 
areas of his theory; and (3) whether the common good is compatible with the concept of 
proactive law enforcement on the part of editors who are not officials. 
 
In analysing Wikipedia from a socio-legal viewpoint, we see familiar and unprecedented 
elements. In its own sort of way, it may or may not portend a future of global governance, 
global citizenship, and how new ideals of freedom may be obtained through constant 
reasoning processes (instead of strict application of rules) – only time will tell if these can 
be transplanted into the “real” world. Hart and Finnis, in their positivistic and normative 
accounts (which purportedly can be combined analytically) of how to identify the law 
and what the law should be, have commendably laid the foundations for us. The socio-
legal model of Wikipedia demonstrates that under the right circumstances, certain 
societies rely greater on the constituents’ internal calibration towards a sense of collective 
good (through reasoning), rather than an insistence on clear signs on what the law is and 
is not, and what the law should be and should not. 
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